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AT MIDNIGHT  on June  30, 1990,  German  economic, monetary,  and social 
union occurred: the mark of the German Democratic Republic was 
replaced  by the deutsche mark;  trade  barriers  were lifted;  legal, tax, and 
social insurance  systems were harmonized;  and all existing barriers  to 
capital  and  labor  movements  were removed.  Within  days a severe price- 
cost squeeze was apparent.  East German  producers  could not profitably 
sell their goods at prices that buyers-East  German,  West German,  or 
foreign-were  willing  to pay. Moreover, demand  for domestically  pro- 
duced output  fell as consumers  diverted  their spending  toward  Western 
products. As a result, there was a severe decline in output;  unemploy- 
ment and short-time  hours rose rapidly.  One of the worst and sharpest 
depressions  in European  history  had  begun. It continues  unabated. 
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This paper will document the basic facts of the depression: the 
behavior of output, employment, wages, prices, vacancies, and other 
macroeconomic  aggregates.  We then explore the twin reasons for the 
depression: producers cannot supply products at market prices and 
cover their short-run  variable costs; and there were declines in the 
demand  for domestically  produced  consumer  and investment  goods. 
We  examine  the consequences  of the price-cost  squeeze for  the goods, 
labor, and asset markets. In the market for goods, we calculate the 
fraction of East German conglomerates that are unable to sell their 
products  at world  market  prices while meeting  their  variable  costs. Our 
estimates are based on unique unpublished  data, which give the mark 
expense that each major  conglomerate  in the GDR incurred  in 1989  to 
earn  a deutsche  mark  of foreign  currency  through  trade  with  nonsocialist 
countries.  We adjust  these expense figures  to take account  of important 
changes  that  have affected  the costs of East German  firms  since currency 
union. The adjusted  data show that firms  employing  only 8 percent of 
the labor  force were "viable" after union, in the sense that they could 
earn sufficient  revenue to cover short-run  variable  costs in the absence 
of significant  productivity  improvements.  These calculations  undermine 
prior  estimates  of high  productivity  in socialist countries. 
The second consequence of the price-cost squeeze has been the high 
incidence  of unemployment  and short-time  work, a labor-market  devel- 
opment that is expected to continue. In the state treaty authorizing 
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currency  union, wages in mark  were converted into deutsche mark  at 
par. At the time of currency  union, these wages were well above market 
clearing, so that firms  could not profitably  employ much of their labor. 
With this large, and growing, slack in the labor market, downward 
pressure  on wages might  have been anticipated.  Instead  wages climbed 
still higher  in the wake of currency  union as labor  unions pressed for a 
schedule  to attain  wage parity  despite  the economic collapse in the East. 
For example, a pattern-setting  contract  signed in March  with the metal 
workers'  union, IG Metall,  achieves parity  in 1994.  In arguing  for higher 
wages, the unions have said that such wage hikes are needed to keep 
qualified  Eastern  workers  from migrating  to the West. We conducted  a 
survey of East German  workers  in order  to determine  their propensity 
to migrate  and the factors likely to influence  their decisions. We found 
that few workers  will migrate  for higher  Western  wages; most prefer  to 
work in the East in spite of the wage differential  and most are prepared 
to wait for new  jobs there if they become unemployed.  They will accept 
jobs in the East that pay significantly  less than those in the West. Thus 
the survey results suggest that the real cause of most migration  will be 
the lack of Eastern  jobs-not  the wage differential.  Higher  wages will 
cause more migration  by increasing  unemployment  than  they will deter 
by closing the wage gap. Unless  policies are undertaken to lower 
unemployment,  a significant  proportion  of the population  will migrate. 
Migration, then, together with investment, will eventually cure the 
Eastern  unemployment  problem. 
We also examine the consequences of the price-cost squeeze for the 
Treuhandanstalt,  the newly formed agency that holds the shares of 
former state-owned enterprises of the GDR in trust for the German 
government  and is charged with privatizing  them. The task has gone 
slowly.  Bureaucratic problems and confusion over property rights 
account  for some delays, but they are not the fundamental  causes of the 
Treuhand's  difficulties.  The fundamental  impediment  to privatization  is 
that the majority  of East German  firms  have negative  value if they are 
operated,  since their  costs exceed their  revenue. Such firms  can be sold 
for their real-estate  or scrap value, but not to individuals  or firms  who 
will operate  them. Currently  the Treuhandanstalt  is faced with a choice 
of either  subsidizing  or liquidating  such money-losing  firms. 
At the present time the German  government  is offering  subsidies to 
encourage  investment  spending  in the East. They are also financing  the 4  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
budget  deficits  of the Eastern  Lander  (states)  to permit  them  to pay their 
bills and  make  needed  infrastructure  investments.  Infrastructure  invest- 
ments are important  because they constitute a precondition  for private 
investment  on a significant  scale. Moreover, these job-creating  invest- 
ments are especially cheap at present. They enable individuals  whose 
support would otherwise be provided by the government to support 
themselves. If a typical individual  moves from unemployment  to em- 
ployment,  the government  budget  benefits  by an estimated  79.1 percent 
of his or her previous compensation  because of reduced  payments  for 
unemployment  compensation  and increased  revenue from social insur- 
ance and tax contributions. 
So far, however, the package of policies that has been enacted fails 
to deal realistically  with the questions of how to preserve  existing  jobs, 
how to speed new job creation, and how to make existing companies 
viable enough to be privatized.  The major  problem  is that wages in the 
East are too high  for most former  state-owned  enterprises  to cover their 
costs. High wages also deter new investment. This creates an obvious 
need for governmental  measures to close the gap between the high 
private  cost of labor,  caused  by high  Eastern  wages, and  the low marginal 
product of labor, caused by outmoded capital and technology. We 
propose a program of self-eliminating  flexible employment bonuses 
(SEFEBs) to eliminate  this gap. Our  analysis shows that such a program 
would give many workers a chance to keep their  jobs and would also 
raise the level of new job creation through  faster private investment. 
According  to our estimates, even deep wage subsidies (for example, an 
employment  bonus equal to 75 percent of current  wages) would have 
very low budgetary  costs. They might even reduce budget deficits- 
largely  for the same reason that infrastructure  investment  is not costly: 
the government  is already  committed  to a high level of income support 
even if workers are unemployed. By making many Treuhand  firms 
profitable,  employment  bonuses would permit  their  rapid  privatization. 
Privatized firms will speed the transition to a modern economy by 
introducing  Western  management,  technology, and work  habits. 
To promote  these ends we propose  two policies: a rapid  infrastructure 
investment program and a program of employment bonuses. These 
policies address  the twin East German  problems  of insufficient  demand 
and  a severe price-cost squeeze. Such programs  are needed  for the East 
German  miracle  to begin. George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  5 
Finally, by way of introduction,  we should  emphasize  that the focus 
of this paper is the economic situation in East Germany. Thus, only 
tangentially  do we discuss the effects of currency union on the West 
German  economy; we do not address at all the effects on the rest of 
Europe or on European  integration.  These other issues are important; 
they are not, however, the topic of this paper.' 
Macroeconomics  of Currency Union 
In this section we describe the macroeconomic consequences of 
currency  union for the product  and labor markets  and then address  the 
issue of why output  fell. 
Output, Employment,  Prices,  and  Wages 
The most immediate  and striking  consequence of currency  union  was 
a depression  in East Germany  virtually  without historic precedent. By 
December 1990  production  of goods was about 46 percent of its 1989 
level. As table 1 shows, much of this decline was concentrated  in July 
1990, the first month of union. During  this month, industrial  output in 
East Germany plunged 35 percent. The decline in output has been 
widespread,  affecting  every major  industrial  sector and virtually  every 
commodity.  Table  2 provides  indexes of output  for ten industrial  sectors 
and shows that no sector escaped the East German  depression. Disag- 
gregated  data  on the production  of selected commodities  reveal  dramatic 
examples  of the severity of the depression:  by December 1990  output  of 
cement was 21 percent of its December 1989  level, bicycle output was 
37 percent, cellulose was  25 percent, and pasta products were 27 
percent.2 
While direct measures  of output  provide clear evidence of a decline 
in the production  of manufactured  goods, no comparable  output  meas- 
ures  are  available  for other  sectors of the economy. Employment  figures, 
however, provide  indirect  evidence of substantial  declines in economic 
1. For an excellent survey of such issues see Lipschitz and McDonald  (1990). Our 
analysis  of the causes of the East German  depression  and  our  policy recommendations  to 
alleviate  it are  close to those of Schmieding  (1991). 
2. Monatszahlen,  December  1990,  3. Folge, pp. 30-34. 6  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Table 1.  Output, Labor Productivity, and Employment in East Germany,  1986-90 
Labor  Employmenta  (in thousands) 
Industrial  productivity 
output  (September  Transportation  and 
Period  (1989  = 100)  1989=100)  Industry  Construction  communications  Trade 
1986  92.1  ...  3,224  475  608  784 
1987  94.8  ...  3,212  470  613  786 
1988  97.7  ...  3,214  467  617  788 
1989  100.0  .  3,193  460  619  784 
1989 
Fourth  quarter  ...  ...  3,153  454  615  783 
October  100.6  101.2  ...  ...  ...  ... 
November  98.6  100.2  ...  ...  ...  ... 
December  97.6  99.7  ...  ...  ...  ... 
1990 
First  quarter  ...  ...  3,086  439  613  760 
January  94.4  98.1  ...  ...  ...  ... 
February  96.6  100.3  ...  ...  ...  ... 
March  97.8  101.7  ...  ..  .. 
Second  quarter  ...  ...  2,961  371  580  722 
April  97.0  101.6  ...  ...  ... 
May  92.1  97.1  ...  ...  ...  ... 
June  86.0  93.5  ...  ...  . 
Third  quarter  ...  ...  2,690  359  554  654 
July  56.0  64.9  2,777  361  553  671 
August  47.9  56.8  2,710  367  558  661 
September  48.9  ...  2,584  350  552  634 
Fourth  quarter  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
October  49.5  ...  2,452  343  525  582 
November  50.9  ...  2,388  337  512  554 
December  45.5  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Sources: Monatszahlen,  November  1990,  pp. 16-18, and December  1990,  3. Folge, pp. 9-11 and 18. 
a. The employment  figures  show the number  of wage and salary  workers. 
activity  outside  of manufacturing.  Table 1 shows the number  of employ- 
ees, including  short-time  workers, in four sectors of the East German 
economy. By November 1990 the number of employees in industry, 
construction, transportation  and communications, and trade had de- 
clined  by 25, 27, 17,  and  29  percent  respectively, when compared  to their 
1989  averages. These employment  declines substantially  understate  the 
decline in manhours  worked because by November 1990, 20.1 percent 
of the work force had been placed on involuntary  "short  time" by their 
firms  and were working  roughly  half of normal  time.3  Further,  as table 1 
3.  German  labor  laws allow firms  with temporary  difficulties  to introduce  a program 
referred  to as "short time"; Eastern  firms  have special leeway in placing  employees on 
short  time for longer  durations  until  the end of 1991.  See Suddeutsche  Zeitung, January 
10, 1991,  p. 26. Workers  on short  time are paid  roughly  two-thirds  of previous  net wages George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  7 
Table 2.  Indexes of Output and Producer Prices by Industrial Sector,  1990 
Index,  1989 =  100 
Index  of producer 
Index of industrial  output  pricesa 
Industrial  sector  May  July  October December  May  July  August 
Total industry  92.1  56.0  49.5  45.5  98.4  51.7  48.8 
Energyb  85.9  52.9  58.9  71.8  105.1  97.6  98.1 
Water supplyb  101.0  93.2  91.1  96.4  122.2  122.8  126.2 
Chemicals  85.5  61.8  47.3  46.3  99.0  31.3  31.9 
Metallurgy  91.9  39.8  30.1  23.7  99.9  44.1  41.2 
Building  materials  102.8  61.8  33.9  22.6  100.6  80.1  78.5 
Machinery  and transportation 
equipment  101.3  70.7  61.8  60.0  103.5  66.1  61.8 
Electronics  100.5  68.6  56.0  41.3  71.7  40.6  43.3 
Light  industry  (excluding 
textiles)  88.4  48.9  47.7  39.4  102.9  51.2  52.0 
Textiles  81.8  47.8  44.2  29.1  100.7  31.7  31.1 
Food  90.0  40.8  45.1  43.4  91.4  60.4  53.9 
Sources:  Industrial  output:  Monatszahlen,  December  1990,  3. Folge, p. 22. Producer  prices:  Statistisches  Amt  der 
DDR, "Indizes  der  Erzeugerpreise  gewerblicher  industrieller  Produkte,"  Heft  6, July 1990,  and  Heft 8, August  1990. 
a. Prices  before  July 1, 1990,  are  Industrieabgabepreise  in mark  of the GDR.  These  prices  include  product-specific 
taxes and subsidies  levied at the producer  level. Prices  after  July 1, 1990,  are in deutsche  mark. 
b. Prices  in these sectors  continued  to be set officially  even after  currency  union. 
shows, industrial  output declined by more than industrial  employment 
so that labor productivity  in East German  industry  fell after currency 
union. If,  as  seems likely, this same pattern holds elsewhere, the 
employment declines in the nonindustrial  sectors reported in table 1 
understate  the relevant  output  declines in these sectors as well. 
As East German  output  has declined, substantial  slack  has developed 
in the labor market. The evolution of unemployment,  short-time  em- 
ployment, and vacancies is reported  in table 3. By February 1991  the 
unemployment  rate had reached 8.9 percent and an additional 21.5 
percent of the work force was on involuntary  short time. This was not 
accompanied  by an expansion of new job openings; rather,  vacancies 
plummeted.  By January  1991  vacancies stood at a mere 15 percent of 
their level a year earlier. The rising unemployment over  1990 was 
(68 percent  for workers  with children,  63 percent  for those without)  by the state. Many 
wage contracts  in East Germany  stipulate  that the firm  must also pay an additional  22 
percent  of the wage. Unemployed  individuals  who participate  in training  programs  for at 
least 25 hours  a week get 73 percent  of previous  net wages if they have children  and 65 
percent  if they  do not. It  is commonly  assumed  that  most  short-time  workers  will  ultimately 
become  unemployed. 8  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Table 3.  The Employment Situation in East Germany, 1990-91 
Thousands  of workers,  except where noted 
Unemployment  Short time 
Month  Number  Ratea  Number  Ratea  Vacancies 
1990 
January  7.4  ...  ...  ...  158.6 
February  11.0  ...  ...  ...  141.4 
March  38.3  ..  ...  ...  105.9 
April  64.8  ...  ...  ...  73.6 
May  94.8  ...  ...  ...  54.3 
June  142.1  1.6  ...  ...  41.4 
July  272.0  3.1  656.3  7.4  27.7 
August  361.3  4.1  1,499.9  16.9  20.4 
September  444.9  5.0  1,728.7  19.3  24.3 
October  536.8  6.1  1,703.8  19.1  24.7 
November  589.2  6.7  1,709.9  20.1  23.8 
December  642.2  7.3  1,795.4  20.5  22.6 
1991 
January  757.2  8.6  1,856.0  21.1  23.0 
February  787.0  8.9  1,900.0  21.5  ... 
Source: Motnatszahlen, December  1990,  3. Folge,  p. 12;  Bundesanstalt  fur  Arbeit,  Arbeitsmarkt  in  Zahlen:  Aktuelle 
Eckdaten  fur  das Beitrittsgebiet,  January  1991,  Niirnberg,  p. 2; Konjuntzktur  Aktuell,  January  1991,  Anhang  11,  p. 72. 
a. The rates  shown  are the number  of unemployed  or short-time  workers  as a percent  of the civilian  work  force. 
accompanied by a fall in vacancies, with an almost perfect fit of 
unemployment  and vacancies to an unshifting  rectangular  hyperbolic 
Beveridge  curve. 
The decline in East German  output  was also accompanied  by equally 
large declines in East German  producer  prices. Beginning  on July 1, 
1990, East German  firms  were required  to set prices for their goods in 
deutsche  mark;  before  July 1, all prices had been quoted  in mark.  Firms 
in  industries  other  than  energy  and  water  supply  were  given  full  discretion 
to set product  prices. Table 2 shows the evolution of producer  prices 
between May 1990  and  August 1990  by industrial  sector. As is apparent, 
firms  used their  new discretion  to lower prices substantially-by almost 
50 percent  between May and  July. 
Although producer  prices were roughly halved following currency 
union, the average of  consumer  prices remained almost unchanged 
through  the end of 1990.  Two main  reasons were that rent, energy, and 
transportation  prices in the consumer  price  index (CPI)  were frozen and 
that retail food  subsidies were removed, driving up the CPI food 
component  even though  food in the producer  price  index (PPI)  declined George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  9 
sharply.  In January  1991  subsidies on energy were ended and those on 
transportation  were eliminated.  Table 4 provides a detailed  breakdown 
of the behavior  of the CPI  before and after  union. 
The divergent movements of producer  and consumer prices led to 
divergent  movements  in real product  and real consumption  wages-the 
ratio  of gross wages to product  prices and  the ratio  of gross wages to the 
cost of living  respectively. Because the treaty  governing  currency  union 
specified  that  contractual  wage and  salary  payments  would  be converted 
from mark to deutsche mark at par and because preexisting wage 
contracts  remained  unchanged  in nominal  terms while producer  prices 
fell roughly 50 percent, real product wages approximately  doubled in 
July 1990.4 In contrast, real (gross) consumption wages rose only 
minimally during July. This characterization  of real wage behavior, 
however, abstracts from the large changes in nominal wages that 
occurred during 1990 both before and after currency union. Table 5 
tabulates  average  gross  monthly  wages  forfull-time  workers  by industrial 
sector. Nominal wages in industry  rose almost 42 percent between the 
first quarter  of 1990 and October 1990, with about 23 percent of this 
increase occurring  prior to currency union.5  As a consequence, real 
product wages in East Germany  almost tripled  between January  1990 
and October 1990, while real (gross) consumption wages increased 
roughly  45 percent over this same period. Finally, in contrast  to the 42 
percent  rise  in nominal  wages, net wages rose by only 22  percent  through 
October 1990  according  to our estimates.6  The difference  is due to the 
4. The increase in real labor cost per manhour  was even larger  because employer 
contributions  to social  insurance  rose from 12.5  percent  of gross wages  to 18.25  percent  of 
gross wages  in July. 
5. This increase  may be somewhat  misleading  because nominal  wages do not include 
various  wage premiums  and fringe  benefits, which may be very different  after  currency 
union. 
6.  No data  are  yet available  on net wages  after  currency  union.  We  estimate,  however, 
that  net wages  as of October  had  risen  about  22  percent.  The  adoption  of the FRG  tax code 
and social insurance  system led to higher  payroll  tax deductions  for Eastern workers: 
average  income  tax payments  fell, but  by less than  social  security  taxes rose. A gross  wage 
increase  of roughly  10  percent  was required  to "compensate"  Eastern  workers  for these 
changes. In addition,  the marginal  rate of taxation  of approximately  20 percent  is now 
considerably  greater  than  the  average  rate  of taxation  of about  4.5 percent.  Thus,  percentage 
increases  in net wages  are  considerably  less than  percentage  increases  in gross  wages. Our 
estimate  assumes  identical  treatment  of Eastern  and  Western  workers  under  the German 
income  tax code. In February  1991  new tax allowances  were  granted  in East  Germany  that 
raise  net income  slightly  relative  to these calculations. 00'  00'  W),  all  e  . 
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Table 5.  Monthly Wages by Industrial Sector,  1988-90a 
Mark  before July 1990,  deutsche mark  thereafter 
1990 
First  Second 
Industrial  sector  1988  1989  quarter  quarter  Julyb  October" 
Total industry  1,041  1,072  1,089  1,205  1,335  1,545 
Energy  1,202  1,229  1,228  1,385  1,454  1,798 
Water  supply  985  1,020  1,051  1,228  1,238  1,579 
Chemicals  1,075  1,112  1,115  1,283  1,494  1,582 
Metallurgy  1,116  1,140  1,132  1,335  1,352  1,547 
Building  materials  1,012  1,045  1,081  1,230  1,307  1,593 
Machinery  and transporta- 
tion equipment  1,073  1,101  1,124  1,229  1,410  1,574 
Electronics  1,045  1,069  1,091  1,195  1,367  1,502 
Light industry  (excluding 
textiles)  946  978  994  1,062  1,117  1,415 
Textiles  943  978  994  1,048  1,069  1,401 
Food  965  1,003  1,032  1,142  1,187  1,482 
Source: 1988  and 1989:  Statistisches  Amt  der DDR,  Jahrbuch,  Arbeitskrafte  und  Lohne, 1989,  pp. 74-78;  first  and 
second  quarter  1990:  Statistisches  Amt  der  DDR, "Arbeiter  und  Angestellte  und  deren  Bruttolohne  nach  Wirtschafts- 
bereichen  und  Sektoren  im 1. Halbjahr  1990,"  Berlin,  August  24, 1990,  p. 6; July  1990  and  October  1990:  Gemeinsames 
Statistisches  Amt, unpublished  data. 
a. The average  gross monthly  wage per full-time  employee  is shown. 
b. Data for July and October  1990  are reported  according  to the sectoral  classification  used in the former  GDR. 
Data  for  these same  months  reported  according  to the West  German  sectoral  classifications  are  available  in Konjunktur 
Aktuell,  January  1991,  Anhang  II, p. 69. 
high  West German  rate  of social security  taxation  and the high  marginal 
tax rate on income. This calculation omits, however, the possibly 
substantial  real income gains that occurred when imported  consumer 
goods, unavailable  prior to currency union, became freely available. 
Estimates  of the change  in the cost of living, which are based on a fixed 
consumption bundle, omit the gains from this enormous increase in 
choice.7 
In summary,  tables 1 through  5 reveal the major consequences of 
currency  union  for output, employment,  wages, and prices: output  and 
producer  prices each fell by roughly  50 percent while the cost of living 
remained  virtually  unchanged.  The precipitous  declines that occurred 
in output and prices were concentrated in July 1990-the  month of 
currency union. Employment has declined and short-time work has 
7.  Collier (1985) estimated the magnitude  of these gains at 13 percent of nominal 
income for a family  of four in the GDR in 1977.  Collier  used household  budget  data  and 
assumed  identical  preferences  in the two Germanys  in order  to quantify  the gap between 
effective and  notional  purchasing  power  caused  by quantity  constraints  in the GDR. 12  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
increased significantly,  albeit more gradually.  As a consequence, pro- 
ductivity  had  declined  dramatically  as of October 1990.  Over  30 percent 
of East Germans are now unemployed or employed on short time; 
vacancies  have all  but  disappeared.  In spite  of this, wages have increased 
substantially  and continue  to rise.8 
Why Did Output Decline? 
According  to the theory  of comparative  advantage,  removing  barriers 
to trade in a small open economy like East Germany  causes the prices 
of tradable goods to  attain equality with those prevailing in world 
markets.  As relative  product  prices change, profitability  rises in sectors 
with comparative  advantage  (that  is, relatively  low costs), providing  an 
incentive for expansion in output;  the opposite happens  in sectors with 
comparative  disadvantage. 
If all factor prices, including  wage rates, are flexible, no involuntary 
unemployment  occurs when free trade  is instituted,  even in the extreme 
case in which labor and capital are completely immobile. Voluntary 
unemployment will undoubtedly occur, however, as workers leave 
declining sectors and move to expanding sectors in search of higher 
wages, perhaps  retraining  in the process.9 
The comparative  advantage  paradigm  offers clear predictions con- 
cerning  the behavior  of macroeconomic  aggregates  following  a move to 
8. Throughout  this paper  we rely on data  collected in the former  GDR, the accuracy 
of which might  be questioned.  In many cases, secrecy in the former  GDR led to sins of 
omission  rather  than  of commission  in GDR statistics.  For a discussion  see Collier  (1985, 
pp. 134-40). Since March 1990,  much previously  unobtainable  information  has become 
available. 
9. This is the model that has been applied  to unemployment  in the United States by 
Lilien (1982)  and Davis (1987).  The fraction  of the labor  force in various  sectors in East 
Germany  is quite  different  from  that  in West  Germany.  The proportions  of employment  in 
agriculture,  manufacturing,  construction,  transportation  and communications,  and trade 
in the GDR in 1989  were 10.8 percent, 43.7 percent, 6.7 percent, 7.6 percent, and 10.2 
percent  respectively,  compared  to 3.9 percent,  33.1 percent,  6.6 percent,  5.6 percent,  and 
13.0  percent  in the FRG. See Schnabel  (1990,  table 2). It is likely that the East German 
percentages  will ultimately  approach  those in West Germany  as the technology gap is 
eliminated  as a result  of the similarity  in factor  endowments.  Restructuring  industry  in the 
East will also be necessary because employment  is currently  concentrated  in extremely 
large  firms;  88 percent  of GDR  employees  in industry  in 1989  worked  in firms  with  at least 
500  employees,  compared  to only 38 percent  of FRG  employees  in 1987.  See Statistisches 
Bundesamt  (1990,  pp. 118-19)  and  Statistisches  Amt der  DDR  (1990,  p. 161). George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  13 
free trade:  output  and employment  should expand in some sectors and 
contract  in  others. Unemployment  should  rise  as workers  leave contract- 
ing industries,  but vacancies should  also rise as new jobs are created  in 
the expanding  sectors; the Beveridge curve should shift outward.  The 
predictions  of the theory of comparative  advantage  have been grossly 
violated in the East German  case. Output  and employment  have con- 
tracted in all sectors-not  just in some. The Beveridge curve has not 
shifted  outward;  rather,  the East German  economy has moved along a 
fixed Beveridge  curve. 
The predictions  of the theory of comparative  advantage  do not apply 
in the East German case for one overriding reason: wages in East 
Germany  have been well above the full-employment,  market-clearing 
level. A significant  gap  between  actual  and  market-clearing  wages  existed 
at the time of currency union; since that time, nominal wages have 
continued to rise. For this reason, the advent of free trade on July 1 
placed  the majority  of East German  firms  in a severe price-cost  squeeze. 
Few firms  producing  tradable  goods could cover their  short-run  variable 
costs at the wage rates prevailing  on July 1, and this would have been 
the case even if they had been able to sell their goods immediately,  in 
unlimited  quantities  at world  prices. This has been the first  cause of the 
current  depression  in East Germany. 
The second reason for the swift decline in output  was the sharp  drop 
in demand for Eastern goods after currency union. Demand declined 
because East German  consumers  and  firms  diverted  their  spending  away 
from  East  German  consumption  and  investment  goods  toward  previously 
unavailable  Western products on a massive scale. It seems likely that 
total investment  spending  also declined. In 1991  exports to Council  for 
Mutual  Economic Assistance (CMEA)  countries will also decline, de- 
pressing  demand  further.  Even in the absence  of any  price-cost  squeeze, 
such declines in demand  would have reduced  output in East Germany 
because most Eastern firms faced highly inelastic short-run  demand 
curves for their goods in world markets. These firms, abandoned  by 
their traditional  customers, simply could not find enough new buyers 
quickly  enough  to avoid a significant  slump  in sales-even  if their costs 
were at or below world prices. In addition,  a number  of miscellaneous 
factors, which are beyond the scope of this paper, such as the lack of 
compatibility  of Eastern  goods and  Western  standards,  and  environmen- 
tal and safety problems,  contributed  to the decline in output. 14  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
The two major  factors that account for the decline in output can be 
illustrated  in the standard  demand  and  supply  framework  shown  in  figure 
1. The curve SS depicts the East German supply curve of a typical 
tradable good as a function of its producer price in deutsche mark 
following currency conversion at initial money wage rates. Assuming 
putty-clay  technology, short-run  average  variable  cost is constant  at the 
level p5.  At this minimum  price, supply  is perfectly  elastic up to capacity, 
Yf.  The value of p depends critically on the value of the wage, which 
was, at least initially,  proportional  to the exchange rate of unity chosen 
to convert  wage contracts  denominated  in mark  into their  deutsche  mark 
equivalents. 10 
The curve LRD depicts the long-run  demand curve for the typical 
tradable  good. Long-run  demand is assumed to be infinitely  elastic at 
the world  price  p*. In the situation  depicted  in figure  1,  p5  exceeds p*, so 
that the firm-in  the absence of technological  change, improved  labor 
productivity,  or new product design-must  go bankrupt  unless subsi- 
dized. At the wages prevailing  at currency union, most East German 
firms  faced bankruptcy-the situation  illustrated  in this figure. 
The curve SRD  depicts the short-run  demand for the typical East 
German  tradable  good after  currency  union.  It is not  fully  elastic because 
of difficulties in finding new customers on the part of firms and in 
switching  suppliers  on the part  of customers. As drawn,  the demand  for 
the tradable  good after currency union amounts to Y, at the long-run 
equilibrium  price, p*. Sales fall short of Yf,  capacity output, because 
East German consumers prior to  currency union had been denied 
freedom  of choice. When trade  barriers  were lifted, expenditures  were 
diverted  toward  previously unavailable  Western  products. In order  for 
firms to sell their capacity output in the short run, prices for Eastern 
goods would have had to fall below p*, the long-run  equilibrium  level, 
to p, in figure 1. 
For  most  tradable  goods, market  equilibrium  following  currency  union 
is illustrated by point E in figure 1: sales fall far short of capacity 
production,  and deutsche mark  prices are above the level required  for 
full employment in either the short run (p5)  or the long run (p*). The 
output  decline, from Yf  to YO,  can be conceptually  decomposed  into two 
10. Assuming  that  different  firms  have different  values of p, the economy's aggregate 
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Figure 1.  The Decline in Output of East German Tradable Goods 
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The distance  between  Y, and  YO  is the change in quantity due to the price-cost  squeeze.  The distance  between  Yf 
and  Y1 is the change  in quantity due to the demand shift. 
independent  portions:  the portion  due to the demand  switch away from 
East German  products and the portion due to the price-cost squeeze. 
The distance Yf  -  Y1  represents  the decline in output  due to the demand 
shift. The distance Y1  -  YO  represents  the decline in output  due to the 
price-cost squeeze-the  loss in sales that occurred  because firms  could 
not price their products competitively and still cover short-run  costs. 
Because the Treuhandanstalt  has thus far provided  loans and subsidies 
that allow firms  to sell their products  at prices below short-run  variable 
cost, the decline in output  due to the price-cost  squeeze has not yet fully 
materialized. 16  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
The Price-Cost Squeeze 
This section documents  that  wages are in fact above market  clearing. 
That is,  at prevailing Eastern wages and world market prices most 
Eastern  firms  that  produce  tradable  goods are  unable  to cover even their 
short-run  costs of production.  We later  discuss the various  factors that 
account  for the behavior  of wages. 
Domestic  Resource  Cost of Foreign  Exchange 
We have obtained  a data set, previously  used for planning  purposes 
by the government  of the former  GDR, that we can adjust  to estimate 
the extent of the current  price-cost squeeze in East German  industry. 
We will also use these data to assess the current viability of Eastern 
industry under alternative  assumptions about the evolution of wages 
and productivity.  We consider a firm  to be viable if the world price of 
tradable  goods (p* in figure 1) exceeds the short-run  average variable 
cost of production  at capacity (fi in figure 1). If the short-run  average 
cost curve is horizontal,  as drawn  in figure 1, viable firms  earn positive 
quasi-rents  and hence do not require subsidies to remain  in business, 
although they may not operate at capacity if short-run demand is 
insufficient.  Because viable  firms  may  earn  less than  a competitive  return 
on either  existing  capital  or new investment,  according  to our  definition, 
they may be unable  to remain  in business in the long run. 
Planners  in  the  GDR  routinely  tabulated  the  foreign  currency  proceeds 
from  export  sales  to nonsocialist  countries  as well as the cost, at  producer 
prices in mark,  of the goods that were exported. They maintained  such 
records for every Kombinat  (conglomerate)  that sold products  outside 
the communist  bloc. Our data measure the domestic resource cost of 
earning foreign exchange for 116 Kombinate in  1989. Alternatively 
stated, our figures  give the total cost (plus any excess profit)  in mark  of 
earning  a deutsche mark  in world  markets  before currency  union. Most 
Kombinate exported to  nonsocialist countries (indeed, nonsocialist 
exports  amounted  to about  20 percent  of GNP in 1989),  and  thus the data 
cover almost the entire industrial  sector."I  Comparable  data are also 
11. With  exports  evaluated  at the  Richtungskoeffizient  of 4.4 mark  per  deutsche  mark, 
exports amount  to about  22 percent  of GNP. This coefficient  is a shadow  exchange  rate 
used to value nonsocialist imports and exports in the GDR. We discuss the shadow George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  17 
available  for each of the 183  individual  enterprises  within  these Kombi- 
nate that sold more than 10 million  deutsche mark  of goods in Western 
markets.  Finally,  ourdata  set includes  measures  ofthe domestic  resource 
costs of East German  conglomerates  in socialist trade-defined as the 
expenses incurred  by East German  firms per transfer  ruble earned in 
CMEA sales.12 The expenses incurred  by East German  firms  in selling 
their products  in world markets,  when appropriately  adjusted,  provide 
a good measure  of the viability  of East German  firms  under  free trade.  13 
Prior  to currency  union  GDR  consumers  were unable  to "vote with  their 
feet"; hence the prices paid  by East Germans  for products  produced  in 
the GDR serve as a poor gauge of what consumers would have been 
willing  to pay if they had  been free to choose Western  goods. Similarly, 
the prices in CMEA trade  are not useful because sales were politically 
negotiated. But the prices paid by customers in nonsocialist countries 
are an accurate  reflection  of their  world  market  values under  free trade. 
In this section we first present the unadjusted  domestic resource cost 
data  and  then  explain  how  they can  be adjusted  to yield  a current  measure 
of the short-run  average  variable  costs and viability  of East Germany's 
former  state-owned  enterprises. 
Table  6 and  figure  2 summarize  the raw  cost data.  The  average  expense 
incurred  in mark, per deutsche mark  earned in nonsocialist sales, was 
3.73 in 1989.14  Alternatively  stated, an index of the producer  prices of 
exchange  rate in greater  detail  later  in the paper.  With  exports  evaluated  at their  export- 
weighted  average  domestic resource  cost of 3.77 mark  per deutsche mark,  nonsocialist 
exports  amounted  to about 18  percent  of GNP. See Statistisches  Amt der  DDR  (1990,  pp. 
107,  277). 
12. The Kombinat  level data are unpublished  data compiled by the East German 
planning  ministry.  Data on the domestic  resource costs of individual  firms  exporting  at 
least 10  million  Valutamark  of goods to nonsocialist  countries  are contained  in Schreiber, 
Hendzlik,  and  Schmolinsky  (1990).  The  numbers  from  these  two sources  are  in  approximate 
agreement.  The domestic resource cost figures  for each sector use weights based on 
employment  shares  in 1989.  Figures  on employment  by Kombinat  were obtained  from  the 
Staatliche  Zentralverwaltung  fur Statistik,  "Wichtige  Kennziffern  der Industrie  Arbeits- 
6konomische  Kennziffern,  Berichtszeitraum:  1.  1  -31.12.1989.  " 
13. In order  to make up for lost domestic sales, Eastern  firms  will have to find new 
customers  in these markets. 
14. This figure  is the employment-weighted  average  of the domestic  resource  costs of 
each Kombinat; the export-weighted  average is  slightly different, 3.77. Expense is 
measured  as the value of output  at producer  prices  (Betriebspreise),  which  are exclusive 
of product-specific  taxes and  the trade  margins  of the foreign  trade  companies.  Industrie- 
abgabepreise  (IAP)  include  product-specific  taxes. 18  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Table  6. The Domestic  Resource  Cost of Earning  Foreign  Exchange  in East Germany, 
by Sector, 1989  and 1990 
Domestic  resource  cost of earning  one: 
Deutsche mark  Transfer  ruble 
Share  of 
Industrial  sector  employment  Unadjusteda Adjustedb  Unadjusteda Adjustedb 
Total industry  1.00  3.73  1.84  4.65  2.30 
Energy  0.11  2.08  0.85  3.16  1.29 
Chemicals  0.12  4.11  1.50  5.93  2.16 
Metallurgy  0.07  3.22  1.35  7.43  3.11 
Machinery and transporta- 
tion equipment  0.26  3.54  1.83  3.51  1.81 
Machinery  0.15  3.59  1.85  3.62  1.87 
Transportation equipment  0.10  3.46  1.79  3.35  1.73 
Electronics  0.18  4.82  2.42  3.44  1.73 
Light industry  0.24  3.74  1.72  5.69  2.62 
Textiles  0.14  3.70  1.71  6.45  2.97 
Furniture, toys,  and other  0.05  4.22  1.95  4.55  2.10 
Glass, ceramics, and paper  0.05  3.33  1.54  4.65  2.14 
Food,  drinks, and tobacco  0.02  4.09  2.93  8.00  5.73 
Sources:  Authors'  own calculations  using  unpublished  data  from  the government  of the former  GDR. 
a. The unadjusted  cost in each sector is the average  expense in mark  of earning  a deutsche  mark  in trade  with 
non-CMEA  countries  and  a transfer  ruble  in CMEA  trade  in 1989.  The numbers  are the averages  of Konmbinat-level 
data  by sector, weighted  by each Kombinat's  share  of sectoral  employment. 
b. The  adjusted  cost is an estimate  of the short-run  average  variable  cost in deutsche  mark  of earning  one deutsche 
mark  in trade  with non-CMEA  countries  and  a transfer  ruble  in CMEA  trade  in October  1990.  The adjusted  expense 
is estimated  by multiplying  the unadjusted  expense  by one minus  the adjustment  factors  in the sixth  column  of table 
7. These  factors  approximate  the percentage  difference  between  domestic  resource  cost in 1989  and  short-run  average 
variable  cost in 1990. 
East German  industrial  exports (in mark)  was over three times as high 
as an index of the producer  prices (in deutsche mark)  of comparable 
goods in Western markets.1"  Table 6 also presents domestic resource 
cost ratios  disaggregated  by industrial  sector. The cost in mark  of earning 
a deutsche mark  varies significantly  across sectors ranging  from a low 
of 2.08 in the energy  sector to a high  of 4.82 in the electronics sector. An 
15. In early 1990  the GDR  publicly  revealed,  for the first  time, the "shadow  exchange 
rates" (Richtungskoeffizienten)  used internally  to convert deutsche mark, dollars, and 
transfer  ruble  into  mark  (also  called  Mark  Valutagegenwert  or "mark  value  equivalents"). 
See, for example,  Haendcke-Hoppe  (1990).  These conversion  rates were ministry  "fore- 
casts" of the expenses that East German  firms would actually incur, on average, per 
deutsche mark  (or per dollar,  or per transfer  ruble)  earned  in foreign  trade. In contrast, 
our data measure the actual costs of earning  foreign exchange. Firms with domestic 
resource  costs in excess of the Richtungskoeffizient  received  export  subsidies.  It was not 
expected that all firms would cover their costs in producing  for foreign markets.  The 
official conversion  rates in 1989 were  1 deutsche  mark =  4.4 Mark Valutagegenwert;  1 
U.S.  dollar  =  8.14 Mark Valutagegenwert;  and 1 transfer ruble =  4.67 Mark Valutage- 
genwert.  See Statistisches  Amt  der  DDR (1990,  p. 275).  The publication  of these numbers George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  19 
Figure 2.  The Domestic Resource Cost of Earning Foreign Exchange in Selected 
East German Industries, 1989a 
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Source: Authors'  own calculations  using  unpublished  data  from  the government  of the former  GDR. 
a. The figure  uses a box-and-whiskers  diagram  to display  the univariate  distributions  of the unadjusted  data.  The 
box represents  the interquartile  range-that is, the box encompasses  the middle  50 percent  of the data. The line 
across  the middle  of the box denotes  the median.  The whiskers  extend  to 150  percent  of the interquartile  range  rolled 
back to the first available  data point. Observations  that lie beyond the whiskers  are considered  outliers  and are 
individually  marked  by bubbles. 
enabled  many  riddles  concerning  East  German  trade  to be solved  and  led  to a reassessment 
of the magnitude  of GDR  trade  with  the West. It is now understood  to be much  larger  than 
was previously  thought.  In the months  preceding  currency  union,  the availability  of these 
conversion  rates  led Horst  Siebert  among  others  to a relatively  pessimistic  assessment  of 
the viability  of East German  industry  given conversion  of wage contracts  at par. Siebert 
argued  for  conversion  of wages  at two to one, with  a subsequent  adjustment  to compensate 
for the rise in prices  of subsidized  products  and  for higher  social insurance  contributions. 
See Siebert  (1990).  Similarly,  Renate  Filip-Kohn  and  Udo Ludwig  used  the  newly  available 
conversion rates to estimate the deutsche mark value of GDR GNP by input-output 
methods. See Filip-Kohn  and Ludwig (1990). Their assessment was by far the most 
pessimistic  on record.  Under  their  most  optimistic  set of adjustments,  they  estimated  GDR 
GNP at DM 230  billion  in 1988.  The value  of GDR  GNP, calculated  according  to National 
Income  Accounting  conventions  for 1988,  is 345 billion  mark;  see Statistisches  Amt der 
DDR (1990,  p. 107).  Implicit  in this calculation  is an estimate  of the overall  level of GDR 20  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1991 
inspection  of the enterprise-level  data reveals that only a single firm  in 
East Germany  outside the energy sector-the  State Porcelainworks  of 
Meissen-had  costs per deutsche mark  earned of less than unity. The 
costs in  the  energy  sector  do not  include  the  environmental  costs resulting 
from  the use of brown  coal. 
The sectoral averages presented in table 6 conceal enormous intra- 
sector variation  in costs across Kombinate and individual  firms. For 
example, in electronics, the Carl  Zeiss Kombinat  had an expense ratio 
of 3.66 mark per deutsche mark earned, while the Kombinat Mikro- 
elektronik  needed to spend 7.17 mark  per deutsche mark.  16  Within  the 
Zeiss conglomerate,  however, Zeiss Precision  Instruments  of Jena had 
costs of 2.37 mark  per deutsche mark,  while Pentacon  of Dresden, the 
manufacturer  of Praktica  cameras, which exported over 40 percent of 
its output to the West, had expenses of 7.04 mark  per deutsche mark 
earned in foreign sales. The liquidation  of Pentacon within months of 
currency union reflects the predictive power of these cost ratios; the 
Treuhandanstalt  said that Pentacon  was losing money on every camera 
sold.  17  The enormous  variation  in costs across Kombinate  is illustrated 
in figure  2, which uses box-and-whiskers  plots to show the univariate 
distributions  of expenses per deutsche mark  for seven broad  sectors.  18 
toFRG  prices  of 1.5.  In  contrast,  the  Deutsches  InstitutfurWirtschaftsforschungestimated 
1989  GNP at DM 286 billion. See Wochenbericht  46/90, 15 November 1990, p. 653. In 
performing  their  calculation,  Filip-Kohn  and  Ludwig  assumed  that  exports  were "dumped" 
so that the relative  prices of GDR exports to the West were far lower than the relative 
prices of GDR goods in the aggregate.  Alternatively,  they assumed that the relative 
productivity  of the GDR versus the FRG  in exports, which they computed  to be at most 
one-third,  was lower than  elsewhere  in the economy. In contrast,  we assume  that  export 
prices  adequately  reflect  the world  market  value  of tradable  industrial  goods. 
16. This Kombinat  is losing DM 5 million  every month and will have to lay off 70 
percent  of its workers.  Sucddeutsche  Zeitung,  November  8, 1990,  p. 33. 
17. "Stillegung  bei Pentacon,"  press release  of the Treuhandanstalt,  Berlin,  October 
2, 1990.  On the other  hand,  Meissen  Porcelain  has orders  for more  than  two years' worth 
of output,  and  Mitsubishi  made  an offer to buy this firm,  an offer  that  was rejected  by the 
Trust.  It was decided  that  the government  of Saxony should  retain  ownership  of Meissen 
Porcelain  because  of its cultural  significance. 
18. Available  time series data  on the Richtungskoeffizient  and the domestic  resource 
cost of earning  foreign exchange in the GDR suggest a significant  deterioration  in the 
competitiveness  of the East German  economy  during  the 1980s.  The  Richtungskoeffizient 
rose from 2.4 over the 1980-84  period  to 2.9 in 1985,  3.6 in 1986,  4.3 in 1987,  and 4.4 in 
1988  and 1989.  See Siebert  (1990).  Available  data  for the 1985-89  period  show the actual 
evolution  of the overall domestic resource  cost ratio: 1.87 in 1985,  3.42 in 1986,  3.87 in George  A. Akerlof,  Andrew  K. Rose,  Janet  L. Yellen,  and  Helga  Hessenius  21 
Calculations  of Short-Run Variable Costs 
The domestic  resource  cost data  must  be adjusted  to obtain  a measure 
of the current  viability  of each Kombinat.  A firm  is viable, according  to 
our  previous  definition,  if its short-run  average  variable  cost per  deutsche 
mark  earned  is less than unity. Our  raw data on the domestic resource 
costs measure  total  cost-fixed  cost plus  variable  cost-plus  any  extraor- 
dinary  profit  per deutsche mark  earned. Short-run  average  variable  cost 
per deutsche mark earned, our measure of firms' viability, can be 
obtained  from these data by adjusting  for the differences  between total 
cost  plus extraordinary  profit and short-run variable cost,  and for 
differences in costs before and after currency union. To adjust for 
differences between total cost plus extraordinary  profit  and short-run 
variable  cost, we remove all profits,  interest, and depreciation  in excess 
of repairs  necessary for current  operation.  To adjust  for differences  in 
costs before  and  after  currency  union,  we estimate  the effects of changes 
in the tax structure,  in the cost of imported  intermediate  inputs, and in 
wages. (We calculate  the relevant  adjustments  at the sectoral  level using 
information  concerning  the cost structure  of each sector contained in 
the 1987  input-output  table of the GDR.) 
In  the GDR,  there  was no important  distinction  between  taxes, profits, 
and interest. They were different  accounting  names with no meaningful 
economic distinction  given to different  parts  of the "surplus"  earned  by 
a firm.  Therefore  we shall lump  together  the adjustments  for taxes (net 
of subsidies), profits, and interest payments. Taxes (net of subsidies), 
profits,  and  interest  payments  in the GDR, all of which  entered  domestic 
resource costs,  were enormous: about 59 percent of value added in 
industry.  '9 To compute short-run  variable  cost, we eliminate  this entire 
surplus  from the domestic resource cost figure  and add in the relevant 
1987,  4.06 in 1988,  and 3.77 in 1989.  This substantial  change  in the Richtungskoeffizient 
and the domestic  resource  cost ratio reflects  changes  in the world  price of petroleum,  a 
significant  GDR  export, and Soviet oil, a major  imported  input.  The cost of imported  oil 
from  the Soviet Union was a five-year  moving  average  of the world  price. Between 1980 
and 1984,  the ratio  of the price of oil paid by the GDR to the Soviet Union to the world 
market  price  of oil doubled.  In 1986  it doubled  again,  as Soviet prices  peaked  while  world 
prices  plummeted.  In 1989  and 1990,  this price  ratio  declined  by 46 percent  relative  to its 
1986  peak, permitting  some decline  in the domestic  resource  cost ratio  of the GDR.  These 
series  are  based  on unpublished  GDR  data. 
19. Statistisches  Amt  der  DDR (1990,  pp. 108-09). 22  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
taxes after currency  union. These are employer  contributions  to social 
security, which are higher now than they had been in the GDR. Our 
adjustment  intentionally  excludes the value-added  tax (VAT) and the 
corporate  income tax.20 
The second important  impact of currency  union on variable  costs in 
East Germany  stems from the changes that have occurred  in the costs 
of imported  inputs. Currency  union  has led to a substantial  reduction  in 
the costs of inputs  from both nonsocialist  and socialist countries. Prior 
to the union, 22 percent of total material  use in East German  industry 
had consisted of imported  inputs.21 Enterprises  were charged  4.4 mark 
per deutsche mark  of imported  inputs from nonsocialist countries and 
4.67 mark per transfer  ruble of imports  from CMEA countries; these 
numbers are simply the "shadow prices"  (Richtungskoeffizienten)  used 
internally  to price foreign goods. Since currency union, however, the 
cost of a deutsche  mark's  worth  of Western  products  has fallen  from  4.4 
to unity, leading  to a substantial  cost decrease. Further,  the conversion 
rate used to price both purchases and sales from socialist countries, 
denominated  in transfer  rubles,  was halved-from 4.67 mark  per  transfer 
ruble  to 2.34 deutsche mark  per transfer  ruble. This has also resulted  in 
a substantial  cost reduction  for  Eastern  firms,  a reduction  that  will persist 
20. The  domestic  resource  cost numbers  measure  the  value  of GDR  exports  at  producer 
prices  per  deutsche  mark  of foreign  exchange  earned.  Because  foreign  exchange  earnings 
in  the  former  GDR  were  exclusive  of any  VAT  paid  abroad,  short-run  variable  costs should 
also  be computed  exclusive  of VAT. East  German  firms  that  export  abroad  are  now  exempt 
from  VAT;  currently  for sales within  Germany  both  revenue  and  cost will  be higher  by the 
amount  of the VAT. Because the corporate  income tax is a levy on profits,  it should  not 
be included  in short-run  variable  cost. Interest does not enter short-run  variable  cost. 
These debts could lead to bankruptcy,  however, unless they are forgiven.  Debts of GDR 
firms  were converted into deutsche mark  at a two-to-one rate; the Treuhandanstalt  is 
making  the interest  payments  on all old debt and in some instances  the Treuhandanstalt 
has agreed to forgive the principal  as well. See, for example, Frankfurter  Allgemeine 
Zeitung,  March  7, 1991,  p. 16, and  March  8, 1991,  p. 15. 
21. See Statistisches  Amt der DDR (1990,  pp. 108-09).  While  a precise geographical 
breakdown  of the sources  of these inputs  is unobtainable,  it is known  that  54 percent  of all 
imports  into  the GDR  came  from  nonsocialist  countries  and  the remaining  46 percent  were 
from  socialist  countries.  Since 70 percent  of all imports  into the GDR  were used as inputs 
in industry, it is  reasonable to assume that these same percentages approximately 
characterize  the sources of imported  inputs as well. In performing  the input-output 
calculations  reported  in table  7, we have estimated  the fraction  of imported  inputs  in each 
sector from the CMEA and non-CMEA  countries  through  a variety of indirect  means, 
since this breakdown  is unavailable  in East German  data. George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  23 
if current  deutsche mark  prices for socialist imports  continue  to prevail 
after  CMEA  trade  is switched  from  barter  to hard  currency. 
Table  7 reports  the results  of input-output  simulations  quantifying  the 
adjustments  to domestic  resource  costs resulting  from  the radical  changes 
in the fiscal system and in the pricing  of imported  inputs.22  Input-output 
analysis takes intersectoral  feedbacks into consideration  in assessing 
cost reductions  in each sector of the economy. Cost reductions  that  lead 
to lower prices in one sector reduce  the costs of material  inputs  used by 
other sectors, thus permitting  further  price cuts elsewhere in the econ- 
omy. We assume  that  producer  prices will match  short-run  variable  cost 
in each sector.23'24 
The columns  in table  7 report  percentage  adjustments  in the domestic 
resource  cost figures  needed  to estimate  average  short-run  variable  cost. 
The first  column shows the adjustment  resulting  from  the elimination  of 
22. We have made  use of the recently  published  East German  input-output  table for 
1987  to estimate  the  percentage  difference  between  domestic  resource  cost before  currency 
union and short-run  variable  cost after currency  union. See Statistisches  Amt der DDR 
(1990, pp. 108-09). Our analysis is modeled on the work of the Deutsches Institut  fur 
Wirtschaftsforschung  (DIW), which has emphasized  and estimated  the scope for price 
cutting  due  to these cost reductions.  In  Deutsches  Institut  fur  Wirtschaftsforschung  (1990), 
DIW  presents  a detailed  analysis  estimating  the percent  by which  gross  value  added  would 
be able to fall in each sector as a consequence  of the fiscal reforms  at currency  union. In 
unpublished  work, DIW  used input-output  methodology  comparable  to our own in order 
to estimate  the potential  reduction  in producer  prices  that  could  occur  in each sector. We 
are  indebted  to Bernd  Gorzig  of DIW  for  providing  us with  the results  of that  analysis.  The 
analysis  that  we report  below makes  use of similar  methodology  but also takes account  of 
reductions  in the costs of imported  inputs  due to currency  union,  which  were  not included 
in the DIW analysis. Michael  Burda  (1990)  has also emphasized  the importance  of the 
scope for price  cutting. 
23. One shortcoming  of the analysis  is that  we assume  that  after  currency  union  East 
German  enterprises  continued  to source their  inputs  domestically  to the same extent as 
they did previous  to union-an assumption  that  is undoubtedly  unwarranted  if the prices 
of those inputs  have not fallen  to competitive  levels. A further  limitation  of our  analysis  is 
that it assumes  that firms  cut prices by the maximum  amount  possible, whereas, in fact, 
there  is no incentive  for further  price  cutting  once prices  have fallen  to world  levels. 
24. It should  be emphasized  that  the total-adjustment  figures  in table  7 are  the amounts 
by which  producer,  and  not  consumer,  prices  can  decline.  In  the  GDR,  enormous  subsidies 
were given to transportation  and basic foods, and some subsidies  were provided  in light 
industry,  which caused consumer  and producer  prices to diverge.  The imposition  of the 
VAT  will  raise  consumer  prices  in all sectors  by 14  percent.  Finally,  a variety  of new taxes 
imposed  on alcohol,  tobacco,  and  petrol  will  raise  consumer  prices  in these sectors  . Taking 
these factors into account, consumer  prices should increase, not decrease, in several 
important  sectors  including  food and  transportation. 0~~~~~-.  ~  ~  ~  - 
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the very high  enterprise  taxes (net of subsidies)  and the interest  burden 
on firms,  coupled with an adjustment  for increased  employer  contribu- 
tions to social security in compliance with the West German  system. 
For industry  as a whole, the change  in the system of enterprise  taxation 
permits cost  reductions averaging 36 percent. The second column 
assesses the effects of lower depreciation allowances. A 50 percent 
decline in depreciation  allowances, leaving the remaining  50 percent of 
depreciation  for current  repairs,  yields an almost 5 percent  adjustment. 
The third  column shows the effect of the reductions  in imported  input 
costs discussed earlier.  This adjustment  is substantial,  giving  rise to a 20 
percent  cost reduction  in industry  as a whole. 
Wage  movements  have also exerted an important  influence  on costs. 
From  the first  quarter  of 1990  to October  1990,  wages rose by 42 percent. 
We estimate that a wage hike of roughly 10 percent would have been 
necessary to compensate workers for the net increases in payroll tax 
deductions (social security plus income tax) attendant  upon currency 
union.  A gross  wage increase  of this  amount  would  have sufficed  to leave 
net wages constant. The fourth  column  of table 7 shows the adjustment 
to domestic resource  costs if wages had risen by only 10  percent. Since 
"surplus"  was so large  that  wages were only a small  fraction  of costs to 
begin with, this adjustment  is  small-2.4  percent. The fifth column 
shows the impact  of the further  32 percent  increase in gross wages that 
occurred  up through  October  1990:  not surprisingly  these additional  pay 
hikes have raised  costs significantly. 
Summing  the first through  the fifth columns we find that short-run 
average  variable  cost in East German  industry  after  currency  union  was 
about 51 percent lower than the domestic resource cost of foreign 
exchange before currency  union. This reduction  in costs corresponds 
closely to the slightly more than 50 percent reduction  in East German 
producer  prices between May and August of 1990. The logic behind 
our  calculations provides  a  simple  explanation for  these  price 
cuts. 
The final two columns of table 7 provide estimates of the percent, 
relative to present  levels, by which each sector's short-run  average 
variable cost would rise as a consequence of an additional 1 percent 
across-the-board  wage increase for Eastern workers and of a wage 
increase  of 1  percent  only in the sector in question.  The same  figures  can 
be used to assess the impact on sectoral costs of economywide and 26  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
sector-specific  productivity  improvements.  Wage costs now constitute 
a much larger  percentage  of total costs in the East than they did before 
currency union. In consequence, each 1 percent wage hike will now 
raise short-run  variable  cost by roughly  0.66 percent. We will use these 
figures to estimate the sensitivity of the survival prospects of East 
German  firms  to further  wage and  productivity  changes. 
Viability of East  German Industry 
In order  to gain perspective on the current  viability  of East German 
industry, it is necessary to compute short-run  average variable  costs. 
The sectoral adjustment  factors in the sixth column  of table 7 measure 
the percentage  difference  between short-run  average  variable  costs per 
deutsche mark earned and unadjusted  domestic resource costs. This 
measure can thus be used to estimate the current value of short-run 
average  variable  cost per deutsche mark  earned  for each sector and for 
each Kombinat  within that sector.  These  adjusted  domestic  resource 
cost  figures give our "benchmark" estimates of  short-run average 
variable costs, in deutsche mark, per deutsche mark earned in world 
markets  as of October 1990.  These estimates thus provide  a characteri- 
zation of the current  competitiveness of East German  industry.25  The 
third  column  of table 6 presents sectoral  averages  of adjusted  domestic 
resource costs. The picture that emerges is dismal. Only the energy 
sector can cover its short-run  costs. 
Table  8 describes  the distribution  of adjusted  domestic resource  cost 
ratios across Kombinate in East Germany under our benchmark  as- 
sumptions and several alternative scenarios concerning wages and 
productivity.26  This  table  gives the cumulative  number  of conglomerates 
25. The adjusted  resource  cost figures  actually  provide  an underestimate  of the short- 
run variable  costs per deutsche mark  earned. The reason is a technical one. The raw 
domestic resource cost figures measure producer  prices at Betriebspreise,  which are 
exclusive  of any product  specific  taxes levied at the firm  level. But  the East German  input- 
output table values goods at producer  prices (IAP prices), which are inclusive of such 
taxes. Table 7  measures the percentage by which these IAP prices can fall. This 
overestimates  the percentage  by which the Betriebspreise  can decline. Thus the picture 
that  emerges  here  of the viability  of East German  industry  is slightly  overoptimistic. 
26. We have adjusted  each Kombinat's  domestic  resource  cost ratio  by the relevant 
sectoral  adjustment  factor  from table 7. Ideally, a separate  adjustment  factor should  be 
computed  for each enterprise  and each conglomerate  based on the relevant  details  of its 
own cost structure.  Such an approach  could be attempted  using  the more  detailed  input- 
output  table  (with 131  sectors)  that  is now available  for the GDR. George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  27 
Table 8.  The Viability of East German Kombinate  under Benchmark and Alternative 
Assumptions 
Adjusted  Benchmark  casea  Viable  employment  with  across-the-board 
expenses  changes (percent) 
per  Viable  c  (perent 
deutsche  employ-  10 percent  10 percent  50 percent  75  percent 
mark  Number  of  ment  wage  productivity  labor cost  labor cost 
earned  Kombinateb  (percent)c  increase  increase  subsidy  subsidy 
< 0.25  2  0.4  0.4  0.4  1.9  2.5 
<0.5  7  2.5  2.5  2.5  4.9  10.6 
< 0.75  10  4.9  4.9  5.2  14.5  36.6 
<  1.0  14  8.2  7.5  12.3  36.6  77.2 
<  1.25  27  19.9  17.5  26.8  69.3  89.7 
<  1.5  46  37.5  33.3  46.7  82.7  96.2 
<  1.75  66  55.2  49.9  63.4  90.7  99.5 
< 2.0  86  73.9  64.1  78.1  96.1  99.8 
< 2.25  96  81.8  77.1  86.7  98.5  99.8 
< 2.5  105  87.2  83.9  89.8  99.4  99.8 
< 2.75  107  90.8  89.8  91.2  99.8  99.8 
< 3.0  108  91.2  90.9  96.3  99.8  100.0 
< 3.25  111  96.3  91.3  96.3  99.8  100.0 
< 3.5  111  96.3  96.4  99.6  99.8  100.0 
< 3.75  114  99.6  96.4  99.6  99.8  100.0 
< 4.0  114  99.6  99.6  99.8  99.8  100.0 
< c  116  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Authors'  own calculations  as described  in the text. 
a. The benchmark  case (as in the sixth column  of table 7) assumes elimination  of taxes, profits,  interest,  and 
subsidies  to the firm;  an increase  in employer  and employee  contributions  to social insurance  to the West German 
level of 18.25  percent  each;  a 50 percent  reduction  in depreciation  expense;  savings  on imported  inputs  as described 
in the text; and a 42 percent  increase  in gross wages. 
b. The cumulative  number  of Kombinate  with  adjusted  domestic  resource  cost ratios  below the level indicated  in 
column  one is shown. 
c. The percent  of wage and salary  workers  in Kombinate  with adjusted  domestic  resource  cost ratios  below the 
level indicated  in the first  column,  as a fraction  of the total number  of wage and salaried  workers  in all Kombinate 
in the sample,  is shown  in the third  through  seventh  columns. 
and  the percentage  of employment  at varying  levels of competitiveness. 
Under  our  benchmark  assumptions  only about  8 percent  of the industrial 
work  force is employed  in viable Kombinate,  those with expense ratios 
below unity. As is apparent,  the majority  of firms  currently  have short- 
run variable costs between one and two deutsche mark  per deutsche 
mark  earned. 
Table 8 also reports  the impact  of a 10  percent  wage hike, above and 
beyond  the 42 percent  hike that  had  occurred  through  October  1990,  and 
a 10  percent  productivity  increase.  (The 10  percent  productivity  improve- 
ment yields the same results as a 20 percent productivity  improvement 
with a 10 percent wage hike, the additional  amount  that has probably 28  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
occurred since October.) Such improvements  in productivity can be 
expected. A survey conducted by the Ifo Institut fur Wirtschaftsfor- 
schung  in May 1990  to measure  the extent of disguised  unemployment 
in the GDR  estimated  it amounts  to approximately  18  percent  in industry 
and 15 percent in the economy as a whole. Practices that reduced 
productivity include widespread overmanning, political activities of 
workers,  high  absenteeism,  frequent  interruptions  because  of an  absence 
of inputs,  and excessive in-house  production  of inputs.27 
The final two columns of table 8 present the results of simulations 
designed to assess the effectiveness of substantial  cuts, of 50 percent 
and  75 percent, in total labor  cost. Such cuts could be achieved through 
a policy of wage subsidies. As is apparent,  subsidies to achieve reduc- 
tions in labor costs of this magnitude  would substantially raise the 
number  of viable Kombinate-from  14 conglomerates hiring about 8 
percent of the industrial labor force in the benchmark case,  to 47 
Kombinate  hiring  almost 37 percent of the industrial  work force in the 
case of a 50 percent  reduction  in labor  costs, to 88  Kombinate  employing 
77 percent of the industrial  work force in the case of a 75 percent 
reduction in labor costs. In a later section we discuss the economic 
desirability  of adopting  deep wage subsidies. 
At the time of currency  union  it was widely rumored  that  one-third  of 
East German  firms  would go out of business. The microeconomic  data 
that have been presented  in this paper  offer a far more pessimistic view 
of the likely viability of the East German  economy. In the absence of 
massive productivity  improvements  or substantial  subsidization,  most 
Eastern  industry  will have to close down.28 
27. See Vogler-Ludwig  (1990,  p. 7). These estimates  of hidden  unemployment  take as 
given the state of technology,  the extent of vertical  integration,  the product  mix, the age 
of the GDR  capital  stock, and  so on. 
28. Prior  to currency  union  the available  information  regarding  conditions  in the GDR 
led most analysts  to adopt  nervously  optimistic  forecasts  concerning  the viability  of East 
German  industry.  The most influential  study  comparing  GDR  and  FRG  productivity  prior 
to currency  union  was conducted  by DIW  for  the Bundestag  in 1987.  Productivity-output 
per employee-in  the East as of 1983  was judged to be approximately  52 percent  that in 
the West, while  wages per  employee  in the GDR  were 35 percent  of those in the FRG.  See 
Bundesministerium  fur innerdeutsche  Beziehungen  (1987,  pp. 390, 718). In 1989  average 
gross monthly  wages and salaries  per employee  in the whole FRG  economy amounted  to 
DM 3,192;  the comparable  GDR  figure  for  industry  in the first  half  of 1990  was 1,110  mark. 
See Statistisches  Bundesamt  (1990,  p. 566);  the GDR  wage figure  is based  on unpublished 
data provided  to us by the Statistical  Office  in East Berlin.  These figures  imply  that  at a George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  29 
The Price-Cost  Squeeze  and Exports 
Indirect confirmation  of  the price-cost squeeze comes from the 
behavior  of exports following currency  union and the discussions that 
have taken place concerning  export sales. The changes associated with 
currency  union should  have had  little effect on the demand  schedules  of 
foreign  buyers. Indeed, many foreign  purchases  were covered by long- 
term  contracts.  But an implication  of the price-cost  squeeze is that  many 
Eastern firms should have realized losses if they filled such orders. It 
turns  out that  export  sales, in real  terms,  declined  much  less dramatically 
than production:  between July and November of 1990 total exports, 
excluding sales to West Germany, amounted to almost 89 percent of 
one-to-one  exchange  rate unit labor  costs in East Germany  would average  67 percent  of 
the West German  level. Given  the similarity  of relative  productivity  across sectors, even 
the sectors  with  the lowest relative  productivity-construction  materials,  agriculture,  and 
forestry-would have unit labor  costs in East Germany  approximately  15  percent  below 
those in West Germany.  Moreover,  even the most pessimistic  assessments  before  union 
placed  GDR  per  capita  GNP at 45 percent  that  of the FRG. For a survey  of estimates,  see 
Bundesministerium  fur innerdeutsche  Beziehungen  (1987, p. 480). (However, two days 
prior to currency  union DIW published  a revised estimate of GDR per capita income 
relative to the FRG of 40 percent. See Wochenbericht,  26/90, June 28, 1990.)  Western 
estimates  of prices  in the GDR  relative  to those in the FRG  indicated  that  the purchasing 
power  parity  exchange  rate  of the mark  relative  to the deutsche  mark  was close to unity: 
the cost of the consumption  bundle  of the typical  East German  household  was  judged  to 
be slightly  lower in mark  in the GDR  than  in deutsche  mark  in the FRG. It was estimated 
that  in 1985  a GDR  consumer  in a typical  four-person  employee household  would pay 24 
percent  more  in deutsche  mark  to buy its consumption  basket  in the FRG  than  that same 
basket would cost in mark in the GDR. See  Bundesministerium  fur innerdeutsche 
Beziehungen  (1987, pp. 516, 732-33). Similarly,  the Bundestag's  estimates of the price 
parities  for industrial  goods suggested  that  producer  prices  in mark  in the GDR  exceeded 
comparable  deutsche mark  prices by roughly  31 percent. Bundesministerium  fur inner- 
deutsche  Beziehungen  (1987,  pp. 390, and 717-18). As we have shown, there  was ample 
scope for prices  to fall by this amount  following  currency  union,  even with  wage contracts 
converted  into deutsche mark  at parity.  With  the benefit  of hindsight,  it is apparent  that 
the market  values  of the outputs  of centrally  planned  economies  have been overestimated 
for one fundamental  reason. Because socialist planning based targets on economic 
indicators,  it was biased  toward  high  values of those indicators  and  against  unobservable 
characteristics  such as product  quality  and variety  that  Western  consumers  value. These 
characteristics  have been just as unquantifiable  for Western analysts as for socialist 
planners,  if not more so. In addition,  Western  valuation  of Eastern  products  has been 
complicated  by the fact that  socialist  economies  made  products  that  were not produced  in 
the West. The Western  production  cost of these goods, which  was the method  used in the 
most careful  studies  to evaluate  Eastern  versus Western  quality,  would often far exceed 
their  market  value. See, for example,  Sturm  (1974)  and  Alton  and  others  (1990). 30  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
their level during  the same five months of 1989.29  But there are many 
indications  that  firms  are  losing money on both socialist  and  nonsocialist 
exports and can only continue satisfying  orders  because the Treuhand- 
anstalt  has implicitly  or explicitly subsidized  the losses. If these bailouts 
end, many more firms  will fail and the impact  of the price-cost squeeze 
on output  will be fully felt. 
EXPORTS  TO  SOCIALIST  COUNTRIES.  Table 6 shows the domestic 
resource  cost of CMEA  exports  in mark  per transfer  ruble  earned  before 
currency  union  and  our  estimates  of their  adjusted  cost in deutsche  mark 
per transfer ruble after union. (Before currency union these exports 
were 17  percent  of GNP.) In industry  as a whole, the domestic resource 
cost of exports per transfer  ruble earned was 4.65 mark  in 1989. After 
currency  union we estimate that the short-run  average variable  cost of 
CMEA exports amounted to 2.30 deutsche mark per transfer ruble. 
Using Kombinat-level  data, we find that before union 70 percent of 
export sales were "profitable"  at the Richtungskoeffizient  (shadow  rate 
of exchange) of 4.67 mark per transfer  ruble. The remaining  exports 
required  subsidies  from the GDR government.  After union the transfer 
ruble was valued at 2.34 deutsche mark. Under these new conditions, 
we estimate  that  roughly  20 percent  of CMEA  exports would be unprof- 
itable  and  therefore  require  subsidies. 
There  is ample  evidence that  many  Eastern  firms  did  require  subsidies 
to fulfill CMEA contracts after July 1, 1990. For example, Wartburg 
cars, which cost DM 14,400 to produce, were exported at DM 7,600 
each.30  The East German  shipyards  also incurred  heavy losses on their 
CMEAexports.31 These sales continued  only because, under  agreements 
29. Konjunktur  Aktuell,  January  1991, Anhang  II, p. 68. Sales to the CMEA bloc, 
denominated  in transfer  ruble,  are converted  into deutsche  mark  using  the exchange  rate 
of DM  2.34 per  transfer  ruble  both  before  and  after  currency  union.  Available  data  suggest 
that most of the decline that occurred, at least through  September,  was in exports to 
nonsocialist  countries.  A breakdown  of exports by region  is available  for July, August, 
and September  in Monatszahlen,  December  1990.  During  these three  months,  exports  to 
the socialist  countries  rose by 8.5 percent  when compared  to the first  six months  of 1990. 
During  the same three months,  exports to the industrialized  Western  countries  were 76 
percent  and  exports  to developing  countries  were 62 percent  of their  level during  the first 
six months  of 1990. 
30.  Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  January 22, 1991, p. 15. 
31. One estimate places the total losses of the shipyards  since devaluation  of the 
transfer  ruble  at DM  4.5 billion.  Die Zeit, no. 46, November  16, p. 10. George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  31 
signed  with  the Soviet Union, Germany  pledged  that  Eastern  firms  would 
honor existing export contracts. Consequently, until January  1, 1991, 
the German  government  continued to pay subsidies to firms that had 
outstanding  contracts  but were unable  to cover their production  costs. 
With  the elimination  of most subsidies  on January  1, many  East German 
companies are feeling the pinch of the price-cost squeeze. Newspaper 
accounts indicate  that unless subsidies  continue, output  will have to be 
cut in many  sectors.32  Even if export subsidies  were to continue,  CMEA 
exports  are likely to decline in 1991  for a different  reason:  since January 
1, all  trade  with  CMEA  countries  has  been denominated  in hard  currency 
rather than transfer ruble. Now that the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European  countries have abandoned  barter  arrangements  and are free 
to spend their  hard  currency  earnings  where they please, it seems quite 
likely that the demand  for East German  goods will decline,  just as East 
German  demand  for CMEA products declined after currency  union.33 
There  are already  indications  that a major  decline in trade  with Eastern 
Europe  will occur this year.34 
32. In 1990, 1,500  firms  received export subsidies  for exports to socialist countries. 
These subsidies  totaled  DM 3.5 billion. In 1991  it is expected that  only 149  firms  will get 
subsidies, and the government  expects to spend no more than DM 1 billion on them. 
Suddeutsche  Zeitung, November 13, 1990. For example, the Treuhandanstalt  has an- 
nounced  that the production  of Wartburg  cars will be discontinued  at the end of March 
1991 since it would cost DM 200 million to subsidize their production.  Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, January 22, 1991, p. 15, and Siiddeutsche  Zeitung, January 31, 1991, 
p. 37. In February,  strikes hit all of the key shipbuilding  centers, including  Schwerin, 
Rostock, and Stralsund,  as thousands  of workers  demanded  that subsidies  be continued 
rather  than  let money-losing  companies  be shut  down. The  Wall  Street  Journal,  February 
21, 1991. 
33. Immediately  after currency union East Germany  canceled many orders from 
Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  and Bulgaria.  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung, Sep- 
tember  10  and 12, 1990.  This made  it difficult  for these countries  to pay for East German 
exports. It is anticipated  that when trade  is denominated  in hard  currency,  the deutsche 
mark  revenue  will fall below the rate  implicit  in the current  transfer  ruble-deutsche  mark 
exchange  rate  of 2.34. In shipbuilding,  for example,  it is estimated  that 1 transfer  ruble's 
worth  of sales will be worth  DM 1.56  in 1991,  as compared  with  DM 2.34 prior  to January 
1, 1991,  and  4.67  mark  before  currency  union.  FrankfurterAllgemeine  Zeitung,  November 
19, 1990,  p. 18. 
34. For example,  the foreign  trade  ministry  of the Soviet Union was unwilling  to sign 
contracts  with  East  German  firms  after  January  1, 1991,  and  a special  negotiation  involving 
the  Soviet  Prime  Minister  and  the  German  Economics  Minister  resulted  in  the  authorization 
of Soviet orders totaling  only DM 9 billion for 1991.  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung, 
February  13, 1991,  p. 17. 32  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
EXPORTS  TO  NONSOCIALIST  COUNTRIES.  In  the  case  of  CMEA 
exports, the subsidies of the Treuhand  have been explicit and widely 
discussed. In the case of nonsocialist exports, subsidies have been 
implicit:  sales have continued  but losses have occurred;  the losses have 
been "financed"  by the Treuhandanstalt,  which  has guaranteed  loans to 
firms  unable  to pay their  bills. A case in point concerns a firm  within  the 
Robotron complex that had exported mechanical typewriters to the 
West. This firm continued selling abroad up through December 1990 
when it announced  that typewriter  production  would cease in January 
1991  and the firm  would fire the 1,000  workers  that had been producing 
them. Typewriter  sales had been unprofitable.35  Similarly,  it has been 
estimated  that production  of raw steel will probably  fall by 45 percent 
during 1991 (it had already fallen 55 percent in 1990), in part because 
East Germany  had been providing  high subsidies to steel exports in 
order  to obtain  hard  currency.36 
In summary,  we have argued  in this section that  a substantial  portion 
of the output  decline in East Germany  has resulted  from the price-cost 
squeeze. Stated differently,  wages in East Germany  are well above the 
full-employment,  market-clearing  level-and  rising.  East  German  wages 
are now about 50 percent of West German  levels. West German  wages 
exceed U.S.  wages by approximately  20 percent; thus East German 
wages are about 60 percent of U.S. wages. While the skill of the East 
German  labor force may justify such wages in the long run, they are 
simply  too high  for  existing  Eastern  firms  to operate  profitably  at  present. 
In this regard,  it is instructive  to compare  the experience of Poland 
with that of East Germany. In Poland, trade was freed with a fixed 
exchange  rate  that  has succeeded  in  producing  a current  account  surplus. 
In July 1990  the average monthly  wage in Poland, about DM 175, was 
roughly 13 percent of that in East Germany  after one-to-one mark to 
deutsche mark  conversion.37  In 1989, however, Thad Alton estimated 
that GNP per capita  in Poland  was 47 percent  of the GDR level.38  Thus, 
a 3.6 mark-deutsche  mark exchange rate would have been needed to 
yield the same ratio of wages to estimated per capita income in East 
Germany  as prevailed  in Poland. 
35.  Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  December 7, 1990. 
36.  Suddeutsche Zeitung,  February 5, p. 26. 
37.  PlanEcon (1990, p. 19). 
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The Collapse of Demand for East German Goods 
Motorists at French double-track  rail crossings are warned: "One 
train may hide another." The price-cost squeeze would have been 
sufficient  to cause the East German  depression;  nevertheless, there is 
also another powerful reason for the output decline. Demand for do- 
mestically  produced  consumption  and  investment  goods declined  sharply; 
the level of investment  probably  declined too. In addition,  a decline in 
exports to CMEA countries is apt to occur in the near future. (These 
shifts correspond  to the distance  labeled Yf  -  Y,  in figure  1.) The simple 
Keynesian multiplier  model describes the determination  of aggregate 
demand  under  present conditions  in East Germany.  We use this frame- 
work to explore the output  and budgetary  effects of government  spend- 
ing. 
First we present a collage of statistics to indicate the behavior of 
consumption, investment, government spending, and imports in East 
Germany. (Export behavior was covered earlier.) Ideally, national 
income  accounting  figures  would  be used  to compare  expenditures  before 
and  after  currency  union.  But such  comparisons  are  treacherous  because 
they necessarily entail the conversion of expenditures in mark into 
deutsche  mark.39  No official  statistical  series giving  comparable  pre-  and 
post-union  data  is currently  available. 
Consumption  and Imports 
The Bundesbank  (among  others)  had  feared  that  currency  conversion 
and  trade  liberalization  might  lead  to an  enormous  surge  in consumption. 
However, East Germans did not go on a spending spree following 
economic union on July 1. Household budget data collected by the 
Statistical Office in East Berlin show that the rate of saving out of 
39. The most widely cited GDR  GNP statistics  are those produced  by the Deutsches 
Institut  fur Wirtschaftsforschung.  The East German  Statistical  Office  estimated  GNP in 
1989  to be 353.2 billion  mark.  Statistisches  Amt der DDR (1990,  p. 107).  DIW estimated 
that  the  value  of GDR  GNP  in deutsche  mark  prior  to currency  union  was DM  285.7  billion, 
using  an implicit  exchange  rate  derived  from  the productivity  estimates  in the Bundestag 
report.  See Wochenbericht,  7/91, February  14, 1991,  p. 55. As we discussed above, this 
exchange  rate  gives a very high  value of GNP in comparison  with what is obtained  from 
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household net income was 13.5 percent in September 1990 and 14.8 
percent in October  compared  with 16.7 percent in the first  five months 
of 1990  and 12.7  percent  in 1989.40 
While there was no binge in overall consumption, residents of the 
East substituted Western products for domestic goods on a massive 
scale. The household  budget data show that with the opening  of trade, 
Easterners  took the chance to buy goods-especially  cars and  electrical 
appliances-that had  been unavailable  or prohibitively  expensive in the 
GDR. The demand for these items surged in July and August. By 
September  they continued  to account  for 21 percent  of the expenditure 
of Eastern  residents.41 The switch toward  Western  goods also occurred 
because the variety and quality  of Eastern  production  had been low by 
Western  standards.  Anecdotes  of East-West  quality  differences  abound, 
affecting even cabbages, which allegedly contain more worms in the 
East than in the West. Many observers say that along with the bad 
products  good ones have also been shunned. 
Although  no aggregate  statistics  are  available  that  clearly  quantify  the 
magnitude  of this switch, its proportions  have been evident. Within 
weeks of economic  union,  most observers  were astounded  to find  so few 
goods of local origin in Eastern stores.42  A survey of Eastern grocery 
stores in September  revealed high import  penetration.  The proportion 
of Eastern products  in retail sales amounted  to 4 percent of the coffee 
and  cocoa, 6 percent  of the chocolate, 12  percent  of the fresh cheese, 24 
percent of the sugar, 29 percent of the detergent,  and 65 percent of the 
margarine.43  The West German  Statistical Office reported  that during 
40. In June 1990,  the month  before currency  union, there was a surge in household 
saving:  it amounted  to 1,235  mark,  or 39.5  percent  of net income  per  household.  Dissaving 
occurred  in both July and August. Nevertheless, the saving  rate  for the three months  of 
June,  July, and  August  amounted  to 9.6 percent  of net income.  Monatszahlen,  December 
1990,  pp. 54-55. 
41.  Monatszahlen,  December  1990, p. 55. 
42. Aggressive  Western  retailers  rapidly  set up distribution  outlets in the East after 
July 1. An alternative  hypothesis  as to why there  are so few goods of Eastern  origin  in the 
stores is not that Eastern  residents  do not want  them  but rather  that  these Western  retail 
chains  are not sourcing  from  the East. 
43. Suddeutsche  Zeitung,  September  25, 1990.  According  to a recent  report,  however, 
the food industry  has begun  to recover  and  East German  products  are  making  it back  onto 
the shelves. Suddeutsche  Zeitung, January  31, 1991, p. 31. The disappearance  of East 
German  products  was not confined  to foodstuffs.  For example,  it was reported  that  in the 
Centrum  Department  Store in East Berlin  almost  no East German  products  were on the 
shelves. A salesperson  interviewed  in a toy store indicated  that Eastern products  are George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  35 
September 1990, DM 2.4 billion of goods were shipped from West to 
East Germany-a  277 percent increase over the same month  in 1989.44 
These figures do not measure total purchases of Western goods by 
Eastern residents since their purchases made in the West are not 
included. Exceptionally strong growth in West Germany has been 
attributed  by most observers, including  the Bundesbank,  to "the im- 
mense import  pull exerted by the economy of the GDR after  its western 
frontiers  had been opened."45  The Bundesbank  cited this as one of the 
main reasons for the decline in the West German  foreign trade surplus 
in August 1990 in comparison with the previous year. Moreover, it 
attributed  to Eastern  purchases made in the West very large increases 
in retail sales for food, drink,  and tobacco, very strong  growth  in sales 
of electrical equipment and apparatus, and a "spate of orders" for 
domestic  passenger  cars in the six months  before currency  union.46 
Investment 
In 1989  gross investment in East Germany  amounted  to 77.0 billion 
mark  (almost 22 percent of GNP).47  In the first quarter  after currency 
union investment  was at an annual  rate of 37.8 billion  deutsche mark.48 
This probably  represents  a fall in real investment.49  There  was a signifi- 
cant  rise, as was the case with  consumption,  in the imports  of investment 
goods. In September  1990  shipments  of investment  goods from  West to 
simply too expensive. Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung, December 10, 1990. A poll of 
Eastern  firms  found broad  agreement  with this conclusion:  75 percent  thought  that the 
quality and prices of their products have made it difficult  to sell them. Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung,  October  22, 1990. 
44. Data  from  the Statistisches  Bundesamt  show that  monthly  shipments  of food rose 
to DM 651 million,  investment  goods to DM 972 million,  and  consumer  goods to DM 224 
million.  Data for October  through  December 1990  show shipments  at roughly  the same 
level as in September  1990. 
45.  Monthly Report of the Deutsche  Bundesbank,  September  1990, p. 5. 
46.  Monthly Report of the Deutsche  Bundesbank,  September 1990, p. 30, and October 
1990, p. 15. 
47. Statistisches  Amt  der  DDR  (1990,  pp.  110, 112).  The  investment  figure  is in  constant 
1985  prices.  The 1989  GNP  figure  was 353.2  billion  mark  in constant  1985  prices. 
48.  Quartals Bericht, December  1990. 
49. It is likely that  the investment  price  index fell by less than  51 percent,  so that  real 
investment  fell. Although  the producer  price  index  fell by 50.6  percent,  investment  is labor 
intensive  and,  as table  7 shows, the scope for  price  reductions  in construction  was lower- 
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East Germany occurred at the annual rate of DM 11 billion.50  We 
therefore  conclude that domestic production  of investment  goods must 
have fallen  considerably.  This conclusion  is corroborated  by three  other 
observations.  In December 1990  output  of cement in East Germany  was 
about  21 percent  of its December 1989  level. The number  of completed 
dwelling  units in 1990  was 32 percent  lower than  in 1989.5'  A November 
1990  survey of firms  in the construction  sector showed that many more 
respondents considered business "bad" than "good" (the ratio of 
"bads" to "goods" was not quite as large  as in industry,  where output 
was at 50 percent  of its 1989  level).52 
The unsurprising  decline in investment  by as yet unprivatized  firms 
in  the East could  conceivably  have been offset by direct  investment  from 
outside  East Germany.53  In  this  regard,  a survey  of investment  intentions 
is revealing. Private West German  firms in 1991 were planning  about 
DM 13.5 billion worth of investment (3 percent of total West German 
investment) in East Germany.54  This level of investment may seem 
surprisingly  low to readers of German  newspapers, since there have 
been dramatic  announcements  of investments  by large  firms:  for exam- 
ple, Volkswagen, DM 4.2 billion; Siemens, DM 1 billion; Mercedes 
Benz,  DM  1 billion; IBM Germany, DM 200 million.55  But these, 
50. These data  were provided  by the Statistisches  Bundesamt. 
51. Monatszahlen,  December  1990,  3. Folge, pp. 30, 38. 
52. Ifo-Institut  fur  Wirtschaftsforschung  (1991). 
53. For example, the possibility  that new technologies  imported  from the West will 
become available  following  privatization  gives Eastern  managers  good reason  to wait to 
make  new investments.  Suppose  that  an old technology  could  earn  a positive  return  but  a 
new technology  could make  a return  that  is a multiple,  fi, of that  return.  At discount  rate 
r, it would pay to wait to invest if the new technology  is expected to be available  in less 
than  ln(i)Ir years. Iffi =  1.5 and r = 0.06, it would  pay to wait rather  than  to invest now 
if the new technology  will be available  in 6.75 years. 
54. Neumann  (1990,  p. 10). 
55. Volkswagen  is investing  DM  4.2 billion  in East Germany  (with  33  percent  financed 
with  government  subsidies).  The  whole  project  is expected  to create  35,000jobs  (including 
jobs at various parts suppliers).  Suddeutsche  Zeitung, October 20/21, 1990. Siemens 
already  employs 15,000  workers  in East Germany  and plans to increase  employment  to 
about 25,000 to 30,000 while investing DM 1 billion. Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung, 
November 29, 1990. Mercedes is planning  to spend DM 1 billion in building  a new 
production  site, which will be finished  in 1994  or 1995.  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung, 
February  9,  1991, p. 14. IBM Germany  is planning  to invest DM 200 million in East 
Germany  and create between 2,000 and 3,000 jobs. Frankfurter  Allgemeine Zeitung, 
December  17, 1990.  Opel has invested DM 27 million  in a new assembly  line, which will 
produce  10,000  cars  a year  and  employ  200  people.  It plans  to expand  production  to 150,000 
cars a year. There  is considerable  backward  linkage  to this project  since Opel  has signed George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  37 
unfortunately,  appear  to be more  the iceberg  than  its tip. While  fully half 
of the firms  in the poll planned  some investment,  most of this investment 
was small and consisted primarily  of distribution  facilities: the major 
reason  firms  wanted  to invest in East Germany  was "to be closer to the 
market."  In the words  of one German  economist, "Given  West German 
money, the East Germans  only want  to buy West German  products.  And 
Western  industry  is interested,  naturally  enough,  first  in selling  products 
there, not in building  factories  and making  them.  "56 
One important  reason for the slow pace of Western investment is 
Eastern wage costs, the problem emphasized throughout  this paper. 
While  wages in East Germany  are lower than in West Germany,  wages 
elsewhere, for example, in Greece, Portugal, and the rest of Eastern 
Europe, are lower still.  In consequence, PlanEcon, a  Washington 
consulting  company, considered  it "hardly  a surprise  that non-German 
investors  were staying  out of East Germany.  "'57 
Infrastructure  investment supported  by the federal government  will 
in fact be more important  than private investment by Western firms. 
Making  estimates from the federal budget is difficult  because not all 
expenditures  are broken down between East and West. Estimates of 
government  investment  in East German  infrastructure  range  from  a low 
of DM 35 billion to a high of DM 55 billion.58  At the minimum,  these 
expenditures  will include  DM 6.5 billion  for telecommunications;59  DM 
8.0 billion for the East German  Reichsbahn;  DM 3.4 billion for road 
construction;60  and  aDM 5.0 billion  subsidy  programforlocal  investment 
in schools, hospitals, and retirement  homes.6' 
Government  Spending 
Local government  will be a significant  contributor  to the East German 
recession. The removal  of high  taxes and  other  governmental  collections 
contracts  with 350 East German firms to supply parts. Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung, 
October  6, 1990. 
56. Ferdinand  Protzman,  "Germans  Lower  Expectations  on East's Economic  Recov- 
ery," The  New York  Times,  February  13, 1991,  p. C2. 
57. PlanEcon  (1990,  p. 2). 
58.  SeeSSuddeutscheZeitung,March2/3,1991,p.13.FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung, 
March  2, 1991,  pp. 1-2, and  March  6, p. 1. 
59. Neumann  (1990,  p. 10). 
60.  Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  February 8, 1991, p. 13. 
61. Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  March  2, 1991,  p. 1. The state and local govern- 
ments  may  add  to this from  their  own revenue  sources. 38  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
at economic union has resulted in a loss of revenue for state and local 
governments.  This loss has been partly  compensated  by contributions 
from the West, mainly  from the federal government,  of approximately 
DM 62 billion  out of DM 97 billion in projected  expenditures  for 1991.62 
This contribution,  however, is not sufficient  to avoid significant  layoffs. 
At the end of 1990  there were 1.7 million state and local employees, of 
whom 300,000 were in Wartestand  (a "state of waiting"-roughly the 
public  sector equivalent  of short  time). By the end of 1991  the Deutsches 
Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung  (DIW) projects that only about 1.1 
million  will be employed  with no one in the state of waiting.63  These cuts 
are consistent with the October 1990  projections  by the German  labor 
ministry  of a decline  of 700,000  public  employees.M4  In addition,  the army 
will be reduced  from  its 178,000  troops in 1989  to 50,000.65 
The Multiplier, Budget  Cuts,  and Infrastructure Investment 
The German  government is naturally  preoccupied with limiting  its 
spending  in the East and controlling  the budget  deficits of the five new 
Lander. If spending in the East is curtailed, however, the sales and 
production  of East German  firms  will fall even further.  Moreover,  as we 
will show, it will be almost impossible for the German  government  to 
achieve deficit reduction through spending cuts in the East. More 
importantly,  such reductions, if achieved, could lower output dramati- 
cally. In other words, spending  increases undertaken  now will not be 
62.  Wochenbericht,  10/91,  table 1, p. 92. We have added  to DIW's  estimates  of DM  35 
billion  from  the Unity Fund  and  a DM 10  billion  contribution  from "other"  governments 
DM 5 billion  from VAT collections and DM 12 billion  from recently announced  federal 
subsidies  to municipal  governments.  The  VAT  collections  were  included  in tax collections 
but the DM 12 billion  in subsidies were not. Although  the subsidies  are earmarked  for 
special  programs,  we have  not altered  the DM  97 billion  of expenditures  because  it is likely 
that the Lander and municipalities  will use these funds for programs  that are already 
budgeted  in light  of their  anticipated  deficits. 
63. We are grateful  to Rudolf  Zwiener  of DIW  for making  available  these projections 
as well as for clarifying  the budgetary  data. 
64.  Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  September  25,  1991. In 1989 total civilian  em- 
ployment  in the state sector, including  health,  schools, culture,  communal  activities, and 
social services amounted  to about 1.8 million  workers.  Statistisches  Amt der  DDR (1990, 
p. 125).  This  figure  does not include  workers  in local transportation  and  waterworks. 
65. Terence Roth, "Most East German  Soldiers are Fading  Away as Reunification 
with  a Former  Enemy  Nears," The  Wall  Street  Journal,  September  10, 1990,  p. A10. George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  39 
very costly from the perspective of either social welfare or the budget. 
The policy implications  are straightforward:  reductions  in spending  in 
East Germany should be  avoided at the present time and needed 
infrastructure  investments-especially  those using local factors of pro- 
duction and locally produced intermediate  inputs intensively-should 
be undertaken  as soon as possible, while unemployment  remains  high. 
These implications  follow from  the simple Keynesian  multiplier  model, 
which  provides  a good approximation  to the determination  of output  and 
deficits  in the current  depression.  The simple  "Keynesian  Cross" model 
is relevant in analyzing  the consequences of spending  changes in East 
Germany  because interest rates, exchange rates, and prices can all be 
considered fixed. Interest rates and exchange rates are fixed because 
they are determined  outside East Germany;  prices are fixed because 
they have already  fallen to average short-run  variable  costs (j  in figure 
1) or below; as we show later, there is an elastic supply of labor at the 
current  wage. 
The model we have in mind  is straightforward.  Income (Y)  is the sum 
of consumption (C), investment (1), government spending (G), and 
exports (X)  less imports  (M). Output  is produced  by labor  (N) according 
to the production  function Y =  N/b.  There is a transfer  to the unem- 
ployed,  TR =  0(1  -  t  -  y) w (L  -  N),  where  w is the East German 
wage, t is the average  income  tax rate, y is the rate  of both employer  and 
employee contributions  to social insurance,  L is the labor  force, and 0 is 
the net replacement  ratio  due to unemployment  benefits. Consumption 
depends  on disposable  income:  C  =  C0 +  c[(1  -  t  -  y) wN  +  TR], 
where  c is the marginal  propensity  to consume  out of disposable  income. 
Imports  have consumption,  investment, and government  components, 
so that M  =  Mo  +  mCC  +  mI,  +  mGG.  Investment, government 
spending,  and  exports are autonomously  set at I, G, and  X respectively. 
The equilibrium  level of income in this model is  Y =  aA,  where 
A =  (1 -  mc) [C0 +  Oc  (1 -  t -  y) wL] +  (1 -  m1)I 
+  (  -  mG)  G + X -  MO 
is autonomous  spending  on domestic  output  and  ax  is the multiplier.  The 
multiplier is ax =  1/[1 -  (1  -  mc) c (1  -  t  -  y) (1  -  0) bw]. Taking 
reasonable benchmark parameters of 0 -  0.68,  t =  0.045,  y  =  0.1825, 
mc  =  0.5,  c  =  0.85,  and bw  =  0.65 (the approximate value of labor's 
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low: ot =  1.073.  With  reasonable  parameter  values, the multiplier  is low 
because consumption  of domestic goods varies remarkably  little with 
the level of output.  This is due to the high  marginal  propensity  to import 
and  the existence of unemployment  compensation,  which  automatically 
stabilizes  workers'  real  income. 
The model can be used to approximate  the impact of changes in 
government  spending  on the overall East German  budget deficit. We 
define  the East German  budget  deficit  broadly  as the difference  between 
the outlays  and  the receipts  of all governmental  entities  in East  Germany, 
including the federal, Ldnder, and local governments, the social in- 
surance  funds, and the Treuhandanstalt.  It is this aggregate  deficit  that 
must ultimately  be financed  by West Germany.  Although  the budget  of 
each governmental  entity is now determined  separately  and decisions 
are taken independently, there are obvious spillovers between the 
activities of one entity and the receipts or expenditures  of others. 
The revenue accruing from economic activity in East Germany 
consists of the net surpluses  (or deficits)  of the former  Kombinate  that 
are owned by the Treuhandanstalt. These amount to [Y -  w(1 +  y) N]. 
In addition, there is income tax revenue amounting  to twN and social 
insurance  contributions  of 2-ywN.  Total outlays consist of government 
purchases, G, and transfer  payments, as defined  above. In this model, 
the increase  in the budget  deficit  caused  by a one deutsche  mark  increase 
in government  spending  (or investment)  is 
1 -  O(1  -  mG)  [  -  (  -  0)(1 -  t -  -y)bw]. 
Using the previously assumed benchmark  parameters,  a one deutsche 
mark  increase in government  spending  raises the deficit by only 0.099 
deutsche mark  if the marginal  propensity  to import  out of government 
spending  is zero. If mG =  0.2, the impact  on the deficit  amounts  to 0.279 
deutsche mark; and with mG =  0.5, this impact rises to 0.550. The clear 
implication  of this model is that  projects  that call for higher  government 
spending  in East Germany  and  that  have low import  content can now be 
undertaken  at low cost to West German taxpayers. Such spending 
creates  jobs now, when idle labor  is available  to work, and  also has long- 
run  payoffs. The budgetary  cost of government  spending  is low for two 
major  reasons. First, the new spending  creates  jobs; employed  workers 
pay income taxes and  contribute  to social insurance  rather  than  drawing 
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revenue for the firms,  creating  profits  for the Treuhandanstalt  or, more 
realistically,  reducing  the subsidies. 
The rocketing East German  budget deficit has produced numerous 
calls for spending cuts in the East in order to control the costs of 
economic  union  to West German  taxpayers  and  to reduce  the associated 
deficit spending in East Germany.66  The model also shows that such 
attempts  could  prove costly for Eastern  output  and  employment.  If East 
German  spending  is adjusted  to hit a fixed deficit  target, a one deutsche 
mark  reduction  in the deficit  brought  about  by spending  cuts could take 
a heavy toll on output. The magnitude  of this burden  depends on the 
fraction of government spending for Eastern goods. A one deutsche 
mark  reduction  in the deficit due to lower government  spending  lowers 
outputoby  (I  -  MG)/[MG?  bw(I  -  )(t -  t  -  y)(l  -  MG  -  C(1  -  mc))] 
With mG =  0, this output multiplier  is 10.82. With higher values-0.2 
and  0.5-for  mG,  the impact  on output  drops  to 3.07  and  0.98  respectively. 
That is,  when the marginal  propensity for government to spend on 
imported  goods is low, enormous expenditure  cuts and East German 
output reductions are required  to lower East German  budget deficits. 
The deficit is difficult  to reduce because spending  cuts directed  at East 
German  products  swell the unemployment  rolls, raising  unemployment 
compensation  payments  and  reducing  the profits  (or  raising  the required 
subsidies)  of companies  held  by the  Treuhandanstalt.  Since  the reduction 
in the deficit is so small  when the spending  cuts are directed  at Eastern 
goods, the cuts required  to lower the deficit are extremely large, as is 
the associated decline in Eastern  employment  and  output.67,68 
66. The Bundesbank  has been particularly  concerned  about the likely magnitude  of 
the public  sector borrowing  requirement  (PSBR). By early November 1990  forecasts of 
the 1991  PSBR reached  DM 140-150  billion,  or 4.5 to 5 percent  of GNP. During  the fall, 
the Bundesbank  began  to put strong  pressure  on the government  to limit  deficit  financing 
by raising  interest  rates. See, for example,  Financial  Times,  November  5, 1990,  p. 16. 
67. Alternatively  stated,  West  German  financing  of the Eastern  budget  deficit  provides 
a capital  inflow, permitting  the East to run a current  account deficit. If the West insists 
East German  budget  deficits be cut, thus reducing  the capital  inflow into the East, the 
East's current  account  deficit  must  correspondingly  decline.  This  implies  that  output  must 
fall until  the induced  decline in imports  resulting  from lower East German  consumption 
and from lower government expenditure matches the decline in permissible deficit 
spending.  Large  output  declines  are  likely  to be necessary  for such  deficit  spending  targets 
to be achieved. 
68. There has been great concern in Germany  that large fiscal deficits incurred  on 
behalf of the East will lead to higher  German  interest  rates and an appreciation  of the 
deutsche mark.  The legitimacy  of this concern depends on the cause of the deficit. For 42  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Developments  in the Labor Market 
The  dramatic  decline  in output  after  currency  union  was accompanied 
by a substantial  growth  in unemployment  (either overt unemployment 
or involuntary  "short-time"  work);  employment  also declined sharply, 
though  not to the same extent or with the same speed as output.69'70  As 
of  February 1991, about 30 percent of  the labor force was either 
unemployed  or on short  time; vacancies in January  1991  stood at about 
15  percent  of their  January  1990  level. These developments  are summa- 
rized in tables 1 and 3. 
The  existence of such  substantial  labor  market  slack  could  be expected 
to produce downward pressure on real wages. However, consumer 
prices have remained  relatively  stable throughout  the period, and nom- 
inal wages have risen dramatically.  Eastern  wages began to rise during 
the early spring  of 1990,  and  the growth  in wages continued  after  July 1. 
These increases  (reported  in table  5) amount  to 42 percent  of gross wages 
for full-time industrial  workers between the first quarter  of 1990 and 
October  1990. 
Despite these increases, Eastern wages are still roughly 50 percent 
below Western  wages.7' High Eastern  unemployment  accompanied  by 
example, if CMEA orders  from East Germany  decline in 1991,  Eastern  output  will fall 
further  and unemployment  will rise. Additional  unemployment  of 100,000  workers  for a 
year would automatically  raise unemployment  compensation  benefits  by about DM 946 
million, assuming an average wage of DM 1,500 a month. Income tax receipts and 
contributions  to social security would fall by about DM 738 million. At fixed Eastern 
expenditure  levels, the Eastern deficit would rise. Such "passive" deficits, however 
(unlike  those resulting  from  deliberately  stimulative  "active" fiscal  policy), do not result 
in any demand  stimulus  (a rightward  shift of the IS curve), which would cause interest 
rates  to rise. 
69. Three sources accounted  for most of the decline in employment  since the fall of 
1989.  First, unemployment  (as a fraction  of the labor  force) rose from  zero to 7.3 percent 
in December;  second, migration  flows (mostly  to West Germany)  reduced  the labor  force 
by about 6 percent; third, about half a million workers (6 percent of the labor force) 
accepted an early retirement  option offered to workers  at least 57 years of age (Klodt 
[1990b]).  The East German  labor force was also reduced by the discharge  of 270,000 
working old-age pensioners and 100,000 foreign workers (mainly Vietnamese). See 
Deutsche  Bank  Economics  Department  (1991a). 
70. The  dramatic  decline  in productivity  was unexpected,  at least  in part  because  labor 
productivity  increased  following  the West German  currency  reforms  of 1948. 
71. In 1989  average  gross monthly  wages and salaries  per employee  in the FRG  were 
DM 3,192. The comparable  figure  in the GDR  in the first  half of 1990  was 1,110  mark,  or George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  43 
a large East-West wage differential provides strong incentives for 
migration.  While  it is clear  that  migration  will contribute  significantly  to 
the reduction  of Eastern  unemployment  over the long run, we will show 
that  it  will  occur  sufficiently  slowly  to make  a  relatively  small  contribution 
to lowering  unemployment  over the next several years. 
In this section we explore issues that  affect the Eastern  labor  market, 
focusing on the key questions of migration  and the rise in wages since 
currency  union. Many  of our  results  are  based on surveys we conducted 
in February  1991  in East Germany.  One of our surveys consists of 210 
personal  interviews of individuals,  who were arbitrarily  approached  in 
cafeterias, shopping areas, and train stations in Dresden, Leipzig, 
Magdeburg,  and Rostock. These individuals  were at least 16 years old, 
had  grown  up in the former  GDR, worked  during  the previous  year, and 
were currently  in the labor  force. They were asked a series of questions 
about  their  perceptions  of labor  market  opportunities  in East and West 
Germany,  their  migration  intentions,  and  their  opinions  concerning  wage 
developments  in the East since currency  union. In addition,  45 identical 
surveys were administered,  mainly to unemployed  people, at employ- 
ment offices in East Germany.  We also distributed  1,000 surveys that 
could be answered and mailed to the United States; we have received 
301 admissible  written responses. Finally, a variant  of the survey was 
administered  in person to  107 students at universities in Dresden, 
Leipzig, and Magdeburg;  the students  had grown  up in the former  GDR 
and planned  to seek employment  after graduation.  University students 
are of special interest because they tend to be extremely mobile and 
highly  skilled.72'73 
about  35 percent  of the 1989  FRG figure.  Wage  increases  during  1990  have reduced  this 
differential  to approximately  50 percent.  However, the gross wage  differential  overstates 
the real wage gap between East and West Germany  because rent is highly  subsidized  in 
the East. In July 1990  the typical  four-person  household  in East Germany  spent  DM 55 a 
month  on rent;  in contrast,  the typical  four-person  household  in West  Germany  spent  DM 
694 a month  in 1989.  See Statistisches  Amt der DDR (1990,  pp. 319, 479). It is estimated 
that living  space per inhabitant  in the GDR was 25 square  meters  in comparison  with 35 
square  meters  in the FRG. See Melzer  (1989,  p. 95). East German  rent  per  worker  will rise 
by DM  441  a month  for a family  of four  if rentals  per  square  meter  are  adjusted  to Western 
levels. For a two-worker  household  earning  DM 1,500  per earner  per month  (assuming  a 
marginal  payroll  tax rate of 0.3825), gross wages would have to rise by 23.8 percent  to 
compensate  Eastern  workers  for higher  rents. 
72. The personal surveys were conducted by Helga Hessenius, Daniel Gross, and 
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Migration 
Free labor mobility was enshrined  in the state treaty, though there 
had been much migration  before economic union. Table 9 presents 
monthly  migration  flows  between East and  West  Germany  since October 
1989.  Much  of the influx  occurred  during  late 1989  and  early 1990,  before 
East Germans  knew that unification  would occur; many migrants  were 
taking  advantage  of what was viewed as a potentially short window of 
opportunity. When it became clear that the migration option was 
permanent,  flows fell to lower levels. 
Annual migration  flows during 1989 and 1990  amounted  to about 2 
percent  of the East German  population.74  These flows are  large,  but  they 
are not without historical precedent. From 1950 to 1959, 2.6 million 
individuals  migrated  from the GDR and other Eastern  European  coun- 
tries to the FRG.7s 
Leipzig,  Magdeburg,  Rostock, Jena, Chemnitz,  Gera, Erfurt,  and  Eisenach.  Participants 
were asked to respond  only if the household  contained  a member  of the labor  force who 
had  worked  during  the previous  year. Of the 327 responses  that  were received  by March 
23, 301  were  admissible.  The  mail  survey  was identical  to the  personal  (nonstudent)  survey 
in all  respects  but  one: in the personal  survey,  respondents  were  asked  to "agree,  partially 
agree/partially  disagree,  or disagree"  with a number  of statements.  In the corresponding 
questions  in the mail  survey, respondents  were given the additional  option  of agreeing  or 
disagreeing  strongly.  A trial  version  of our  survey  was conducted  in late  January;  the data 
from  this initial  attempt  were used to revise the survey  and  have not been directly  used as 
data. 
73. Our  nonstudent  survey  was not a random  sample  of the East German  labor  force. 
For example,  we undersampled  rural  residents  and women and oversampled  individuals 
with higher  than average education  and training.  We intentionally  oversampled  unem- 
ployed individuals.  The following numbers  provide a comparison  of the incidence of 
various demographic  characteristics  in the actual GDR labor force in 1988  and in our 
sample  (actual/sample):  percentage  of men  (51.1/62.1);  percentage  under  25 years  old(12.9/ 
13.5);  percentage  of 25-34 year  olds (26.2/22.8);  percentage  of 35-44 year  olds (21.5/28.6); 
percentage of 45-59 year olds (33.1/32.7); percentage of  60-64 year olds (4.6/2.2); 
percentage  over 65 years  old (1.7/0.0).  The following  concern  educational  characteristics: 
percentage  who attended  college or university,  Hochschule (7.3/14.6);  percentage  with 
vocational  or technical  training,  or occupational  certificate,  Meister  or Fachschule  (16.4/ 
28.3); percentage  with an apprenticeship,  Abgeschlossene  Lehre (55.3/45.0);  percentage 
with no apprenticeship,  keine Berufsausbildung  (20.9/11.6). See Statistisches Amt der 
DDR (1990,  pp. 128-29)  and  Institut  der  deutschen  Wirtschaft  (1990,  p. 116). 
74. Migrants  from the East in 1988 (the last year for which the relevant data are 
available)  were younger  than the West German  populace, with fewer housewives (1.3 
percent  versus 23.9 percent)  and  retirees  (14.2 percent  versus 21.6 percent).  See Bundes- 
anstalt  fur  Arbeit  (1991). 
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Table 9.  Migration between East and West Germany,  1989-90 
Number of people 
Eastern  estimatesa  Western estimatesb 
Outflow  Inflow  Outflow  Inflow  Inflow  Inflow 
Month  in 1989  in 1989  in 1990  in 1990  in 1989  in 1990 
January  ...  ...  41,413  593  4,627  73,729 
February  ...  .  45,062  151  5,008  63,893 
March  ...  ...  44,094  71  5,671  46,241 
April  ...  24,052  136  5,887  24,615 
May  ...  ...  13,940  265  10,642  19,217 
June  ...  .  13,616  437  12,428  10,689 
July  .  ..  27,323  353  11,707 
August  ...  24,537  581  20,959  ... 
September  .  .  18,150  688  33,255 
October  34,308  61  ...  ...  57,024  ... 
November  70,868  176  ...  ...  133,429 
December  54,200  494  ...  ...  43,221 
Sources: Eastern  measurements  are from  Monatszahlen,  December  1990,  p. 4. Western  measurements  are from 
Bundesanstalt  fur Arbeit  (1991,  table  5). 
a. Eastern  outflow  figures  give the number  of individuals  from  the East who gave notice  of departure  to the West. 
Eastern  inflows  are the number  of individuals  who gave notice  of their  arrival  from  the West. These figures  exclude 
outflows  and inflows  to and  from  foreign  countries. 
b. Western  inflows  are the number  of individuals  from the GDR who registered  upon their arrival  in the West. 
Since currency  union  in July 1990,  migration  has been treated  by the West as internal  migration. 
If migration  continues  at its current  pace, it will be a significant  factor 
in the long-run  reduction  of Eastern unemployment,  but insufficient  to 
eliminate  Eastern unemployment  quickly. In January  1991  there were 
2.6  million unemployed and short-time workers in the East.  With 
migration  at its peak 1989  annual  rate of 344,000  and with 64.4 percent 
of the migrants  employed, it would take over 11 years to eliminate  the 
current unemployment  and short time in the East through migration 
alone.76  Since much of this future migration  will be caused by high 
unemployment,  as we shall demonstrate,  it will not occur so rapidly  as 
to keep unemployment  low.77 
76. This figure  is the premigration  labor  force participation  rate  of 1988  migrants.  See 
Bundesanstalt  fur  Arbeit  (1991,  table 1). 
77. Commuting  will also contribute  to the solution of the unemployment  problem. 
Estimates  of the number  of commuters  in 1990  vary  from 100,000  to 300,000.  Commuting 
is especially  concentrated  around  Berlin  and areas  like Eisenach  and Magdeburg,  which 
are relatively  close to the border.  Commuting  is likely to rise as Eastern  unemployment 
continues  and  closer ties with  the West are attained.  It is of interest  to record  the number 
of workers  who live within relatively easy commuting  distance of the West. In 1989, 
697,100  people  worked  in East  Berlin;  548,700  worked  in  Potsdam  (close to Berlin);  293,900 
worked  in Schwerin  (at the western end of Mecklenburg-Western  Pomerania);  654,100 
worked  in the Magdeburg  region;  and  648,400  worked  in the Erfurt  region,  which  includes 
Eisenach.  See Statistisches  Amt der  DDR (1990,  pp. 67, 85, 89, 93). 46  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Table 10.  Survey Answers Concerning Migration and Employment Conditions in East 
and West Germany for Various Subgroups of the East German Population 
Responses  of those  answering  question,  in percent 
Nonstudents 
Unem-  Short-  Under 
Survey  item  All  Employed  ployed  time  Female  31  Students 
Number  of respondents  556  460  96  99  211  144  107 
Migration  scalea 
0  22  21  29  16  32  13  3 
1-2  16  16  15  21  16  9  3 
3-4  19  20  13  19  17  21  25 
5  29  30  24  25  24  32  48 
6-7  7  7  7  1  1  4  14  13 
8-10  8  7  12  8  7  10  9 
Willing  to wait for 
Eastern  job paying 
current  wagesb  85  86  85  91  88  80  75 
Median  wait time 
(months)c  6  6  6  6  6  6  6 
Would  then try to work 
in Westd  11  11  15  13  7  14  28 
Expected  percent 
change  in wages if 
work in Weste  154  145  199  143  154  151  118 
Hard  to find  a 
job in the Westf  Yes  65  66  61  69  73  55  ... 
No  35  34  39  31  27  45  ... 
Expect to lose 
my Eastern  jobs  Agree  28  28  ...  65  28  38 
Disagree  39  39  ...  9  37  37  ... 
Hard  to find  a new 
job in the Easth  Agree  73  73  78  86  73  64  51 
Disagree  15  14  22  4  13  22  12 
(Continued) 
There  are three  major  findings  of our survey. First, the great  majority 
of people  are  reluctant  to migrate  and  do not anticipate  doing  so. Second, 
the minority  of people who consider  it very likely that they will migrate 
is large enough that the size of future migration  from East Germany  is 
apt to resemble what has occurred since September 1989. Third, a 
significant  fraction  of East Germans  consider  migration  a serious  option 
and could be pushed into moving. Wage differentials  will not induce 
them to move, but lack of work for a sufficiently  long period  will drive 
them to it. The answers to survey questions concerning  migration  and 
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Table 10  (continued) 
Nonstudents 
Unem-  Short-  Under 
Survey  item  All  Employed  ployed  time  Female  31  Students 
Expect wages in the 
East to rise quicklyi  Agree  46  52  19  37  47  35  44 
Disagree  31  26  59  29  29  42  27 
Willing  to accept up 
to a 20 percent 
wage cuti  Agree  28  32  25  13  30  17 
Disagree  59  48  70  75  57  78  ... 
Wouldn't  be welcome 
in the Westk  Agree  44  45  40  42  48  35  21 
Disagree  27  26  32  25  22  33  45 
Sources: Authors'  own surveys of 556 nonstudents  and 107 students  in East Germany  in February  1991.  The 
results  for students,  which  are reported  in the last column,  were gathered  from  comparable  questions  in the special 
student  survey  with appropriate  changes  in wording  as described  in the text. For several  questions  the respondents 
were asked  to agree, partly  agree-partly  disagree,  or disagree  with  a given statement.  In the mail  sample,  they could 
also agree strongly  and disagree  strongly.  The percentages  who agree or disagree  in the table include  those who 
agree  strongly  or disagree  strongly,  respectively. 
a. The migration  scale refers  to a scale from  0 to 10, where  0 means "I am not going  to work  in West Germany 
under  any condition",  and 10 means  "I am definitely  going  to work  in West Germany." 
b. "Imagine  the following  situation:  (If employed:  You are unemployed  and)  you learn  that  new, secure  jobs will 
be created  in East Germany  which  pay wages  comparable  to your  old (current)  job. If you can be reasonably  certain 
that  you will be offered  a job, would  you be prepared  to wait for this  job?" 
c.  "How many  months  would  you wait?" 
d.  "What  would  you do next?" 
e.  "By what percent  would  your wages change  if you worked  in West  Germany?" 
f.  "Do you think  it would  be difficult  or easy to find  a job in West  Germany?" 
g. "If I stay in East Germany  I will probably  lose my  job." 
h. (If employed:  If I lose my current  job) "it will be difficult  to find  a (new)  job in East Germany." 
i.  "If I keep my current  job (or, if unemployed,  find a new job) in East Germany  I think  that my wages will 
increase  quickly." 
j.  (If employed:  If I lost my current  job) "I would  be prepared  to accept  a new  job here  in East Germany  paying 
up to 20 percent  less than  my old (current)  job." 
k. "I don't  think  that I would  be welcome  in West  Germany." 
To gauge  the chances of migration,  we asked  respondents  to rate  their 
chances of working  in West Germany  on a scale of 0 to lO.78  Zero  meant 
"I will  not work  in West  Germany  under  any  circumstances.  " Ten  meant 
"I will definitely  work in West Germany."  We shall  loosely refer  to this 
scale as the "migration"  scale, but, because working  in the West is not 
synonymous  with living  there, we also asked respondents  whether  they 
might  commute  to the West. Commuting  was particularly  important  for 
those who indicated a high intention of working in the West. Eight 
percent of respondents  rated themselves 8, 9, or 10 on the scale, and 
78. The survey statistics reported  in the text pertain  to the merged sample of 556 
observations,  which consist of the 255 personal  interviews  and the 301 admissible  mail 
surveys.  The statistics  pertain  to nonstudents  unless otherwise  specified. 48  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
thus gave a clear indication  of their  intention  of working  in the West. Of 
these, 54 percent  indicated  that  they might  commute  to jobs in the West 
rather  than live there. Thirty-eight  percent of respondents  rated them- 
selves 0, 1, or 2 on the migration  scale; these respondents  gave clear 
indication  of their intention  to stay in East Germany.  The remainder  of 
the sample-a  clear majority-gave answers between 3 and 7. Twenty- 
nine percent rated  themselves at 5. In the opinion of our interviewers, 
such scores indicate that working in the West is an option for our 
respondents,  one which  they understand  and, if driven  to it, will choose. 
Respondents'  answers  are  not  proportional  to their  subjective  probability 
of working  in the West. Many of those who scored themselves as 5 on 
our scale gave other indications  of their strong  attachment  to the East, 
suggesting that migration  would be a last resort. On the basis of the 
migration scale, students were the most willing to migrate, with an 
average response of 4.9; both employed and unemployed  respondents 
averaged  3.5 79,80 
An important  indication that East Germans  are reluctant to move 
appears  in their expressed willingness  to wait for  jobs to appear  in the 
East that  are comparable  to those now available.  We asked nonstudents 
who were unemployed:  "Imagine  the following  situation:  you learn  that 
new, secure jobs will be created in East Germany  which pay wages 
comparable  to your old job. If you can be reasonably  certain that you 
will be offered a job, would you be prepared  to wait for this job?" We 
asked the same question to employed respondents,  asking  them first  to 
imagine  that they had lost their current  job. Eighty-five  percent of all 
nonstudents  said  they would  be willing  to wait  for such  ajob. When  asked 
how long they would wait the median answer was six months. When 
asked what  they would do next only 11  percent  of those who would wait 
indicated  any  intention  of looking  for  work  in  the West. More  (14  percent) 
said they would begin retraining.  Many  others said they would look for 
different  jobs in the East or "wait some more [sic]  ". Nor did  most of the 
79. The standard  deviation  of this estimate  is 0.1. The existence of nontrivial  sample 
selection  bias probably  means  that  this figure  overstates  mobility,  since women (who are 
underrepresented)  gave lower scores than  men and we have excluded  nonparticipants  in 
the labor  market  (who have tended  not to migrate). 
80. Our  results  are broadly  consistent  with the findings  of a recent  poll carried  out by 
the Emnid  Institute  for Der Spiegel. In that poll, 71 percent  of East Germans  indicated 
that  they  would  stay  in East  Germany  no matter  what;  22 percent  said  they  would  probably 
stay; 5 percent  would probably  go West; and 1 percent  would definitely  migrate.  "Hun- 
derttausende  ab in den Westen,"  Der Spiegel, March  18, 1991,  pp. 50-57. George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  49 
15  percent  of respondents  who indicated  that  they would  not waitfor the 
job we described  indicate  that they would work in the West.81 
This reluctance  to move was similarly  clear for university students, 
who, as the migration  scale confirmed,  are much more mobile than the 
population  at large.  Eighty-nine  percent  of students  said  that  they would 
prefer to work in the East if they were offered  jobs with comparable 
wages and  working  conditions  in both the East and the West. We asked 
this group:  "Suppose that you have tried  to find  ajob in East Germany 
but were not successful. You find out that new, secure jobs will be 
created  in East Germany  which will pay wages comparable  to those now 
prevailing  in the East. If you are reasonably certain that you will be 
offered one of these jobs, would you be willing to wait for that  job?" 
Seventy-five  percent  of those asked indicated  that  they would  be willing 
to wait for these Eastern  jobs that they think  pay less than half those in 
the West. Furthermore  the average length of time they would wait is 
fairly long. The median wait is  six months.82  Finally, it should be 
emphasized  that for both students and nonstudents, the willingness to 
wait for ajob in the East is just as high  for those who think  they can find 
work  easily in the West as for those who think  that  it would  be difficult. 
We  attempted  in a number  of ways to gauge  the sensitivity  of migration 
to wage differentials.  We find  no systematic evidence that wage differ- 
entials on their own are an important  driving  force for migration.  Our 
respondents  are  well aware  of the differences  in wages that  prevail.  They 
expected, optimistically, that they would receive a 154 percent wage 
increase if they worked in the West. (We estimate the monthly gross 
income differential  at 100 percent.)83  Nevertheless, in spite of these 
81. Of the 15  percent  of respondents  who said they would not wait for a  job identical 
to their  old one at their  old wages, only 21 percent  rated  their  chance  of migrating  as 7 or 
higher.  The unemployed  individuals  who said  they would  not wait  gave a mean  migration 
score of 4.3. 
82. Students may be impatient  to find  jobs because they do not have the financial 
resources that nonstudents may enjoy, such as savings or access to unemployment 
benefits. 
83. The wage gap  is larger  for more  skilled  members  of the labor  force since the wage 
distribution  in East Germany  was highly compressed. For example those with college 
degrees  (HochschulabschluJ3)  in the East earn  wages 54 percent  more  than  those with no 
apprenticeship  training  (Ohne  Berufsausbildung),  while, in the West, college graduates 
earn double. Similarly  the average  wage of managers  and consultants  in the East with 
college degrees is 85 percent higher than the average wages of those without special 
training  in retail trade; the comparable  wage gap in the West is  182 percent. See 
Wochenbericht,  32/90,  August  9, 1990,  table 1, p. 443. 50  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
differentials,  the vast majority  of respondents  do not care to move. In 
regressions  attempting  to explain  the migration  propensity,  as measured 
by the migration  scale, we found  no economically  significant  correlation 
between expected wage gains and self-score on the migration  scale. 
To investigate the possibility that the current  wage differential  has 
little effect on migration  because it is expected to be eliminated  rapidly, 
we asked employed  individuals  to agree  or disagree  with the statement: 
"If I keep my current  job, I expect that my wages will rise quickly." 
Unemployed  individuals  were asked to respond  to the analogous  state- 
ment: "If I stay in East Germany  and find a new job, I think that my 
wages will rise quickly." Only 46 percent of respondents agreed or 
agreed strongly with this statement. Thirty-one percent disagreed or 
disagreed  strongly.  In addition,  the willingness  to migrate  was uncorre- 
lated with wage expectations, even when attention  is confined  to those 
who think  it would be easy to obtain  work in the West, suggesting  that 
wage differentials are not an important factor governing migration 
decisions. We consider it additional  evidence that both employed and 
unemployed  respondents  are willing to wait for a job in the East that 
offers wages identical to those in their current  or previous  job, rather 
than look for a job in the West that they think  offers more than double 
the  pay. The  wage  differential  may  attract  some, but  not  the  vast  majority  . 
People may, however, be pushed to the West by lack of available 
jobs. Respondents  in our survey  were fully aware  of the prospects  ofjob 
loss and the difficulties  that they would face in finding  new work in the 
East.  Seventeen percent of  our sample were already unemployed. 
Twenty-two percent of those employed were on short time. Of the 
employed  respondents  only 39 percent  disagreed  with the statement  "If 
I stay in East Germany I will probably lose my job."  Twenty-eight 
percent agreed  or strongly  agreed, and the remaining  33 percent  partly 
agreed  and  partly  disagreed.  The  great  majority  (73  percent)  of employed 
people feared  that if they lost their  job it would be difficult  to find  a new 
one in the East. Similarly,  78 percent  of the unemployed  felt that a new 
job would  be difficult  to find.  In  these circumstances,  migration  becomes 
a possibility that must be entertained. As the ratings given on the 
migration  scale indicate, the majority  of individuals  have entertained 
this possibility. This explains why 62 percent of  the sample rated 
themselves above 2 on the migration  scale in spite of clear indications 
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Eastern  work  in the  future  will make  migration  more  likely. For  example, 
while 75 percent of the students who preferred  working  in the East at 
equal pay were willing to wait for a job in the East if it was reasonably 
certain  that one would materialize,  this number  fell to 35 percent  if the 
prospect of getting such a job was only 50 percent over the course of a 
year. Older people seemed less willing to migrate  in response to job 
uncertainty,  as indicated  by the small  number  of individuals  who told us 
they would  work  in the West following  the wait  for ajob that, in the end, 
did not materialize. 
At least initially,  unemployment  will not push previous  jobholders  to 
migrate  because German  unemployment  benefits are fairly generous. 
For the first  year of unemployment,  benefits are 68 percent of terminal 
net wages for those with  children  and  63 percent  for those without;  these 
benefits  decline to 58 and  53 percent  respectively after  one year.84  They 
do not, however, last indefinitely.  After two years they are replaced  by 
welfare payments  at the same level. But welfare is means tested and is 
not granted  if a spouse is employed or receiving either unemployment 
compensation or welfare benefits. Since most prime-aged, married- 
couple households in East Germany  have two earners,  a two-year  spell 
of unemployment  threatens  an ultimate  reduction  in family income of 
one-half  if the spouse is employed and more than two-thirds  if both are 
unemployed.85  As a result, East Germans cannot expect to remain 
unemployed  for very long periods  living  on their  unemployment  benefits 
at more or less  their previous standard of living. If jobs  continue 
disappearing  at present  rates, and  new  jobs do not materialize,  migration 
will become a necessity. 
Thus  far, East Germans  who have migrated  and  looked  for work  have 
quickly found it in the West-more  quickly than the West German 
unemployed.  Between July 1989  and June 1990, 538,000  GDR citizens 
migrated to West Germany. If one assumes that the West German 
unemployment  durations  structure  applies  to unemployed  migrants  and 
that previously  employed migrants  who did not enter training  would be 
seeking  jobs, one would  predict  unemployment  for  migrants  in June 1990 
84. Deutsche  Bank  Economics  Department  (1990,  p. 50). 
85. Participation  rates  were  higher  in  the  GDR  (around  53  percent  of the GDR  populace 
is employed  versus  48 percent  in the FRG),  especially  for women  (50  percent  for the GDR 
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of 138,700.86 In contrast the actual unemployment  of migrants  in that 
month  was 84,000. 
Nevertheless, it is important  to realize that the first  migrants  do not 
represent  a random  sample  of the Eastern  populace, since the decision 
to migrate  is voluntary. People with unusual initiative or transferable 
skills  were more  likely to migrate  in the early  stages. A random  selection 
of the East German  population  would probably  not have found  jobs so 
quickly.87 
Although  average  education  levels in East Germany  are  high, studies 
of migrants  have also shown that many  were underprepared  for work in 
the West, especially for using Western  technology. Those who found it 
especially difficult  were engineers, service sales people, and cashiers.88 
The difference between the East and West is epitomized, although 
exaggerated, by the coal shoveling  jobs held by some of our survey 
interviewees in Saxony. They were understandably  puzzled why they 
should be asked the survey question: "Do you think that it would be 
easy or difficult  to find  ajob in West Germany?"  89 
Our  survey  sought  to determine  more  generally  whether  East  Germans 
thought  it would be easy or difficult  to obtain  work in the West. A small 
majority  of the survey respondents  thought  it would be difficult  to find 
work in the West. For instance, 66 percent of employed respondents 
and 61 percent  of unemployed  respondents  stated that it would be hard 
86. We calculated  the exit rates  from  unemployment  by cohort  of entry  using  Salant's 
method. See Salant (1977, pp. 39-57). We assumed 64.4 percent of migrants  would be 
seeking  jobs. This is the rate  of prior  employment  of those who migrated  in 1988.  For the 
estimate of unemployment,  we conservatively  assumed that no migrants  who entered 
training  would seek jobs before June 1990. We assumed that 16.0 percent  would enter 
training.  This  is the ratio  of those who entered  training  in 1990  relative  to an estimate  of all 
migrants  for 1990,  which  extrapolates  the March  to June  rate  for the rest of the year. See 
Bundesanstalt  fur  Arbeit  (1991,  table  23). 
87. It is also likely that migrants  moved to areas of West Germany  where  jobs were 
relatively  plentiful  rather  than  to regions  with  high  unemployment. 
88. See Klodt  (1990a,  p. 83). 
89. Our survey takers interviewed counselors at the employment service of the 
Bundesanstalt  fur  Arbeit  in  Dresden,  Leipzig,  and  Magdeburg.  These  counselors  reiterated 
that the specific skills of East German  workers  often fail to match the requirements  of 
Western  jobs, giving examples similar  to those noted in the text. They believed that 
significant  numbers  of East Germans  in the West had  failed to pass an initial  three-week 
trial  employment  period. A substantial  number  of workers  arriving  from the East have 
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to find  work  in West Germany;  76 percent  of those who thought  it would 
be hard  also thought  it would  be difficult  even if they changed  occupation. 
In our surveys, we also inquired  about a wide variety  of factors that 
might be expected to affect mobility. We found that one of the most 
important  reasons for staying in the East was the proximity  of family 
and  friends;  78 percent  of nonstudents  and  54 percent  of students  agreed 
that "It is very important  for me to continue living close to my family 
and friends here in East Germany." Furthermore,  individuals who 
reported  that  they  did  not  have  many  friends  or  relatives  in  West  Germany 
were less willing to migrate. (Sixty-two percent of students and 53 
percent of nonstudents indicated that they did have many friends or 
relatives  in the West.) As East Germans  move to the West in increasing 
number,  this  growing  stock  of Zugezogene  will act as an  attractor  toward 
those remaining  in the East. As in a Schelling  "tipping"  model, a reason 
for the continuation  of the flow from East to West will be the stock of 
family  and  friends  who are building  up in the West.90 
We also found  that some potential  explanations  of migration  patterns 
do not appear  to be very important  to the members  of our survey. For 
instance,  neither  Eastern  pollution  nor  high  Western  housing  costs seem 
to affect migration.  These negative  results hold for both our nonstudent 
and  our student  respondents.91 
The  results  obtained  in  our  survey  confirm  the results  of earlier  studies 
that show the reluctance of Germans  to  ixgrate.  For example, Barry 
Eichengreen  has pointed  out that  only 1.3  percent  of the FRG  population 
moved between Lander  in 1983;  in comparison,  3.3 percent  of the U.S. 
population  moved from  one state to another.92  This low rate of German 
migration  occurred despite considerable  interregional  variation  in per 
90. Schelling  (1971). 
91. We  inquired  about  a number  of factors  that  might  influence  mobility.  Respondents 
were  asked, "Do you have  many  friends  and/or  relatives  in the West?"  Fifty-three  percent 
said yes and 47 percent  no. Respondents  were asked to agree, partially  agree-partially 
disagree,  or  disagree  with  several  statements  . The  percentages  of nonstudents  who  agreed/ 
disagreed  follow. "Higher rents deter me from working in the West." (17/72);  "It is 
important  for me to continue  living  close to my family  and  friends  here  in East Germany." 
(78/11);  "Pollution  in East Germany  significantly  lowers my quality  of life." (50/26);  "I 
very much  like the neighborhood  in which I live." (63/10);  "I believe that the quality  of 
life is better  in East Germany  than  in West Germany."  (11/63);  "My family  wouldn't  like 
living  in West  Germany."  (48/27);  "I can easily imagine  living  in West  Germany."  (39/39); 
"I think  that  I should  help  rebuild  the East German  economy." (86/4). 
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capita income: the coefficient of variation  of per capita  income in 1983 
was 0.21  for  31  regions  of the FRG  compared  with  0. 16  for  the continental 
U.S. states.93 
Just because the vast majority  of East Germans  will wait a long time 
to leave, and thus will not soon escape from the growing  joblessness 
there, does not mean that a large migration  to the West will not occur. 
The small  fraction  of the population  who are disposed to leave can still 
yield a large migration  relative to the flows that have occurred so far. 
Our  nonstudent  sample revealed that 8 percent of the population  rated 
their  chances of working  in the West 8, 9, or 10. If half  of the 8's, three- 
quarters  of the 9's, and  all of the 10's  who said they would not commute 
actually  migrate  to West Germany,  then 4.2 percent of the work force 
will migrate. If the labor force participation  rate of migrants  is 64.4 
percent, as in 1988, and if migration  occurs over the next one to two 
years, total migration  would amount  to 551,000  over this period. This is 
comparable  to the rate of migration  in the six months  prior  to currency 
union. 
In West Germany,  there is considerable  fear of migration  from the 
East. Indeed  44 percent  of our Eastern  survey respondents  agreed  with 
the statement  "I don't think  I would be welcome in West Germany."94 
These fears have affected policy. For example, Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl's offer of February  6, 1990,  to enter  into a monetary  and  economic 
union with the GDR was prompted,  at least in part, by the continuing 
large-scale  GDR emigration.  Important  aspects of the state treaty  were 
directly  aimed  at reducing  immigration  into the FRG. Most importantly, 
the decision to convert  wage contracts  at par  was an attempt  to ensure  a 
reasonable standard  of living for East German  workers. In addition, 
unemployment  insurance  paid to GDR residents migrating  to the West 
was reduced  in January  1990;  it had  been calculated  on the basis of FRG 
remuneration  and was changed  to a standardized  integration  allowance 
with a maximum  duration  of one year.95 
93. See Eichengreen  (1990,  p. 11). 
94. Only  27 percent  disagreed. 
95. Prior  to January  1990  unemployment  benefits  were calculated  on the basis of FRG 
remuneration.  Such generous unemployment  benefits  explain why a study of migrants 
published  in 1985  found  a rather  relaxed  attitude  about  taking  jobs. At 68 percent  of FRG 
wages, an Eastern migrant  was typically earning  double his or her previous wages if 
unemployed  in the West. See Ronge (1985). Shortly before union, a number  of other 
special social benefits  that had previously  been granted  to GDR immigrants  by the FRG George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  55 
We view the West German  fear of economic  loss from East German 
migration  as exaggerated. One of the significant  fears-in  addition to 
concerns  about  higher  rents  and  greater  congestion-is  that  immigration 
will lower Western wages.96  Is that fear rational?  The effect of East 
German  emigration  on West German  wages can be approximated.  A 
migration  of 2.5 million  workers  from  East to West over the next decade 
would increase the West German  labor force by 9 percent.97  Suppose 
the production  function  of West German  output  is Cobb-Douglas  with a 
labor share  of 0.65,98 and labor  is paid its marginal  product.  If the West 
German  capital  stock is unaffected  by this migration  flow, wages will be 
depressed  by 3.15 percent  [ =  0.09  x  (1 -  0.65)],  which amounts to a 
0.32 percent reduction  in the (geometric)  annual  wage growth. On the 
alternative  assumption  that  West German  entrepreneurs  borrow  capital 
at  world  market  rates,  which  are  unaffected  by the migration,  the German 
capital-labor  ratio  remains  unchanged  as a consequence  of the migration, 
and  there  is no depression  of German  wages at all.99  A further  indication 
of the ability  of the West German  economy to absorb  migration  inflows 
is the 0.5 percent decrease in the Western  unemployment  rate between 
the third  quarter  of 1989  and July 1990, despite the surge in migration 
during  this period.  In any case, it is important  to note that  approximately 
half  of the migration  into West Germany  is composed  of ethnic  Germans 
from  outside East Germany. 
were also eliminated.  These included  special  official  assistance  in findingjobs  and  housing 
as well as settling-in  grants  and  the celebrated  "welcome  money." East  Germans  also had 
full access to the West German social security system as if they had paid regular 
contributions.  A delay  of three  months  was introduced,  before  which  immigrants  from  the 
GDR  were not entitled  to receive social  benefits;  this delay  is comparable  to that  for FRG 
citizens  who voluntarily  give up ajob. See OECD  (1990). 
96. See Begg  and  others  (1990). 
97. The  West  German  laborforce  in 1989  was 27,742,000.  See Statistisches  Bundesamt 
(1990,  p. 20). 
98. Labor's share  of net social product  at factor cost in West Germany  in 1989  was 
about  67 percent.  See Statistisches  Bundesamt  (1990,  p. 566). Burda  and Sachs estimate 
the elasticity  of output  with  respect  to labor  input  to be 0.64; Burda  and  Sachs (1987,  table 
Al, p. 35). 
99. A further  factor mitigates  the negative  impact  of union on West German  wages. 
An  important  consequence  of currency  union  was a switch  in  demand  toward  West  German 
goods by East German  residents. This switch in consumer  demand, coupled with the 
market's  expectation  of large  future  investment  in the united  Germany,  should  in principle 
lead to an appreciation  of the deutsche  mark,  raising  real  consumption  wages. This issue 
has spurred  a large  debate concerning  the desirability  of a realignment  in the EMS. For 
examples,  see Begg  and  others  (1990)  and  Lipschitz  and  McDonald  (1990). 56  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Wage Movements 
One of the most striking  consequences of currency union has been 
the enormous  increase in real wages that accompanied  it. Between the 
first  quarter  of 1990  and  July 1990,  average  industrial  wages per  full-time 
worker  rose almost 23 percent. Between July and October 1990,  indus- 
trial  wages rose 16  percent. Table 5 reveals the near  uniformity  of these 
increases across industrial  sectors. Comparable  wage increases were 
achieved in other sectors: for example, between July and October 1990 
these increases  amounted  to 17  percent  in  mining,  21  percent  in  wholesale 
trade, 12 percent in retail trade, and 22 percent in insurance. Further 
wage increases are being negotiated in most sectors. For example, in 
January  1991  construction  workers  were granted  increases that  brought 
their  wages to 60 percent  of West German  levels, and  in April 1991  their 
wages will rise to 65 percent of the West German  level.100  There were 
also reductions  in working  hours negotiated in most contracts, with a 
40-hour  workweek  guaranteed  in many  contracts  signed  in August. 
A simple  reason  for the wage increases, the law of one price, suggests 
that economic union created a single labor market  in which only one 
wage can prevail. In such a unified  labor market,  any wage differential 
induces  employers  to move  jobs from  West to East and  induces  workers 
to move in the opposite direction.  According  to this logic, wages in East 
Germany  are  rising  because East German  workers  are  moving  into West 
Germany,  while  capital  is moving  into East Germany.  These movements 
are occurring,  but they are proceeding  slowly. Using reported  ratios of 
jobs created  per deutsche mark  invested by four  large-scale  investors  in 
West Germany  (Volkswagen, Siemens, IBM, and Opel), the total pro- 
jected investment by Western firms in 1991, DM 13.5 billion, would 
result in 112,000,  371,100, 100,000,  and 169,000  jobs respectively. This 
is more  than  the proverbial  drop  in the bucket,  but  also considerably  less 
than the needs of the East German  economy. In contrast to the slow 
movements of  both migration and investment, wages have moved 
rapidly.  As the first section of this paper showed, wages were too high 
100. Konjunktur  Aktuell, Anhang  II, January  1991, p. 69. A full description  of the 
provisions  of contracts  negotiated  in East Germany  since currency  union  is contained  in 
Sachverstandigenrat  zur Begutachtung  der gesamtwirtschaftlichen  Entwicklung  (1990, 
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at union  for the profitable  employment  of many East German  workers; 
since union, wages have moved in the wrong direction, away from 
equilibrium. 
Wages rose while migration  was relatively small and falling;  thus it 
appears implausible  that wage increases were granted  in response  to 
migration  by East German  workers or because East German  workers 
were unwilling  to accept wage cuts in order to maintain  employment. 
Our  survey  asked  unemployed  respondents  to agree  or disagree  with  the 
statement  "I would be prepared  to accept ajob paying  up to 20 percent 
less than my old job paid." Employed  respondents  were, analogously, 
asked if they would accept such a pay cut in order to gain work in the 
event that they lost their current  job.  Twenty-eight percent of the 
participants  in our survey indicated  that they would be willing  to accept 
such  a cut in pay. This suggests  that  there  is a significant  stock of workers 
not only available  to East German  industry  at current  wages, but even 
at substantial  reductions  in pay. 
Some combination  of five factors  is probably  responsible  for the wage 
increases. First, the pay increases that occurred following currency 
union  may have been partly  intended  to compensate  workers  for higher 
payroll  deductions  and  the  removal  of price  subsidies  following  economic 
union. Our  survey asked East German  workers  who had received wage 
increases their opinions concerning  the reasons for the increases. The 
responses are summarized  in table 11. Fifty-two  percent  of respondents 
in our main  survey agreed  with the statement  that "wages rose in order 
to make  up for the elimination  of price subsidies  (for example, for basic 
foodstuffs) and increases in social insurance contributions." Thirty- 
three  percent  disagreed. 
Following  currency  union  both employee  and  employer  contributions 
to social insurance  rose substantially.  GDR contributions  had been 10 
percent  of earnings,  up to a statutory  ceiling of 600 mark  a month, paid 
by the employee and 12.5 percent paid by the employer; at currency 
union, combined social security contributions  (for health, old age, and 
unemployment)  rose to 36.5 percent, split evenly by firms  and workers. 
The FRG personal  income tax was also adopted  in the East, phased in 
over two steps. Earnings  in the East are  sufficiently  low, and  exemptions 
under  the FRG tax code sufficiently  high, that the average income tax 
rate  for East German  households  is now substantially  lower than  before 
union. We estimate  that  this tax amounts  to about  4.5 percent, although 58  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Table 11.  Survey Responses Concerning the Reasons for Eastern Wage Increases 
Percent 
Survey statement  Agreea  Disagreea 
"My wages rose to compensate  for the removal  of subsidies  (for 
example, on food) and higher  social insurance  contributions."  52  33 
"My wages rose because it would have been unfair  for them to 
remain  so far below the West German  level."  31  57 
"It is fair for West German  firms  that set up enterprises  in East 
Germany  to pay lower wages as long as the unemployment  rate 
in East Germany  remains  high."  14  76 
"My wages rose because productivity  increased."  12  80 
"My wages rose because unions fought hard  for wage increases."  64  22 
"My employer  and/or  my union was concerned  that my benefits 
not be too low in case of short-time  or unemployment."  28  56 
"Unions were restrained  in bargaining  because they feared that 
more firms  would go out of business."  29  51 
"My current  wage would be much lower now if wage contracts 
had been converted  at the rate of two mark  to one deutsche 
mark  (instead  of one to one)."  69  25 
Source:  Authors'  own  surveys  of  556  nonstudents  in  East  Germany  in  February  1991.  The  table  shows  the 
responses  of employed  individuals whose  wages had increased  since currency union. See text for further information. 
a.  In personal interviews,  individuals could agree, partly agree-partly disagree, or disagree. In the mail questionnaire, 
individuals  could  also  agree  or disagree  strongly.  Agree  refers  to  all those  who  agree or agree  strongly.  Disagree 
refers to those  who disagree or disagree  strongly. 
the marginal  tax rate for East Germans  is currently  about 20 percent.  101 
Whereas  income and social insurance  taxes together  amounted  to about 
15 percent of gross wages in 1989,  these payments  currently  amount  to 
almost  23 percent  of gross wages for the typical  household.  102 
In the GDR, necessities-such  as nonluxury  food, rent, and public 
transportation-were greatly subsidized  by the government.  Food sub- 
sidies were eliminated  at union;  railway subsidies were partially  elimi- 
nated  on January  1, 1991;  subsidies  on gas and  electricity  used  for  heating 
were also reduced  in January  1991;  and  rent subsidies  will be phased  out 
gradually.  It was widely expected that consumer  prices would rise after 
union because of the removal of food subsidies. In fact, the aggregate 
CPI  remained  almost  unchanged;  although  the prices  of some necessities 
increased, the prices of many manufactured  and luxury goods fell. 
However, the reduction  in energy  and  transportation  subsidies  caused a 
101. These calculations are based on Deutsches Institut  fur Wirtschaftsforschung 
(1990,  pp. 3, 5) and  Genser  (1990,  pp. 20-22, 75). 
102. See Statistisches  Amt  der  DDR (1990,  p. 144). George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  59 
7.4 percent increase in the CPI in January  1991.  And the rent increases 
scheduled  for October  1991  are  likely  to erode  net real  wages by a further 
4.3 percent.'03 
These factors are not sufficient  to account fully for gross wage hikes 
of the magnitude  that have occurred. As noted previously, we estimate 
that net wages rose approximately  22 percent between the end of 1989 
and October 1990. By February  1991, consumer  prices had risen more 
than  6 percent  above their 1989  level. Thus, as of February  1991,  net real 
wages in East Germany were at least 15 percent higher than before 
union. Even taking  account of the scheduled  rent increases in October 
1991, net real wages are now significantly  higher  than before currency 
union.  104 
A second potential cause of the Eastern wage increases might be a 
strong sense among Eastern workers that wage equality  between East 
and West is fair. In the words of Reiner Gohlke, former head of the 
Reichsbahn  and the first  managing  director  of the Treuhandanstalt,  "It 
is unfair  that  an engine  driver  should  receive three  times the pay to make 
a roundtrip  from  Hamburg  to Leipzig  as to make  the same  journey  in the 
opposite direction."''05 The argument  for equality also has a historical 
basis: prior  to World  War  II, East Germany  was on par with (indeed a 
little bit richer  than)  West Germany.  Moreover,  the formal  educational 
attainments of  East Germans remain comparable to those of their 
counterparts  in the West. The East Germans  have already suffered  40 
years of  deprivation as  a  result of  socialism. The continuation of 
inequitable  pay only prolongs  the effects of an unfair  historical  accident. 
This explanation  for wage increases does not receive strong  support 
in our survey. Most East Germans doubt that their wages increased 
because it would have been unfair  for them  to stay so far  below Western 
103. Rents are scheduled to rise by DM 1 per square meter on October 1, 1991. 
Siiddeutsche  Zeitung,  January  30, 1991,  p. 25. This is equivalent  to a 4.3 percent  decline 
in net real wages for a typical  worker  in a four-person,  two-earner  household  who earns 
DM 1,500  a month. 
104. These  calculations  do not  take  account  of changes  in  bonuses  andfringe  payments, 
which amounted  to 19 percent  of East German  compensation  in 1989.  No information  is 
currently  available  on how these benefits  have changed  since  currency  union.  In 1989  total 
compensation  of full-time  employees amounted  to 1,324  mark  a month  in industry,  while 
gross wages  amounted  to 1,072  mark  a month.  See table  S and  Statistisches  Amt  der  DDR 
(1990, p.  144). The difference consists of premiums  and bonuses, spousal and child 
allowances,  Christmas  money, and  other  miscellaneous  payments. 
105. This comment  was made  in a conversation  with  the authors. 60  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
levels; only a minority-31 percent-agreed or strongly  agreed  it would 
have been unfair.  Fifty-seven percent disagreed  or strongly  disagreed. 
But, interestingly,  76  percent  of the respondents  to our  survey  disagreed, 
many strongly  so, with the statement  "It is fair  for a West German  firm 
that establishes an enterprise  in East Germany  to pay lower wages as 
long as the unemployment  rate in East Germany remains so high." 
Presumably  East Germans  feel that  if they work  for a Western  firm  with 
productivity and technology equal to that in the West, they should 
receive "equal pay for equal work." Lower wages because of higher 
unemployment would be exploitation. But, at the same time, East 
Germans  recognize that wage increases  jeopardize employment  in the 
East and that no productivity  increases have yet occurred that could 
warrant  such wage increases.'06  Thus it is not unfair  for Easterners  to 
receive lower  pay in existingjobs. Sixty-two  percent  of all East Germans 
in a poll conducted  by Infratest  (and  79 percent  of West  Germans)  agreed 
that  wages in the East should  not rise "too quickly."''07 
Third, the wage increases that occurred  may reflect the behavior of 
strong  unions  bargaining  on behalf  of Eastern  workers.  Unions probably 
perceived  such  wage  hikes  as enhancing  the  welfare  of their  membership. 
Sixty-four  percent  of employed  respondents  who had  experienced  wage 
increases agreed  that "My wage income rose because unions  fought  for 
higher  wages." Only 22 percent  disagreed. 
It was clear, even from the beginning, that currency union would 
result in considerable  readjustment  with a great deal of unemployment 
and many plant closings. In a poll conducted in East Germany  by the 
West German Allensbach Institut, only 45 percent of  respondents 
thought  their  current  firm  would surely survive.  108 The German  govern- 
ment offered workers generous unemployment  benefits, based on ter- 
minal  wages. In such an "end game," it would pay workers  to increase 
their wages, so that if unemployed  or placed on short time, they would 
receive higher benefit payments. Over a quarter (28 percent) of our 
106. Eighty percent disagreed with the statement "Wages rose in East Germany 
because  productivity  increased." 
107. In a poll taken  by Infratest  Kommunikationsforschung  in Munich,  people  in both 
East and West Germany  were asked to list their priorities  for East Germany.  For East 
Germans,  the equality  of wages ranked  as the fourth  highest  priority  out of ten, whereas 
for  West  Germans  it was ranked  last.  FrankfurterAllgemeine  Zeitung,  December  13, 1990, 
p. 19. 
108. Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  September  19, 1990, p. 19. George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  61 
survey  respondents  thought  that  their  employer  or union  was concerned 
that  their  benefits  not be too low in case of short  time or unemployment. 
Unions  may  have  fought  for  higher  wages  in  part  because  they  believed 
that  wage hikes  would  have only a small  negative  impact  on employment 
in the East. Consider  a union, bargaining  on behalf of its membership 
and  trying  to maximize  its members'  expected utility. The optimal  wage 
demand  for the union depends on the elasticity of labor demand.  If the 
elasticity of labor demand is low, it would be rational for unions to 
bargain  for high wages. This may well be the opinion that unions hold. 
Some support  for this view comes from  our survey. Less than  a third  (29 
percent)  of respondents  thought  unions  were restrained  in their  bargain- 
ing because of their  fear that  firms  would go out of business. 
Colin Lawrence and Robert Lawrence have a simple reason why 
labor demand is apt to be inelastic in an end game.'09  The long-run 
elasticity  of demand  for labor  depends  on the responsiveness  of both  the 
level of investment  to wages and the capital  intensity  of new investment 
to wages. In an end-game  situation,  where an industry  is clearly dying, 
investment  will be low whatever the level of wages since firms  already 
have more capital  than  needed. As a result, the elasticity of demand  for 
labor is low and labor has an incentive to raise wages and appropriate 
the quasi  rents  of the firm.  Our  earlier  analysis  casts doubt  on the validity 
of the idea that the elasticity of labor  demand  is actually  low at present. 
According to our analysis, wages are currently  so high that labor has 
already  appropriated  more than all of the quasi rents of existing enter- 
prises. If subsidies  end, many  businesses will be closed. A reduction  in 
wages would allow more firms  to remain  in business. For example, a 10 
percent wage cut, under our preferred  assumptions, would enable 18 
Kombinate  with about 12 percent  of the work force to meet their short- 
run  costs, rather  than 14  with 8 percent  of the work  force-a  50 percent 
increase  in the number  of workers  in viable firms.  This suggests  that  the 
short-run  elasticity of labor demand  is actually quite high, so that the 
push  for higher  wages reflects  miscalculation  on the unions' part. 
There are two alternative  reasons, however, that unions might dis- 
count this analysis. First, the unions may assume that the Treuhandan- 
stalt simply  will not permit  firms  to go out of business regardless  of their 
financial  viability, so that the "effective" elasticity of labor demand  is 
109.  See Lawrence and Lawrence  (1985). 62  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
actually low. Second, the unions may reason that wage increases will 
have little adverse  effect on the flow of new investment  and  job creation 
in East Germany.  This reasoning  makes considerable  sense if Western 
firms  intend  to follow pay policies that our Eastern  survey respondents 
consider fair: namely, to offer Western rates of pay in new Eastern 
operations  regardless  of the  level of unemployment  (and  wages  in  existing 
jobs) in East Germany. 
A fourth  hypothesis  concerning  Eastern  wage increases is that West- 
ern unions pushed  for East-West  wage parity  in order  to enhance  union 
solidarity  and to slow migration.  (The vast majority  of Eastern  workers 
are covered by union  contracts.)  Western  unions  helped  Eastern  unions 
organize negotiations  for wage increases."l0  They also urged Eastern 
unions to push for wage equalization."' For example, IG Metall an- 
nounced in November that the union would demand  wage increases in 
the current  bargaining  round  of about 50 percent for East Germany  so 
that wages would rise to 60 to 65 percent of Western  levels. The union 
argued  that "unity  requires  equal  wages.""  112 It is quite  clear  that  unions' 
pressure for parity is a major  force for wage increases. IG Metall has 
succeeded in negotiating  a contract  that will result  in wage parity  in  just 
four years. The union has justified this aggressive pursuit  of parity- 
both publicly"3  and in private conversation with us-on  the grounds 
that, without  high wages, migration  will be so large that there will be a 
110. Western  unions probably  perceived large wage hikes in the East to be in their 
interest.  Anecdotal  evidence suggests concern  on the part  of Western  unions that firms 
would switch  jobs away from  the West toward  the East in response  to lower wages. For 
example,  the auto  workers'  union  expressed  concern  that  the situation  of workers  in West 
Germany would deteriorate  because of Volkswagen's new production  sites in East 
Germany  and  other  countries.  Siiddeutsche  Zeitung,  November  8, 1990.  Western  unions 
also may  have  thought,  as did  the West  German  government,  that  higher  wages  in the East 
would  prevent  migration  to the West and  reduce  downward  pressure  on Western  wages. 
Since unemployment  benefits  are linked  to terminal  wages, such hikes might  also reduce 
migration  by raising  the incomes  of unemployed  Easterners. 
111. For example, a spokesman  for IG Chemie,  the union  for the chemical  industry, 
was quoted  as saying  that "the unions  want  wages to reach  West German  levels as soon 
as possible"  but  would  not  object  if up  to 40  percent  of thejobs  were  destroyed.  Frankfurter 
Allgemeine  Zeitung,  November  16, 1990, p. 19. 
112. The union also argued  that a big differential  between East and West Germany 
would lead to migration  of qualified  workers, which would jeopardize the economic 
development  in East Germany.  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung, November 16, 1990,  p. 
19. 
113.  Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  February 7, 1991, p. 15; Siiddeutsche  Zeitung, 
February  7, 1991,  p. 23. George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  63 
shortage  of qualified  people in the East. Seldom has an argument  been 
so specious. With  massive unemployment  in the East it is hard  to believe 
that qualified  job applicants will not be abundant. Furthermore,  our 
survey found that most jobholders, on losing their current  job in the 
East, would wait for another  if it were available,  despite the East-West 
wage differential.  An article  in the January  1991  issue of the tradejournal 
of the German  unions,  Die Quelle,  explains  the other  important  argument 
for wage parity: "The Eastern Reserve Army drives down Western 
wages and threatens the unity of the unions. This is the reason for 
wanting a unified labor market as quickly as possible.""114  While this 
concern  with West German  wages and union solidarity  may explain  the 
demand  for parity, our survey results suggest that parity without em- 
ployment will not stop the migration,  which unions fear as a threat to 
Western  wages. 
A fifth  reason  for the large  wage increases  is that  management  offered 
no effective resistance  to union  demands.  The standard  form  of collective 
bargaining  in Germany  is between a regional  or national  association of 
employers and a single industrial  union."' Where was management  at 
the time of the negotiations?  It was in disarray.  Many  firms  were already 
losing  money  and  were dependent  on subsidies  from  the Treuhandanstalt 
(the Trust)  to continue operations. A large proportion  of Eastern  man- 
agers from the previous regime  remained."16  They were unaccustomed 
to collective bargaining  and knew that they would ultimately  lose their 
own  jobs, no matter  what  wage agreements  were negotiated.  The Trust, 
the holder  of the stock of the newly formed  firms,  chose not to intervene 
in wage negotiations,  although  there  have been clear  indications  of their 
dissatisfaction with the agreements negotiated by the managers of 
Treuhand  companies.  For example, in a dispute  over severance  pay, the 
Trust criticized managers  for signing contracts offering, in its view, 
excessive payments  of DM 10,000  to DM 15,000  to those workers that 
were laid off.'  Apparently, the Trust failed to intervene because in 
Germany  the government  has traditionally  remained  aloof from labor 
114. "Tarifpolitik:  Die Einheitsklemme,"  Die Quelle,  January  1991,  p. 16. 
115. See Flanagan,  Soskice, and  Ulman  (1983,  p. 234). 
116. At the end of 1990  only 12 percent  of all people in management  or supervisory 
positions  had not been there before the Wende.  Suddeutsche  Zeitung, January  17, 1991, 
p. 32. 
117.  Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung, January 29, 1991, p. 18. 64  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
negotiations.  Thus superior  union  organization,  at a time when manage- 
ment was not in a good position for concerted resistance against  wage 
increases and when the owner of the firms-the  Treuhandanstalt- 
remained  uninvolved, played an important  role in the eventual wage 
increases. 
Choice  of Conversion Rate 
In the spring  of 1990  one of the key questions surrounding  currency 
union  concerned  the rate at which wage contracts  denominated  in mark 
would be converted  into deutsche mark;  the state treaty  set this conver- 
sion rate at unity, one deutsche mark  for every mark.  Some economists 
argued  that it would make little difference  what rate was chosen since, 
in the labor  negotiations  subsequent  to July 1, wages would fall if they 
had  been set above their  equilibrium  level and  rise if the conversion  rate 
were too low. According  to a variant  of this argument,  wages were sticky 
downward  and not upward.  If wages rose following currency  union (as 
in  fact occurred),  the conversion  rate  did  not matter,  since  the conversion 
rate  could only be a binding  constraint  against  downward  movements.118 
This  last argument  is correct  if wage bargains  are  made  about  the level 
of wages. In fact, however, wage bargainers  often act as if they are 
negotiating  about  the increases or decreases in wages. Thus the level of 
wages in deutsche mark  set by the conversion rate at union may have 
had  considerable  effect on wage negotiations,  if only by affecting  "initial 
conditions." 
To see whether  wages were affected  by the conversion  rate, we asked 
survey  respondents  who were employed  and  who had  experienced  wage 
increases since July 1  their  opinions  on the statement  "My current  wage 
would be much lower if wage contracts  had been converted at the rate 
of two mark  to one deutsche  mark  (rather  than  at the rate  of one mark  to 
one deutsche mark)  at currency  union." Sixty-nine  percent  of respond- 
ents strongly agreed with the statement;  25 percent disagreed  or disa- 
greed strongly. Whatever the real truth may be, many East German 
workers believe that the nominal  wages established at currency  union 
made a difference to their current  wages even after the first round of 
post-union  wage negotiations. 
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Privatization and the Treuhandanstalt 
In March 1990  all publicly held East German  firms  were converted 
into  joint-stock companies  with the shares  held on behalf  of the govern- 
ment by a trust, the Treuhandanstalt.  The major  purpose  of the Trust  is 
to privatize  the 8,000  companies"  19  in its holdings,  which  together  employ 
about 3.7 million workers.120  Until the time that it can privatize these 
firms,  the Trust  oversees the management  of these companies  and  serves 
as an intermediary  between the government  and the firms,  especially in 
the provision  of guaranteed  loan repayments.  As of late February  1991 
the Trust had privatized  just under 700 firms (or parts thereof) with 
proceeds of DM 3.1 billion.'2' The slow rate of devolution can be 
attributed  to five factors.  122 
First, the speed and scale of change  made  routine  management  tasks 
Herculean. For example, the Treuhandanstalt  had to guide the 8,000 
firms in creating supervisory and management  boards of directors, a 
process that  involved approximately  120,000  appointments.  123  The peo- 
ple chosen for these boards  were to be knowledgeable,  but were not to 
119. This  figure  does not include  stores, restaurants,  and  hotels. The  responsibility  for 
the privatization  of these entities  is being  handled  by a subsidiary  of the  Treuhandanstalt- 
the Gesellschaft  zur  Privatisierung  des Handels.  Treuhandanstalt  Pressestelle, 10/11/1990 
and 10/15/1990. 
120. Of these companies, 1,900  are utilities,  which are expected to be transferred  to 
local communities.  See Cornelsen  (1990).  In the industrial  sector, in 1985  there  were  about 
11  establishments  (individual  production  sites) per  enterprise.  See Cornelsen  (1989,  p. 22). 
Forthe  numberof  employees  in  the  Trust's  enterprises,  see Suddeutsche  Zeitung,  February 
21, 1991,  p. 29. 
121. Handelsblatt,  February  26, 1991.  As of late January,  70 percent  of the 1  1,000 
restaurants  and  small  stores  had  also been  sold.  FrankfurterAllgemeine  Zeitung,  February 
23, 1991,  p. 14. 
122. We  do not  include  in this  list section  613a  of the  German  labor  law, which  prevents 
dismissals  of workers  because  of takeovers  within  one year  of the date  of sale. In the case 
of most  layoffs  after  the sale of East German  firms,  sufficient  other  reasons  can usually  be 
given so that this law is not a binding  constraint  on employment.  Large-scale  layoffs, 
however, must be accompanied  by a social plan between the firms  and the workers.  In 
East Germany  these social plans have typically  involved severance pay, especially for 
long-term  workers. 
123. Under German  law, each firm  incorporated  as an "Aktiengesellschaft"  (AG) 
must have separate supervisory  and management  boards typically with five and ten 
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have had close Stasi connections. (One percent  of the GDR work force 
were Stasi agents;  a much  larger  number  were Stasi informants.) 
Second, the Trust does not have clear title to all of its holdings. 
Properties  expropriated  after the establishment  of the German  Demo- 
cratic Republic  at the end of the Soviet occupation can be claimed by 
their  original  owners, as can properties  taken  between 1933  and 1945  for 
religious  and  political  reasons.124 One  indication  of the scope of potential 
claims  is that  30  percent  of East  German  industry  was not yet nationalized 
at the time the GDR was established.'25  Sensibly, owners of property 
that  has been considerably  altered  can only claim  compensation,  not the 
return  of the original  property.  Nevertheless there  are  many  cases where 
the exact division of legal rights  is unclear.  The inability  of the Trust  to 
transfer  clear legal title makes it difficult  for property  to be sold, even 
with  the Trust's  promise  of indemnity  against  losses. 126 There  have been 
17,000 claims for the reprivatization  of companies or parts of compa- 
nies,127  of which 3,000  had  been processed  by February  1991.  In addition 
over one million  other  claims  to property  have been filed, overwhelming 
the offices in charge  of processing  them.  128 It has recently been decided 
that  job-creating  projects  by investors will take precedence  over claims 
of former owners until the end of 1992; this is expected to ease the 
property  rights  logjam.'29 
The third  impediment  to privatization  is that East German  industry 
and agriculture  fail to meet Western  environmental,  health, and safety 
standards.  The air  stinks;  the waters  of the brooks  and  rivers  are syrupy; 
and the soil is so polluted that in some areas even earthworms  are 
extinct.  '30 More scientifically,  emissions of sodium  dioxide and nitrous 
124. Sinn (1990);  John  Tagliabue,  "Germany  Returning  Property  in East to Pre-War 
Owners," The  New York  Times,  February  3, 1991,  p. 8. 
125. See Cornelsen  (1990). 
126. See Sinn  (1990,  p. 26). 
127. Ferdinand  Protzman,  "Rebuilding  East  German  Industry,"  The  New York  Times, 
February  14, 1991,  p. C5. 
128. Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung, December  20, 1990,  p. 19. The property  rights 
issue has had a serious impact  on the ability  of the Trust  to sell or lease the 1.7 million 
hectares  of agricultural  land  that  it owns. The state  treaty  states  that  land  can only be sold 
or leased if there  are no property  rights  by old owners. Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung, 
November  20, 1990. 
129.  The Wall Street Journal, March 19, 1991, p. A21. 
130. For this description  of water  and air pollution,  see Marlise  Simons,"New Taint 
on East German  Pollution,"  The  New York  Times,  September  9, 1990,  p. 6. George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  67 
oxide are high;  the streams  and  rivers  have high  levels of contaminants, 
including mercury, cadmium, lead, copper, and zinc; and the soil 
contains high levels of wastes, including  dioxins and residues from the 
use of pesticides."3'  Agriculture,  mining, and the chemical sector are 
particularly  affected. The Trust has had a hard time finding  reputable 
firms  who want  to tackle  the environmental  problems  involved  in  running 
these industries,  even though  the Trust has typically negotiated  agree- 
ments that indemnify  purchasers  against liability stemming  from past 
environmental  damage. 
Fourth, the Soviet Occupation and the subsequent GDR regime 
nationalized  and concentrated  production  throughout  the economy-in 
industry, in agriculture,  and in services. Industry provides the most 
extreme example. In 1970  there were 12,000  enterprises;  by 1985  less 
than 4,000 were left, each of which was part of one of 214 industrial 
Kombinate.  132 The size distribution  of industry  in East Germany  is very 
different  from  West  Germany,  especially  in the East's absence  of middle- 
sized firms. The Trust must now decide how to bundle for sale the 
enterprises  under  its control. 
Finally, the fifth  problem  facing the Treuhandanstalt  in privatization 
results from the financial  losses of its constituent firms; these losses 
make the firms  hard  to sell to individuals  who will operate rather  than 
scrap  them. This problem  is a direct  result  of the price-cost  squeeze, and 
its implications  are the focus of the remainder  of this section. 
The Treuhandanstalt  could  probably  sell most of its enterprises  easily 
for scrap  or  for real  estate. But  it is unwilling  to do so. It wants  the people 
or firms who take over existing enterprises to continue employing 
workers  and  to create  newjobs.133 Its actions to date clearly  illustrate  its 
concern  about  employment.  In several  instances, the Trust  has accepted 
a symbolic payment of a single deutsche mark  when the buyers of the 
firm  have given explicit  job guarantees.  134 The Trust  has refused to sell 
131. See Streibel  (1990). 
132.  See Cornelsen  (1989,  pp. 21-23). 
133. This  conclusion  is based  on personal  conversations  with  officials  of the  Treuhand- 
anstalt.  Jens Odewald,  a spokesman  for the Trust,  said  in an interview,  "It is not the only 
goal to sell the firms  as quickly  as possible  to the highest  bidder.  Instead,  we also have to 
help  to create  jobs, encourage  investment,  and  let a sound  economic  structure  develop." 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 19, 1990,  p. 29. 
134. For several  examples, see Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung, January  25, 1991,  p. 
14,  and  February  20, 1991,  p. 21;  and  Der Spiegel,  no. 6, February  4, 1991,  p. 112. 68  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
firms  to buyers who have  just wanted  to use the real estate; in one case, 
the Trust  accepted  the third  highest  bid  for a cigarette  company  because 
this bidder promised to transfer  some of its production  from West to 
East Germany.  135 
In a market  economy without  distortions,  the Trust  would maximize 
social welfare by maximizing  the proceeds from privatization. Each 
enterprise should be sold to the highest bidder, with no additional 
conditions  of sale. However, the Treuhand's  emphasis  on employment 
is warranted  because there is a major distortion in the East German 
economy. Wages are significantly  above market  clearing. Thus, in the 
absence of a job creation  policy, employment  in East Germany  will be 
well below the socially optimal  level. The Trust  is acting  in the country's 
best interest by promoting  employment  as an objective. On this basis, 
though,  the firms  are very hard  to sell. The high  wages that  must  be paid 
to the workers at existing firms  constitute a serious obstacle to sales. 
Consider  an analogy.  Suppose that  there  is a hardware  store owner  who 
is selling  shovels at a very cheap  price. The owner, however, places two 
conditions  on the shovels' sale: first, the shovels must  be used; second, 
his brother-in-law  must  be employed  to use the shovels and  be paid  much 
more  than  the competitive  rate  for his labor.  Not many  people are likely 
to buy the shovels. Indeed, to get rid of his stock of shovels (and  get his 
brother-in-law  employed), the hardware  store owner may have to pay 
buyers  to purchase  the shovels, and  not  just sell them  at a low price. The 
Treuhandanstalt  is trying  to sell East German  industry,  and it is willing 
to take low prices;  but on the terms  of employment  it wants, most of the 
firms  have negative value. 
More formally, if capital is used in fixed proportions  with labor (as 
occurs in the putty-clay  model  after  the capital  has been built),  the quasi 
rents to a unit of capital  are q -  wl, where q is the output  of the capital, 
w is the real wage, and 1  is the labor  used with that capital. The market 
value of the capital is the expected present discounted value of these 
quasi  rents, (q -  wl)/(8 +  r), where 8 is the rate of depreciation  and  r is 
135. Recently, the Trust  has indicated  that  it is unlikely  to close a firm  because of the 
impact  that this would have on its community.  Detlev Rohwedder,  managing  director  of 
the Treuhandanstalt,  said that  even though  the situation  of Zeiss Jena  was incredibly  bad 
it was  in  the  interest  of the  region  to prevent  the  collapse  of the  firm.  FrankfurterAllgemeine 
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the rate of interest. When  the machines  are used and not scrapped,  this 
market  value is negative  for wages that are sufficiently  high. 
The percentage  of Kombinate  with positive quasi rents under  alter- 
native assumptions  was tabulated  earlier.  It was shown that, at present, 
the great bulk of East German industry cannot cover its short-run 
variable costs,  so that quasi rents are negative. If the Trust wants 
entrepreneurs  to buy these enterprises  and use the existing labor, they 
will  find  no takers  unless some arrangement  is made, such  as copayments 
for the employment  of labor. In the absence of such copayments, the 
firms  have negative value. The case of the hardware  store owner, who 
wants to sell a shovel and gain work for his brother-in-law,  is still 
analogous. The hardware  store owner might agree to pay a generous 
fraction of his brother-in-law's  excessive wage. If the fraction of the 
wage is sufficiently  large, the buyer will find  it worthwhile  to purchase 
the shovel and hire  the brother-in-law. 
Unprivatized  firms  must either  be subsidized  on an ongoing  basis by 
the Trust or be liquidated.  Disguised liquidations  have already taken 
place on a large scale, as firms  have been sold or allowed to restructure 
themselves since economic union. Throughout  the fall and winter of 
1990-91,  a litany  of deep cuts in employment  and large  layoffs has been 
announced.'36  A director of the Treuhandanstalt  has estimated that 
eventually, 50 percent of employment  in the Treuhand's  firms will be 
eliminated.'37  Apparently, these cuts will occur despite the Trust's 
concern for job creation: the Trust has not been given a mandate to 
rescue failing  firms  on a broad  scale. 
136. Some of the cuts that  were announced  in February  1991  follow: Interflug  is to be 
liquidated  (Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung, February  11, p. 16);  Robotron  will cut its 
work force from 10,600  to 7,600; SKET Magdeburg  with 30,000 employees reduced  its 
work  force to 16,700  at the end of 1990  and  plans  to lay off 10,000  more  workers  by the end 
of September 1991 (Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  February 23, 1991, p. 15); Zeiss Jena 
plans to cut employment  from 29,000 to 10,000 by the summer  of 1991 (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine  Zeitung,  February  28, 1991,  p. 18).  A Swiss consulting  firm  estimated  that 17 
firms  in the microelectronics  sector could survive  but employment  would have to be cut 
from 35,000 to 5,000-7,000  (Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  February 8, 1991, p. 15). In 
March  the Treuhand  estimated  that 100,000  jobs in the textile industry  will disappear  in 
1991 and 25 firms will be closed down (Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  March 2, 1991, p. 
12) and that half of the 46,000  jobs in the shipyards  will be cut by 1994-95  (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine  Zeitung,  March  5, 1991,  p. 15).  The former  Kombinat  Takraf  announced  that 
it would  reduce  employment  from  27,000  to 7,000  workers  by the end of 1993  (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine  Zeitung, March 5, p. 15). 
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Employment Bonuses 
The status quo in East Germany  is simply not acceptable. Yet the 
question  remains,  what is to be done? A simple  plan, a variant  of which 
we favor, would be to offer wage subsidies or employment bonuses 
(EBs) to all private  (nonagricultural)  employment  located in the former 
GDR. Any private firm hiring a worker in the East would be paid a 
specified  fraction  of that  worker's  initial  wage. With  the bonus program 
in place, all firms  presently  owned by the Treuhand  would be auctioned 
off to the highest  bidder,  without  additional  conditions  of sale.  138  Firms 
that could not be sold would be liquidated. 
The high  level of wages relative  to productivity  in East Germany  is a 
major  distortion  in factor prices; such wages result in too little current 
employment  and too slow a pace of investment and new job creation. 
The subsidy offsets this distortion. The EB program  would raise the 
value of the Treuhandanstalt's  properties, enabling the Trust to sell 
enterprises  that have negative values in the absence of such a scheme. 
The subsidy would enable the Trust to achieve its goal of employment 
creation  without  having  to evaluate each bidder's  detailed  employment 
and  investment  plans.  139  With  an appropriately  chosen subsidy  in place, 
the social and private  gains from  hiring  more labor  exactly coincide, so 
that further  decisionmaking  can be left to the marketplace:  the subsidy 
138. Two early proponents  of such a wage subsidy plan were George L. Perry, 
"Managing  Economic  Reunification,"  The Los Angeles  Times, March  18, 1990,  and  Peter 
Passell, "East Germany's  Morning  After," The New  York Times, August 1, 1990.  Klodt 
(1990b)  has also discussed  the merits  of such schemes. 
139. Although  subsidies to business are not ordinarily  allowed under  the Treaty  of 
Rome,  they  probably  would  be allowed  in East  Germany.  Under  Part  II, Chapter  1, Section 
3, Article  92, Subsection  2, Part  c of the Treaty,  special  assistance  is allowed  to "promote 
the economic development  of areas where the standard  of living is abnormally  low or 
where there is serious underemployment."  In response to our inquiry  concerning  our 
SEFEB plan,  the office  of the Director-General  for Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  of the 
European  Communities  has offered the following opinion: "There are precedents  for 
Commission  approval  of labor  subsidies  in the least developed  regions  of the Community, 
notably  the Mezzogiorno  in Italy. As Eastern  Germany,  with the possible exception of 
East  Berlin,  almost  certainly  qualifies  as one  of the  least  developed  regions,  the  Commission 
is likely to have a favorable  attitude  towards  a labor  subsidy scheme, provided  that the 
amount  of aid per  worker  is not excessive and  that  the scheme  covers a limited  period,  as 
you  envisage.  Non-discrimination  between  sectors  would  also be an  essential  requirement, 
although  the Commission  could  impose  restrictions  on sectors  where  there  is serious  over- 
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gives privatized  firms  the incentive to hire labor  just to the point where 
the value of the marginal  product of hiring  the last worker equals the 
value to that  worker  of his or her  lost leisure. Furthermore,  managers  of 
newly privatized  firms  will be more  effective than  the Treuhandanstalt's 
officials  in restructuring  existing  enterprises,  transferring  Western  tech- 
nology, adopting productivity-raising  measures, and resisting further 
wage increases. 
BUDGETARY  IMPACT  OF  AN  EB  PROGRAM.  The majorobjection  that 
can be leveled against an EB program  is that it is costly. However, a 
subsidy program generates large offsetting budgetary savings since 
workers  who would  otherwise  be unemployed  gain  employment  through 
the EB program.  Consider further  the analogy of the hardware  store 
owner who offers a copayment for the employment of his brother-in- 
law. While such a proposition might result in large payments to the 
shovel purchasers, it could save money for the store owner if he has 
agreed  to support  his sister's family  in the event that the brother-in-law 
is unemployed.  This is the situation  for the German  government  now: it 
is already committed  to supporting  the incomes of East Germans  at a 
high level. The German  government  will most likely come out ahead 
even if it pays substantial  wage subsidies because such a program  is 
likely both to preserve  many  existing  jobs and to speed significantly  the 
creation  of new  jobs. 
In East Germany,  a worker  who is unemployed  receives unemploy- 
ment  benefits, pays no income taxes, and  makes no contributions  to the 
social insurance  fund. In addition, there are no employer copayments 
for social insurance. For the typical worker with children, unem- 
ployment benefits are 68 percent of the net wage. Social insurance 
contributions  are 18.25  percent  of the gross wage for both the employee 
and the employer. The average income tax rate for East Germans  is 
about  4.5 percent.  At these rates, the revenue  gain  from  moving  a worker 
out of unemployment into a job is  substantial: 79.1 percent of the 
worker's  compensation.140  A program  of wage subsidies  offering  benefits 
140. We define  worker  compensation  as the gross wage plus employer's  contribution 
to social insurance.  This calculation  assumes  that  the wage the worker  will receive when 
employed is the same wage that is used as the basis for the worker's unemployment 
compensation.  Because  unemployment  benefits  decline  to 58 or 53 percent  after  one year 
of unemployment,  the savings declines from 79.1 percent to 72.6 percent for a typical 
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below this 79.1 percent level saves the German  government  money on 
every individual  who is employed under the program  and who would 
have otherwise  been unemployed. 
Under  an across-the-board  wage subsidy  program,  however, benefits 
are also paid to workers who would have been employed even in the 
absence  of the subsidies-not just to workers  who would  have otherwise 
been unemployed. In the East German case,  some jobs  would be 
preserved  in Treuhandanstalt  firms, and some new job creation would 
take place even without the subsidy program.  For these inframarginal 
workers,  it could be argued  that the bonuses are costly since there  is no 
revenue  gain  to offset the cost of these bonuses. 
It turns  out, however, that this argument  is not valid when applied  to 
inframarginal  workers in as yet unprivatized  Treuhandanstalt  firms- 
those workers  who would be employed even in the absence of a bonus 
program.  The windfalls  created by the employment  bonuses accrue to 
the government  itself. As long as wages are not changed  by the EBs, the 
payment of EBs to workers in Treuhandanstalt  properties  who would 
otherwise  be employed  results  in no revenue  loss to the  Treuhandanstalt. 
The Treuhandanstalt  recoups the cost of its EBs in the sale  of its 
property. Remember  for a moment the example of the hardware  store 
owner. If the owner offers an employment  bonus of DM 1,000 to any 
shovel buyer  who hires  his brother-in-law,  this would increase  the value 
of the shovel by DM 1,000  to anyone who would have hired  the brother- 
in-law  in the absence  of the bonus. The hardware  store  owner  can  recoup 
the cost of the bonus by raising  the sale price of the shovel. 
An employment  bonus proposal whereby wage subsidies would be 
granted in the East was recently put forth by the unions, which are 
concerned  about  the disappearance  ofjobs. The proposal  was retracted 
when it was realized  that  the bonuses  would  be granted  to both  profitable 
as well as unprofitable  firms.'4'  Such concerns should  be discounted  in 
the case of subsidies that preserve jobs on existing capital in as yet 
unprivatized firms owned by the Treuhandanstalt.  They do apply, 
however, in the case ofjobs that  are  created  outside  the Treuhand  sector 
or as a consequence of new investment  in Treuhand  firms. A complete 
analysis of  an East German employment bonus program requires, 
therefore, separate discussion of the budgetary  costs and savings of 
141.  Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung,  November  16, 1990, p. 19. George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  73 
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bonuses paid on existing  jobs in unprivatized  Treuhand  firms  and those 
paid  on newjobs created  after  the scheme is put  into effect. We consider 
these in turn. 
BUDGETARY  COSTS  FOR  CURRENT  TREUHAND  JOBS.  A simple 
diagram  illustrates  the benefits  and costs of EBs paid  on existing  jobs in 
firms  that  are currently  in the portfolio  of the Treuhandanstalt.  In figure 
3, DD represents the demand curve for labor as a function of worker 
compensation  aggregated  over all of the Treuhand's  properties.  At the 
initial compensation level,  w0, employment is  OA.  An  employ- 
ment bonus in the amount eb (=  JC) raises employment to OB. The 
payment  of this bonus has three distinct  budgetary  effects. First, there 
is the direct cost of the program-the  rectangle CFLJ-which  is the 
product  of the bonus (JC) and the total number  of employees on which 
it is paid (OB). The second budgetary  effect of the program  is positive: 74  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
the government  puts the unemployed to work, generating  additional 
income tax revenue, higher  contributions  to the social insurance  funds, 
and lower unemployment  compensation.  This effect is measured  by the 
area  ABIG, the product  of the number  of additional  workers  employed 
(AB) and the budgetary  cost per unemployed worker (BI). The third 
budgetary  effect of the program  is to enhance the market  value of the 
Treuhand's  properties,  resulting  in greater  revenue for the Trust  when 
the enterprises  in its portfolio are sold. In the absence of the subsidy 
program,  the value of the firms  is measured  by the present discounted 
value of the triangle  JKM;  with bonuses, the value of the firms  rises to 
the present  value of CFM. The extra  revenue  realized  by the Trust  from 
the bonus program  in the current  period  is CFKJ. Summing  up the three 
budgetary  impacts  of the program,  the overall net budgetary  cost of the 
employment  bonuses  is equal  to the difference  between  two areas:  KHIL 
-  ABFHG. As figure  3 illustrates,  the difference  is negative  when there 
is a large  budgetary  cost for unemployed  workers. In this realistic  case, 
the program generates an overall budgetary gain, not a loss.142  Both the 
government  and  the workers  gain  from  the employment  bonus  program. 
Assuming that leisure has no value, workers gain because they earn 
higher  after-tax  income working  than they do receiving unemployment 
benefits. Their  net benefit  is the rectangle  GKLI. Finally, there is a net 
social gain, the trapezoid  AKFB, which is the sum of the gains to the 
workers  and to the government. 
From figure 3, it is possible to estimate the budgetary effects of 
subsidies to existing jobs in Treuhandanstalt  firms using our earlier 
calculations  of the impact  of employment  bonuses  in table  8. A 50  percent 
EB to Treuhand  workers raises the fraction of employment in viable 
firms from 8.2 to 36.6 percent and generates budgetary savings of 
approximately  DM 11.9 billion a year if all workers in viable firms  are 
employed. A 75 percent EB raises the fraction  of employment  in viable 
142. This analysis  treats  the scrap  value  of the Treuhand's  firms  as zero. The demand 
curve, DD, represents  the aggregate  demand  for labor  across all firms.  As compensation 
per  worker  rises, employment  may  fall  for  two reasons:  each  firm  hires  less labor  and  some 
firms  become  unviable  and  are shut  down. In the putty-clay  model,  only this second  effect 
is at work. When firms are shut down, their assets may be sold for scrap, generating 
revenue  for the trust  that  is not included  in our  analysis.  If the scrap  value  of firms  is high, 
our analysis  overstates  the budgetary  savings  of the bonus program.  In an early sale by 
the Treuhandanstalt,  textile machines  from  one factory  were sold  to an industrial  museum 
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firms  from 8.2 to 77.2 percent and generates budgetary  savings of DM 
22.3 billion. Insofar  as there  is less than  full employment  in viable  firms, 
the budgetary  surplus  resulting  from  the program  is proportionately  less. 
With less employment, there will be proportionately  fewer subsidies 
given out, but also proportionately  less benefit. 
We can illustrate  how these calculations  are  made. According  to table 
8, if all  workers  at viable  firms  are  employed,  the increase  in employment 
due to a 50 percent  subsidy  is 28.4 percent  of all employees-from  8.2 to 
36.6. Subsidies  of half of initial  compensation  thus have a direct  cost of 
0.5 x  0.366 of the total compensation  of all Treuhand  employees (this 
cost is subsequently  denoted wOLO).  This is the area CFLJ in figure  3. 
The budgetary  benefit  can be found  by summing  three  areas. First, there 
is the benefit  from fewer unemployed  workers. This is the area  ABIG, 
which is 0.791 x  0.284 x  woLo.  The contribution  of the subsidy to the 
increased  value  of Treuhand  properties  is the sum  of the two areas  CEKJ 
and EFK. JC is one half of compensation,  so CEKJ  has the area 0.5 x 
0.082 x  woLo,  and the area of the triangle  EFK is 0.5 x  0.5 x  0.284 x 
woLO.  The net budgetary  surplus  is 15.4  percent  of the compensation  bill. 
In the preceding  example, unlike  the typical  case where subsidies  are 
given, the capitalists  do not benefit  from the EBs. Any gain they might 
realize is exactly offset by higher  competitive  bids for the properties  of 
the Treuhandanstalt.  This  occurs  even in noncompetitive  situations  with 
few bidders: in most models of auctions, a program  that increases a 
good's value by the same amount  for all bidders  will raise the auction 
price of that good by the identical amount. In the case of EBs, if the 
bidders'  employment  of labor  is unaffected  by the bonus payments, all 
bids should  increase  by the amount  of the bonuses. 
BUDGETARY  COSTS  AND  BENEFITS  FOR  NEW  JOBS.  A full analysis 
of the budgetary impact of an employment bonus scheme requires 
separate  consideration  of the costs and  benefits  of bonuses paid on new 
jobs that  are created  after  the bonus scheme is instituted  and  of bonuses 
paid to workers  who are currently  outside of Treuhandanstalt  firms.  At 
present the number of such workers who would be covered by an 
employment bonus scheme is quite small.143 Thus we focus on the 
143. Such  a scheme  would  apply  to private,  nonagricultural  employment.  In order  to 
avoid  creating  windfall  gains  for  firms  and  establishments  that  have  been  privatized  during 
the  last  year,  it would  be appropriate  to offer  such  enterprises  a bonus  only  for  employment 
exceeding  the present  or agreed  upon levels. The number  of non-Treuhand,  nongovern- 76  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
budgetary  consequences of bonuses paid on new jobs created by new 
investment.  The number  of workers  in such  jobs will become quite  large 
as new investment,  we hope, rapidly  comes to dominate  the productive 
capital  in the East German  economy. 
An employment  bonus  paid  to workers  on new capital  will create  new 
jobs in two ways. First, the subsidy to wages will affect the optimal 
labor-capital  ratio  of new investment:  with  capital  subsidies,  for  example, 
we might  expect capital-intensive  investments  like oil refineries  to locate 
in East Germany;  with labor  subsidies we might  expect labor-intensive 
investments  like corporate  billing  services to locate there. With  a Cobb- 
Douglas production  function, the cost-minimizing  labor-capital  ratio is 
inversely proportional  to the effective wage. With  a deep wage subsidy 
of 75 percent, this ratio increases by a factor of 4; with a subsidy of 60 
percent  it increases  by a factor  of 2.5. 
Second, employment  bonuses will increase  the volume of investment 
by raising its profitability.  By lowering effective wages, employment 
bonuses decrease unit  labor  costs and  raise quasi  rents  (q -  wi) per unit 
of newly invested capital. In consequence, Tobin's q-the  ratio of the 
market  value of the profit stream  from new investment relative to the 
cost of the capital goods-would  rise; the optimal rate of investment 
would rise accordingly.  We expect this effect to be quite large:  a deep 
wage subsidy  would substantially  lower labor  costs and  increase  profits. 
At only 3 percent of total West German  investment, current private 
investment  by West  German  firms  in East German  firms  has  considerable 
scope for expansion. And deep wage subsidies would make East Ger- 
many competitive with alternative production sites in eastern and 
southern  Europe. 
By speeding the pace of job creation in these two ways, deep wage 
subsidies on new investment permit a more rapid reduction in East 
German  unemployment,  resulting  in considerable  budgetary  savings  on 
unemployment  benefits.  These savings  must  be weighed  against  the cost 
of paying  for subsidies  on those new  jobs that would have been created 
even without the program. Some sample calculations show that the 
savings  from  expanded  job creation  are  likely to be large  enough  that  the 
mental,  nonagricultural  workers  is quite  small.  Based  upon  1989  employment  figures  fewer 
than half a million  workers  would obtain subsidies  at present  who are not in Treuhand 
firms.  See Statistisches  Amt  der  DDR  (1990,  p. 127).  Most  uncovered  workers  are  in trade 
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overall  budgetary  cost of the subsidies  on new investment  would  amount 
to only a small  fraction  of the wage bill. 
To approximate  these costs and  benefits  suppose that, in the absence 
of an employment  bonus, investment  would occur at a constant  rate  I0, 
with a capital-labor  ratio  of ko,  resulting  in the creation  of No = Ihko  new 
jobs per period. In contrast, suppose that with an employment  bonus 
equal to a fraction  X  of initial  compensation,  new investment  occurs at 
the constant  rate  II, with a capital-labor  ratio  kl, so that  N1 = Il/k,  jobs 
are created per period. (In actuality the optimal investment rates and 
capital-labor  ratios will vary over time.) The net budgetary  cost of the 
bonuses paid on these new jobs in a given period, t, is the difference 
between the direct cost of the program  and the savings that result  from 
decreased payments  for unemployment  benefits and increased  tax and 
social insurance payments. The net budgetary  cost is [X -  0.791 + 
0.791(NOIN,)]wON1t.  With the slightly optimistic assumption  that both 
investment  and  the capital-labor  intensity  are  unit  elastic with  respect to 
the wage, a 75 percent  EB would  cost 0.84 percent  of total  compensation 
on new investment  in each period. With  the less optimistic  assumption 
that each of these elasticities is one half, an employment  bonus of 75 
percent on new capital would have a net cost of 15.7 percent of the 
compensation  of these workers. With  both elasticities equal to unity, a 
60 percent bonus would generate a 6.4 percent surplus. With both 
elasticities equal to one half, the 60 percent bonus to these workers 
would cost 12.5  percent  of their  total compensation."44 
In evaluating  the overall budgetary  impact  of an employment  bonus 
program, the budgetary effects of the program  on new and existing 
capital must be aggregated.  Because private investment is proceeding 
so slowly at present, deep subsidies to labor could provide significant 
incentives  to invest and  to intensify  the usage  of labor,  yielding  budgetary 
savings on new investment. But, even if subsidies on new investment 
are costly, the cost is likely to be relatively  small  and  will be partially  or 
144. We propose a plan below that gradually  phases out employment  bonuses once 
full employment  has been achieved and that terminates  bonus payments  when Eastern 
wages  have  reached  the  West  German  level. Assuming  that  the  bonuses  are  fully  eliminated 
by the  time  that  full  employment  would  be reached  in  the  absence  of the  plan,  the  budgetary 
cost, if any, of the bonus  program  attains  a maximum  when  full employment  is reached.  If 
there are budgetary  savings before full employment  is reached,  these continue  until  the 
bonuses  are  fully  eliminated. 78  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
perhaps even fully offset by the savings from the bonuses paid to 
Treuhandanstalt  workers. 
THE  IMPACT  OF THE  EB ON  WAGES.  A second objection  that  can be 
leveled against a wage subsidy program  is that its beneficial  incentive 
effects-to  hire  workers  who would be otherwise  unemployed-may be 
vitiated  if the program  induces wages to rise by more than would occur 
in its absence. Continuing  the analogy, the hardware  store owner loses 
money in offering  a subsidy if his brother-in-law  uses the existence of 
the subsidy  to bargain  for a yet higher  wage. For example,  if the brother- 
in-law  bargains  for a wage increase  of DM 400 when the DM 1,000  EB is 
instituted,  a purchaser  of a shovel who would have hired  the brother-in- 
law in the absence of the EB will now be willing to pay only DM 600 
more for the shovel. The hardware  store owner, in this case, has lost 
DM 400. By analogy, subsidies given by the Treuhandanstalt  should 
ideally  not cause resultant  wage hikes. 
Figure  4 illustrates  the argument.  It shows that  the budgetary  benefits 
from  an EB to workers  on existing  Treuhand  capital  will be significantly 
lower, and perhaps  even ambiguous  in sign, if the EB results in wage 
increases. A larger  subsidy  must  be offered  to achieve the same  employ- 
ment gain (within existing Treuhand  firms) as in figure 3. In figure  4, 
compensation  rises  from  its initial  value, wo,  to w1  because  of the subsidy. 
However, only a portion of this compensation increase, JN, actually 
accrues  to workers  as higher  net pay. The remainder,  NR, returns  to the 
government  coffers as extra income tax and social insurance  payments. 
The size of the required  subsidy  is CR. (When  wages remain  unchanged, 
the size is merely  CJ.)  The net gain  to the workers  is thus  JKGIQN.  This 
program  has exactly the same effect on the revenue of the Treuhand  as 
before-it  realizes additional  revenue equal to the discounted  value of 
CFKJ from the sale of its properties. The program  also results in the 
same budgetary  savings from lower unemployment  as before (ABIG). 
Finally,  the social  benefits  of the program  are  also unchanged,  amounting 
to the trapezoid  ABFK. But the direct cost of the bonus program  is 
higher  than before by the amount  JLQN. The overall  budgetary  cost to 
the government  is  now  KHIQPNJ  -  ABFHG,  which  is  higher than 
before by the amount of the net pay hike-JLQN.  In this case the 
government  does not necessarily  make budgetary  gains. 
EB-induced wage increases will, similarly, increase the budgetary 
costs of increased  employment  on new investment. If unions are suffi- George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  79 
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ciently powerful, it is conceivable that the subsidy could simply raise 
the wages of workers  at the expense of the government  budget  without 
generating  any additional  employment at all. This is an extreme and 
unlikely  possibility, but the basic problem  is serious. 
It is possible, however, to design an employment  bonus scheme that 
eliminates  unions' incentives to raise wages and preserves employers' 
incentives to hire more labor. This is accomplished  by linking  the value 
of the bonus inversely to the wage. Such a linkage serves as a union- 
disciplinary  device because it raises the elasticity of labor demand, 
making  wage hikes more costly in terms  of reduced  employment. 
A third  objection  to wage subsidies  is that there  is no natural  time  for 
the program  to be terminated  and  thus it becomes self-perpetuating.  But 
subsidies  can be designed  that  automatically  phase themselves  out when 
no longer  needed. 80  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
The Self-Eliminating  Flexible  Employment Bonus  Program 
The goals of the Treuhandanstalt  should  be to privatize  its properties 
with simple contracts that (1) induce employers to hire workers who 
would otherwise be unemployed, (2) speed new investment, (3) do not 
cause budgetary  loss to the  government,  (4)  do not trigger  union  behavior 
that  would offset the beneficial  implications  of the contracts,  and  (5) are 
self-terminating  when no longer  useful. 
The self-eliminating  flexible employment bonus (SEFEB) program 
accomplishes  these objectives. Under this program,  a bonus would be 
offered  for the private  employment  of all workers  in East Germany.  The 
bonus is a specified fraction of initial compensation. But the bonus is 
flexible because its value is governed  by a formula  that depends  linearly 
on the gap between Eastern and Western  compensation.  The bonus is 
also self-eliminating  because its value falls to zero as wages in East 
Germany approach those in West Germany. With the plan in place, 
further  wage increases should  occur only as the economy recovers; the 
bonus will automatically  terminate as it ceases  to be useful. More 
specifically,  the bonus  at time t, b,, would  be determined  by the formula: 
b  -  wO[(w*  -  w,)I(w* -  wo)], where w, denotes Eastern compensation 
per  worker  at  time  t, wo  denotes  initial  Eastern  compensation,  w*  denotes 
Western  compensation  at  time  t, and  X  is the  desired  percentage  reduction 
in compensation  costs. 
These SEFEBs would serve five major  purposes. First, by changing 
the value of most East German  properties  from negative to positive, 
they would permit sale without scrappage. With the SEFEB plan in 
place, the Trust would simply sell its properties  to the highest bidder 
and liquidate  those that it still cannot sell. The scheme eliminates the 
need for detailed evaluations by the Trust of the employment and 
investment  plans of prospective  purchasers.  It would speed the process 
of privatization,  thereby  encouraging  restructuring  and  the introduction 
of market incentives. Second, SEFEBs will provide the appropriate 
incentives for firms to preserve existing  jobs and to create new ones, 
lowering  unemployment  substantially.  Third,  by taking  workers  off the 
unemployment  rolls, payments for unemployment  compensation will 
fall and revenue from the income tax, social insurance  contributions, 
and the sales of Treuhand  firms  will rise. Fourth, SEFEBs will reduce 
politically  undesired  migration  and  lower  the level of social  unrest.  Fifth, George A. Akerlof, Andrew  K. Rose, Janet L. Yellen, and Helga Hessenius  81 
SEFEBs will control excessive wage demands above and beyond the 
effect of introducing  market  incentives. Unions will have less reason to 
raise wages than with the usual form of wage subsidy because the 
SEFEBs will make labor  demand  more elastic; the beneficial  incentive 
effects for hiring  are less likely to be dissipated  in demands  for higher 
wages, and  the bonuses are less likely to result  in a budgetary  drain. 
In simple maximizing  models of union behavior, the SEFEB plan 
usually  makes  wages sticky  when unemployment  exists. Unions that  are 
concerned  about  employment  as well as wages have an added  incentive 
to keep wages low. If unions maximize the income of their employed 
members, and labor demand  is linear, a SEFEB will usually not result 
in any change  in wages. Unions seeking  to raise  wages above their  initial 
level encounter  a kink  in the labor  demand  schedule  at this point. Wage 
increases above this initial  level cause the bonuses to diminish  and thus 
the trade-off  of wages  for  employment  suddenly  worsens. Consequently, 
the initial  wage is usually a corner  solution  to the income maximization 
problem.  The SEFEB plan  makes  it difficult  for the union  to appropriate 
the quasi rents that the EBs create. As a consequence, these rents can 
be recouped by the Trust  from the sale of its property.  This makes the 
plan  attractive  from  a budgetary  perspective. Wages  will rise eventually 
in this model, when demand  and labor productivity  grow to the point 
that  there  is full  employment:  once that  has  occurred  unions  have nothing 
to gain by keeping wages low because employment is limited by the 
supply  of, and  not the demand  for, workers.145 
The SEFEB plan takes advantage  of the unions' concern about the 
disappearance  of jobs. In effect, it offers them a trade:  the unions can 
either  push for wage parity  and forgo the bonuses that will keep  jobs in 
East Germany or forgo the wage increases and keep the jobs.  The 
SEFEB makes the trade-off between jobs and wages stark, while it 
simultaneously creates incentives for management  to create and to 
continue  those  jobs. 
145. In this case, the availability  of labor  becomes  the condition  that  determines  labor 
usage. At each level of demand,  the unions  compare  the maximum  value of labor  income 
with and  without  the subsidy. Eventually,  when the wage has risen  sufficiently,  they find 
that labor  income is maximized  by forgoing  the bonuses. At this point wages are raised 
beyond the point where employment  bonuses are paid, and employment  falls to what it 
would  be in the absence of the program.  At no time, however, is employment  decreased 
by the payment  of the SEFEBs;  as long  as bonuses  are  paid,  employment  is always  larger. 82  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
In the current  round  of wage negotiations,  unions are bargaining  for 
rapid  achievement  of wage parity. In February,  as we noted above, IG 
Metall  signed  a pattern-setting  contract  granting  wage parity  in  just four 
years. Such contracts represent an absence of  any social contract 
between  government  and  workers.  Any  employment  bonus  plan,  SEFEB 
or otherwise, must be made  with the understanding,  implicit  or explicit, 
that  the government  is giving  bonuses to protect  jobs, and  that  unions  in 
turn should show wage restraint  in order to maintain  the viability of 
those jobs. We endorse any plan with such an understanding.  We offer 
the SEFEB as a suggestion because, relative to simpler employment 
bonus schemes, it makes the loss in employment  resulting  from higher 
wages clearer  and more automatic.  Thus unions have greater  incentive 
to abide  by their  part  of the social contract  than  with simple  employment 
bonuses. Thus  far, management  associations  of as yet unprivatized  firms 
have staged little resistance to demands  for wage parity. By allowing 
privatization,  SEFEB will install  profit-oriented  owners with an interest 
in resisting  unrealistic  wage increases. 
Two precedents  for an employment  bonus plan already  exist in East 
Germany. First, the Bundesanstalt  fur Arbeit has allocated DM 5.3 
billion  in its 1991  budget  for ajob creation  program.  The money will be 
used to pay the wages of previously  unemployed  workers, typically  for 
a year, and is expected to create temporary  jobs for at least 260,000 
workers. Second, the German  government  is currently  subsidizing  new 
jobs in the research  and  development  (R&D)  operations  of East German 
companies. Firms that create new R&D  jobs can get 60 percent of the 
gross wages of these employees for the first 15 months and 50 percent 
thereafter.  Thirty  million  deutsche  mark  are available  for such subsidies 
in 1991.146 
The SEFEB plan will not save every job in East German  industry. 
The 75 percent  SEFEB lowers the short-run  variable  cost of production 
for Kombinate  employing  77.2 percent of the workers below the price 
that  these Kombinate  were receiving  for the share  of their  output  sold in 
Western  markets.  But  it will  take  time  and  knowledge  of Western  markets 
before these firms  will be able to sell all of their output  at these prices. 
For viable firms,  the SEFEB shifts down the short-run  supply  curve so 
146.  See Suddeutsche  Zeitung,  March 18, p. 24, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
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that  their  short-run  average  variable  cost, J, is less than  the world  price, 
p* in figure  1. It thus eliminates  the price-cost squeeze for these firms.  It 
does not, however, affect  that  part  of the output  reduction  resulting  from 
the demand  shift. 
We intend SEFEBs to apply to all private, nonagricultural  employ- 
ment. Using 1989  figures  for employment, this would not include the 
more than  two million  government  and transport  workers.  These work- 
ers'jobs must  be protected  by adequate  subsidies  from  the  federal  budget 
to the Eastern  Lander and municipalities.  Nor does it protect most of 
the  almost  one millionjobs  in  agriculture.  147 In  the European  Community, 
agriculture  has its own forms of protection  and support. 
The SEFEB plan will not eliminate incentives for firms to lay off 
workers  not  needed  to produce  output;  through  its effect  on  privatization, 
the  plan  maintains  incentives  for  adopting  productivity-raising  measures, 
including  those that come about through  cuts in the work force. With 
SEFEBs, activities that have very low (or conceivably negative) value 
added  at world  prices should  and will  be discontinued.  A rational  means 
is created to allow market forces to decide which activities should 
continue in the East: activities should continue as long as they are 
profitable  when labor  is appropriately  priced-at  the social opportunity 
cost of labor, rather  than at the current  wage. In the absence of such a 
plan, the Trust will find itself with insufficient funds to  subsidize 
everything,  and decisions will be made on an ad hoc basis about which 
firms  to subsidize and which to shut down.'48  Such decisions should be 
made  by profit-maximizing  entrepreneurs;  they will instead  be made by 
the Trust.  The old socialist system under  the Central  Planning  Commis- 
sion of the GDR has been replaced  by a new system of central  planning 
under the Treuhandanstalt.  Indeed one of the strongest advantages  of 
the SEFEB program  is that it breaks the unsatisfactory  status quo by 
allowing  fast and  easy privatization,  thereby  speeding  restructuring  and 
the introduction  of market  incentives. 
We add three cautionary  notes about SEFEBs and our calculations. 
In our  budgetary  calculations,  we projected  the unemployment  compen- 
147. See Statistisches  Amt  der  DDR  (1990,  p. 125). 
148. For  example,  the shipyards  in Schwerin  and  Rostock  have  orders  from  the Soviet 
Union  that,  if filled,  will show losses. Should  these orders  be accepted?  A rational  way to 
decide is by seeing whether  these sales are profitable  when the costs are evaluated  using 
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sation  for the typical  worker  at 68 percent  for the indefinite  future.  This 
is based  on the  potentially  false  prediction  that  it  will  be difficult  politically 
to cut off benefits to Eastern workers because of the severity of the 
recession. A husband-wife,  two-child family under current  law would 
impose budgetary  costs on the German  government  of 53.6 percent of 
their previous compensation after two years of joint unemployment, 
rather  than  79.1 percent.  149 
A second assumption  that yields optimistic estimates of budgetary 
costs is that the SEFEB plan leaves migration  unaltered.  The SEFEB 
plan  will lower  migration  by creating  morejobs  in the East. Unemployed 
Eastern workers impose budgetary  costs on the German  government, 
whereas Easterners  who work  in the West impose no such costs as long 
as they do not displace Western workers from  jobs. But, given West 
German  fears about  migration  and  East German  reluctance  to move, the 
benefits  from decreased migration  are likely to be of the same order  of 
magnitude  as, if not greater  than, the offsetting increase in budgetary 
cost. Our calculations  therefore  understate  the budgetary  costs of the 
SEFEB plan but they also ignore  the perceived benefits  from  decreased 
migration  to the West. 
With  any successful bonus program  there will be incentives to locate 
activities  just across the border  to take advantage  of the subsidies.  '50 We 
do not see how this is avoidable. Of course few West German  workers 
will want to work at SEFEB wages, which will begin much lower than 
West German  wages, so there will be no incentive for West German 
labor to cross-migrate  to take advantage  of the wage subsidies. Still, 
there will be incentive for new investment to locate just across the 
border. The main border between East and West Germany  is, for the 
most part, relatively unpopulated.  The major  problem  occurs in West 
Berlin,  which  has two million  people. Until  now Berliners  have managed 
to be competitive with West Germany  with the help of subsidies from 
the federal government. West Berlin is now a boom area because of 
unification,  so the problems  caused  by the introduction  of a deep SEFEB 
may not be severe. If they turn  out to be serious, the special subsidies 
to West Berlin  and the border  areas, which were recently discontinued, 
can be reinstated. We view the border  area problem  as an unpleasant 
149. After one year of unemployment,  benefits decline from 68 to 58 percent  for a 
worker  with children  and  the overall  "replacement  ratio"  falls  from  79.1 to 72.6 percent. 
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side effect of the SEFEB plan-but,  given the severe distress  caused by 
the depression in East Germany, we consider it better to take the 
medicine  than  to avoid its side effects. 
Subsidies to Capital 
Many subsidy programs  for East Germany  have already  been insti- 
tuted. Most of these are subsidies for investment-not  for the use of 
labor.'51 The most important  of them are a 12 percent investment  grant 
for equipment,  accelerated depreciation  for equipment,  European  Re- 
covery Program  loans for new enterprises  and modernization  of enter- 
prises, and subsidized financing  for new enterprises.'52  Except in in- 
stances where the subsidies  are  for the modernization  of existing  capital 
that makes existing  jobs more productive, such policies fail to address 
the  problem  that  existing  firms  with  existing  capital  cannot  meet  expenses 
at current  wages. These subsidies  fail to solve the fundamental  problems 
both of privatization  (how can firms  with continuing  losses be sold?)  and 
of labor  usage (who wants to use labor  when the wage exceeds the value 
of its marginal  product?). 
Furthermore,  subsidies to capital give large incentives to activities 
that create relatively few jobs. The classic example of the failure of 
capital subsidies  to create  jobs is in the Italian  Mezzogiorno,  where the 
bulk  of expenditures  were taken  up  by the capital-intensive  metallurgical 
and chemical industries, with relatively few  backward linkages. A 
European  Economic Community  report  concluded  in 1979:  "What  has 
become blatantly obvious is the illogicality of financing  labor-saving 
undertakings  in a region  like the Mezzogiorno,  where  it is precisely  labor 
which is the overwhelmingly  abundant  factor of production."''53  The 
same statement  is equally  true substituting  will become for has become, 
and  East Germany  for the Mezzogiorno. 
Conclusion 
This paper  has analyzed  the great  depression  that  is occurring  in East 
Germany.  There  are two reasons  for this depression.  First, at the wages 
151. See Klodt  (1990b)  for a valuable  summary  of these programs. 
152. Accelerated  depreciation  on investment  in East Germany  is an important  aspect 
of the tax revisions  announced  in February  1991.  See U.S. Department  of State  Telegram 
on Financial  and  Economic  Developments  in Germany,  February  1-7, 1991. 
153. Commission  of the European  Communities  (1980,  p. 22). 86  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
paid  to East German  workers  there  is a price-cost  squeeze. East German 
firms  are unable to sell their goods at world prices and pay their short- 
run variable costs. Thus wages are too high for most firms to remain 
profitably  in business. Second, economic union was accompanied  by 
reductions in demand and shifts away from Eastern goods toward 
Western  goods. 
The two ultimate  solutions to the problems  in East Germany  will be 
the in-migration  of capital  with new technology  and  the out-migration  of 
labor. Capital is coming in-slowly.  Similarly, labor is going out- 
slowly. In our survey we found a significant  number  of people who will 
move-enough  to make  for a great  migration  when cumulated  over, say, 
a decade. But, still, the vast majority  of East Germans  want  jobs in East 
Germany  and  are  willing  to make sacrifices  to get thosejobs. Thus  many 
will wait in East Germany  for those jobs-unemployed.  The view that 
wages must be high to prevent migration  is unfounded. Rather, the 
higher  are wages, the greater  the price-cost squeeze, the more layoffs, 
and the fewer new jobs  from investment; thus the higher will be 
unemployment.  This unemployment  will be the real cause of most out- 
migration. 
The high  wages, and the price-cost squeeze, also make it difficult  for 
the Treuhandanstalt  to perform  its major  function  (which  is to privatize 
the East German  economy) unless it sells its properties  for their scrap 
or real-estate value. Few people want to own and operate firms with 
short-run  variable  costs that exceed their  revenue. 
This analysis suggests  that  there  is one variable  that  can and ought  to 
be changed:  the effective price  for using  labor.  In East Germany,  wages 
are above the market-clearing  level and rising  toward  parity  with those 
in the West. A social contract  is needed to keep wages from increasing 
further. In return  for wage restraint, employment bonuses should be 
given to save existing  jobs and to speed the creation of new ones. We 
propose a plan for SEFEBs-self-eliminating flexible employment  bo- 
nuses-which  will accomplish  this aim. A 75  percent  SEFEB plan  would 
make Kombinate  employing  three-quarters  of the industrial  work  force 
viable. The budgetary  cost will be low-possibly  even negative. 
Finally, we have emphasized the interdependence  of different  gov- 
ernmental  budgets: the attempt to cut one budget-for  example, the 
budget of the Treuhandanstalt-has spillovers to other budgets-for 
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because  of these spillovers,  the net budgetary  cost of additional  spending 
in the East is presently quite low. Thus, expansionary  governmental 
programs  and infrastructure  programs,  which create  jobs and  have high 
long-run  payoffs, can be carried  out at low cost now. Seldom have the 
causes of such a great economic event or the desirability of policy 
responses to it been more  clear. Comments 
and Discussion 
Rudiger Dornbusch: This paper by George Akerlof, Andrew Rose, 
Janet Yellen, and Helga Hessenius deserves more than perfunctory 
compliments:  it is the most thorough  assessment of the collapse of East 
Germany's  economy to date and contains the sharpest  policy recom- 
mendation.  Their  paper  is more than timely: Eastern  Europe  is looking 
for direction  in developing  transition  strategies,  and Western  optimism, 
and  even enthusiasm,  is waning  in the face of East Germany's  economic 
collapse. The costs of unification  have been staggering  and, not surpris- 
ingly, T-shirts  are appearing  in West Berlin that read "I want my wall 
back." 
The  authors arrive at  three central findings. First,  they  iden- 
tify and quantify two  main causes for the collapse in output and 
employment:  the shift  in demand  away from  East German  goods and  the 
sharp  increase in costs relative to prices. They identify the price-cost 
squeeze in particular  as the central  problem.  Second, the paper  uses an 
opinion  survey to establish  that  people would migrate  only as a result  of 
unemployment,  and not in response to wage differentials.  This finding 
points to the need to avoid unemployment. Third, from these two 
findings,  the authors  make the case for a wage subsidy. In fact, beyond 
arguing  that a wage subsidy would stabilize employment, they even 
demonstrate  that it would reduce  budget  deficits. 
Their advocacy of massive, economywide wage subsidization is 
breathtaking.  Without  the thorough  research  used to back it up, such a 
proposal would have been rejected out of hand; within the context of 
their well-reasoned  case, however, it becomes the most serious policy 
innovation yet proposed. The only alternative is a more aggressive 
pursuit  of a market  economy, if necessary with protracted  high unem- 
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ployment. In previous work I have developed this alternative  position, 
and so have some others.1 
In focusing  on the profit  squeeze as the reason  for economic  collapse, 
the authors  develop an especially interesting  point: they argue  that the 
conversion  rate, which was the center of much discussion, was not the 
critical consideration.  The choice of a 1:1 or a 3:1 ratio may not have 
made much difference. West German  unions, we are told, made a hard 
case for closing  the wage  gap  between  East and  West  and  moving  toward 
wage parity, and would have done so even without conversion at par. 
This point is important  because it recognizes that with unions we must 
suspend  the idea of wages clearing  the labor  market  and the notion that 
picking the right exchange rate is essential to avoid Keynesian unem- 
ployment  in a situation  where  wages might  be inflexible  downward.  With 
union  pressure  for wage  parity,  the issue becomes classical, or high  real- 
wage, unemployment.  The authors  correctly  emphasize  this interpreta- 
tion of the collapse and  hence rightly  dismiss  the controversy  still  raging 
in Germany  about  what  conversion  rate was appropriate.  Their  analysis 
clearly  singles out West German  unions as the villains  in the collapse. It 
is not an argument  the Bundesbank  will like. 
Now consider  the central  argument  of the paper, the case for a wage 
subsidy. Analytically  the argument  is perfect: from the social point of 
view, labor is a fixed cost. Either  the government  pays unemployment 
compensation  or it supports  employment  by a wage subsidy;  one way or 
the other, the government  will pay and hence the only question  is what 
is the best allocation of resources. The authors conclude that if the 
government  pays anyway, better  to squeeze a bit of work  out of the labor 
force than support  idleness. Their conclusion recalls the argument  in 
Western  Europe that the government  should  finance social security by 
lump-sum  taxes or expenditure  taxes, since social benefits  are citizens' 
rights  and not entitlements  based on employment.2  In that way, social 
security  taxes would  not become an obstacle  to employment.  In the case 
of Western  Europe  the argument  is very plausible;  it is far  less so in East 
Germany,  where transformation  of the economy is incomplete. With 
transformation  still on the agenda, wage subsidies risk fossilizing the 
status  quo in production  and employment. 
1. Dornbusch (1991); Schmieding  (1991); Siebert, Schmieding, and Nunnenkamp 
(1991). 
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The authors  lead us to believe that there are only two choices: high 
unemployment  and its resulting  migration  or the wage subsidy scheme. 
But there  is surely  a third  way. The third  way emphasizes  the need for a 
radical change in the landscape of production  and employment. East 
German firms are not organizations that ought to be nurtured  and 
preserved. The sooner they are broken up, the sooner we will see 
productivity  growth  and sustainable  real wage gains. We can think  of a 
firm  as valuable  when it possesses a good business organization  in terms 
of management  or labor, an unusual  product  that commands  rents, or a 
market  that  is privileged.  In East Germany  none of these qualities  apply 
to most firms. Business organization  is appalling:  the Kombinate are 
oversized firms  that deny the gains from trade and specialization;  they 
have incompetent  managers,  are highly  overstaffed,  and  produce  goods 
that no one wants. It is hard to see why policy should not focus on 
breaking  up these organizations  or, where there is a spark of hope, 
forcing  the  radical  shedding  of labor  in  order  to improve  competitiveness. 
The authors'  proposal,  while not encouraging  the status  quo outright, 
does accommodate it too much. While it does not actually subsidize 
unproductive  employment,  neither  does it force the squeeze. It is hard 
to believe that without a drastic squeeze adjustment  will happen  fast. 
But the fact is that at least a third  of workers, if not more, are currently 
in the wrong  job. Why  keep them  in an automobile  factory  if they should 
be flipping  hamburgers? 
The authors'  proposal  also raises the question of where the demand 
for current  East German  output  might  come from. Suppose  that  employ- 
ment stabilized  with moderate  unemployment.  There  has been a drastic 
fall in demand  for East German  goods at most prices, and for some at 
any price. East German  goods are regarded  as "lemons." They have 
even lost their  formerly  captive customers  in the East. Imagine  the East 
German  automobile,  the Trabant,  which is the same  price  as a Volkswa- 
gen Golf. It is just not plausible  that at such a price any Trabants  could 
be sold. The same  argument  holds  for  many,  if not most, goods produced 
in the East. The  radical  shift  of customers  away  from  East German  goods 
is as extreme  as it is understandable.  The  economic  implication  is equally 
clear:  East Germany  cannot  possible go on producing  the product  range 
of the  past. Arguing  that  they ought  simply  to upgrade  quality,  marketing, 
sales, and productivity  is unrealistic.  If that could be accomplished  by 
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if it were so easy China  could do it too. The fact is that most production 
will  have  to cease, and  brand  new  firms  must  be put  in  place  . Interestingly, 
that is precisely what Western  investors seem to be doing. They put up 
new plants  next to the old ones, bring  new capital  and  management  from 
the West, and hire a third of the plant's previous labor force. A wage 
subsidy  might  affect their  capital  intensity, but even that  is not clear. 
Starting  a guessing  game  as to which  firms  should  be rescued  by wage 
subsidies,  because their  products  might  stand  a chance, and  which  firms 
should  go recalls the prospect of a planning  mechanism.  East Germany 
has  surely  had  its share  of planning.  Thus,  the  current  situation  represents 
a state of limbo-planning without  socialism, capitalism  without  profits. 
The way forward should not be more planning, but something more 
radical. 
One alternative  is to accept a few years of massive unemployment, 
with its attendant  risk of mass migration.  We should simply recognize 
that in a few years most people will be producing  very different  goods 
and that a shakeup is inevitable. Unemployment,  job searches, and 
relocation  are the costs of reaching  a higher  productivity  level. 
The situation  resembles 1948, when West Germany  had to accom- 
modate  nearly 10  million  immigrants  in a short  period  of time. This was 
a period of hardship, and unemployment persisted at high, though 
declining, levels throughout  the early 1950s. But that hardship of a 
market  economy with few safety nets translated  into strong  growth in 
output and employment. The German  miracle of the postwar period 
started  with an emphasis on self-help, not with a British-style  welfare 
state or with a plan  like the authors'. West German  growth  in the 1950s 
averaged  5.9 percent against only 1.9 percent in the United Kingdom. 
Policies that  guard  against  risks to production  and employment  become 
a major  obstacle to the ultimate  upgrading  of the East. 
To conclude, let me suggest  a different  interpretation  of the situation 
in East Germany,  one that leads me to a different  conclusion from the 
authors'. A recent survey of the Institute of Applied Economics Re- 
search  reported  that  only one-eighth  of the firms  questioned  complained 
about  unreasonably  high  labor  costs.3 Firms  in the survey  identified  lack 
of demand  as the dominant  problem  (67 percent),  followed by financing 
(39 percent). Wage costs were seen as a problem  by only 12 percent of 
3. See Deutsche  Bank  (1991b). 92  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
the firms.  If this interpretation  is correct,  the solution  to East Germany's 
problem  is radically  different  from  what  the  authors  suggest.  The solution 
would be to bring  in, as rapidly  as possible, firms  from the West-with 
their products, management,  and markets-rather than try to maintain 
a semblance of East German identity. The emphasis would be on 
subsidizing the creation of firms rather than on the perpetuation  of 
current  employment.  Akerlof in an earlier  study taught  us that lemons 
may not be sold at any price; East Germany's economy is mostly a 
lemon.4  To get out of the conundrum,  a pooling equilibrium  with the 
West is essential. 
A competitive  market  may not readily  solve the problem  of relocating 
firms  to the East. There  is the option  of waiting  until  at least some of the 
uncertainty  about wages, the environment, subsidies, and the like is 
resolved. In the face of a coordination  issue, subsidizing  the creation  of 
new firms  offers more direct support  for solving the critical  bottleneck 
than  does excessive focusing on immediate  employment.  A subsidy  for 
firm  formation-not a subsidy for capital-intensive  technology-would 
also help improve East Germany's ability to compete for investment 
with countries  like Czechoslovakia,  where wages are much  lower. 
Manuel Guitian: This is a most interesting  paper, on which it has been 
a pleasure to comment.  1 George Akerlof, Andrew Rose, Janet Yellen, 
and Helga Hessenius describe starkly  the serious ills currently  afflicting 
the former  German  Democratic  Republic  (GDR). And they present an 
attractive strategy  for curing  them and thus engineer an East German 
"Wirtschaftswunder."  After having gone through  the text, I was left 
with the impression  that a better title would have been something  like: 
"East Germany  in, but not from the Cold: The Economic Aftermath  of 
Unification."  After all, the authors  argue  most persuasively  that what- 
ever it is that East Germany  has come in from, it certainly  is not from 
the cold; if anything,  the temperature  in the area has dropped.  And, as 
the opening paragraph  makes clear, the aftermath is not just from 
currency  union, but from  the broad  process of economic unification. 
4.  Akerlof  (1970). 
1. I would like to thank, but not implicate,  my colleague  Donogh McDonald  for his 
contribution  and  assistance  in the preparation  of these comments.  The views expressed  in 
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There is  much to  praise in this paper, not least the amount of 
information  and the wealth of analysis it provides on the situation in 
East Germany and its presentation of a simple, yet powerful policy 
proposal. But, attracted  as I was to the suggestions in the paper, on 
reflection  I found  myself not wholly persuaded  by them. Faced with this 
quandary,  I decided to stress the reasons for my skepticism, believing 
that the very importance  of the paper's  policy recommendations  makes 
it imperative  to question the robustness  of the underlying  analysis. For 
all these reasons, my comments conform more to those of a doubting 
Thomas  or a devil's advocate than  to those of a convinced  reader.  But I 
stress from the outset that the strength  of my doubts should  be viewed 
as a tribute  to the quality  of the paper. 
There can be no disagreement  with the authors' description  of the 
severe downturn  in East Germany.  The additional  data provided  in the 
paper  confirm  it beyond any doubt. According  to the authors,  there are 
two fundamental  causes behind  the depression:  a contraction  in aggre- 
gate demand and a divergence between prices and wage costs. The 
strategy  to deal with them follows inevitably:  government  spending  to 
stimulate  demand  and wage subsidies to correct for the distorted  price 
of labor. In the abstract,  the reasoning  behind  their strategy  is straight- 
forward.  But does it fit well with the concrete case of East Germany? 
The analysis in the paper is appropriate  for a Keynesian downturn 
resulting  from  a cyclical reduction  in aggregate  demand.  Yet, what East 
Germany  confronts is a permanent  shift in demand  out of its domestic 
products  in favor of foreign  goods. I will not deny that there may be an 
element of global demand failure in the Keynesian sense; after all, 
consumers' shift away from East German products may have been 
exaggerated  (a Dornbuschian  overshooting, so to speak) and the same 
may have been the case with investment spending. If so, part of the 
demand  failure  may  be transitory  and  as such the paper's  analysis  would 
be eminently  applicable  to it. But part  of the demand  decline reflects a 
structural  shift to foreign  commodities, with domestic suppliers  unable 
to compete in their production.  The temporariness  of this shift is not 
obvious and the analysis in the paper is therefore  less applicable  to it. 
Still,  given  the complementary  nature  of public  infrastructure  and  private 
capital, the paper's advocacy of an expanded program  of public infra- 
structural  investment is well founded; other things equal, such public 
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I now turn to the other major  element of the paper's diagnosis and 
strategy: the distorted price of labor and its correction through the 
introduction  of a wage subsidy. The reasoning  behind such a subsidy 
would  be unassailable  if the high  level of wages were the only distortion 
afflicting the East German economy. In such a case,  as the paper 
contends, the subsidy  would  correct  the distortion  and  that  would  be the 
end of the story. But the appropriateness  of such a proposition  in the 
East German  context is questionable, to say the least. Among other 
reasons, the activities  of the Treuhandanstalt  cast doubts  on it by helping 
keep afloat  firms  that have little, if any, hope of becoming  viable. Even 
potentially  viable firms  should  be improving  efficiency, a fact that, in its 
preoccupation  with the maintenance  of employment, the Treuhandan- 
stalt is likely to have overlooked. 
These considerations support  my impression that the paper would 
benefit from more emphasis on the institutional setting of the East 
German  economy, particularly  the role of economic policy as a factor 
behind  the events unfolding  in the journey toward  the establishment  of 
a market. For understandable  reasons (most eloquently laid out in the 
paper), the Treuhandanstalt  could hardly avoid acting like a public 
employment  agency; as a consequence, however, this agency has done 
relatively  little  to promote  structural  adjustment  in the  economy. Though 
mentioned  in the paper, issues related to property  rights and environ- 
mental  problems  warrant  a more  in-depth  discussion,  as does the wisdom 
of extending West German  labor legislation (and other aspects of the 
regulatory  environment)  to East Germany.  All these have  been obstacles 
to employment  creation  and to the promotion  of behavioral  changes in 
the East. Administrative  weaknesses have been reported  that undoubt- 
edly have slowed down infrastructural  programs.  These factors  together 
cannot  but have failed to encourage  private  investment. 
An analysis that stresses key institutional shortcomings and that 
deepens  the scrutiny  of the  Treuhandanstalt  would  help  to focus attention 
on the role and responsibility  of economic policy. Instead, the paper 
treats the prevailing  economic distortions  as exogenous to policy. As a 
result, important  questions are overlooked or left out, such as whether 
it is possible to make behavior conform to the market  without perma- 
nently severing  the ties with the previous system of central  planning,  or 
whether a market  setting can be created when (no matter  how under- 
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whether  an efficient  financial  intermediation  system can be established 
with banks  lending  under  government  guarantee. 
I will now turn to a number  of specific subjects in the paper. The 
section on the price-cost  squeeze contains  an impressive  examination  of 
the cost structure  of East German  firms. It also provides a vivid and 
revealing image of an economy woefully unprepared  to confront the 
threat  of competition.  But  caution  must  be exercised  in  the interpretation 
of the data; a few examples will suffice. The paper  is certainly  right  in 
asserting  that preunification  domestic prices in East Germany  provide 
no basis for establishing the value of output. But the statement that 
prices obtained  for exports  give "a good measure  of the viability  of East 
German  firms under free trade" may go too far. To begin with, those 
firms  had  export targets,  the achievement  of which most likely required 
some reliance  on "dumping."  Similarly,  the reliability  of reported  cost 
data may well be suspect since profits  were largely  appropriated  by the 
government.  Care should also be taken, I think, to avoid overstressing 
the degree  of initial  weakness  of East German  industry.  I agree  that  firms 
were vulnerable  and  that  their  vulnerability  has probably  increased  since 
unification;  there  can hardly  be any  doubt  of their  disadvantaged  position 
at the outset of the process. But, whatever the starting  point, it was a 
feature  of the initial  state  of affairs  and  attention  must  be directed  instead 
to the policy-induced worsening of the economic situation of East 
Germany. 
Caveats  also apply  to the discussion  of consumption,  investment,  and 
the multiplier.  Real aggregate  consumption  has been maintained,  if not 
actually increased, through substantial income transfers from West 
Germany.  In addition, the data presented on private investment pros- 
pects for this year may well exaggerate the weakness in investment 
plans. Moreover,  on the basis of current  plans, public  sector investment 
(including  railways  and telecommunications)  may be close to the upper 
end (DM 55 billion)  of the range  mentioned  in the paper. In any event, 
taking  account  of the decline in investment-good  prices, real  investment 
may now exceed its preunification  level. Here again, this is not to say 
that  the evolution  of private  investment  so far  has  not  been  disappointing. 
It has, but the uncertainty over property rights and environmental 
problems combined with the cost, in terms of new production, of a 
possibly  unsustainable  concern  for employment  maintenance  must  have 
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overstress the output effects and understress the budget impact of 
government spending. Possibly, too much is made of scenarios that 
stress  low import  content  or  of the share  of profits  that  accrues  to publicly 
owned firms.  Nevertheless, as I pointed out earlier,  the case for public 
investment  in infrastructure  is strong  on efficiency  grounds. 
The paper  contains  a most lucid  discussion  of the possible reasons  for 
the rapid wage growth that has taken place in East Germany since 
unification.  All of them-fairness  of wage parity,  labor  union pressure, 
compensation for higher deductions, the search for a high base for 
unemployment  benefits,  and  the absence of effective resistance  to union 
wage demands-are eminently  plausible. But they are not complete. A 
fundamental  force behind wage behavior-which  is barely, if at all, 
touched upon in this paper-surely  has been the Treuhandanstalt's 
unwillingness  to countenance high open unemployment  and to close 
down plants (though,  as already  noted, this attitude  is understandable). 
This has created a fertile environment for large wage demands, an 
environment  that, as the paper  makes abundantly  clear, East Germany 
can ill afford.  Incidentally,  the argument  that  bargaining  centers  on wage 
increases seems to be in conflict with the general thrust of the paper, 
which underscores  the importance  of wage level differentials.  In this 
context, let me leave no doubt that, in my opinion, the argument  that 
points to the relatively  limited  importance  of the one-to-one  conversion 
rate on the grounds  of the pronounced  rise in wages in East Germany 
after  currency  union  is valid. 
Possibly the subject  where I depart  most from  the paper's  analysis  is 
with regard  to the Treuhandanstalt.  I have no doubt that its mandate  is 
nothing  short of daunting.  But the assertion  that the "Trust  is acting in 
the country's best interest by promoting  employment  as an objective" 
not only stretches the mandate too far, but is open to question as a 
general  proposition.  No wonder  the authors  are compelled  to follow up 
with an acknowledgment  that on "this basis, though,  the firms  are very 
hard  to sell." Has it really  been in the interest  of East Germany  that  the 
pace of plant closures has been so slow, given that a large share of 
industry  is hopelessly  unviable?  Do not misunderstand:  I do not  advocate 
unemployment;  but reform  is not helped by preserving  employment  in 
unsalvageable  firms.  Rather  than  operating  in the best interests of East 
Germany, the Treuhandanstalt  has helped to encourage high wage 
claims, thus  frustrating  market  signals  and  impeding  the restructuring  of 
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Much of the paper's case depends on East German  wages being too 
high  to clear the market.  If the authors'  survey of East German  labor  is 
to be believed, this imbalance  has not been caused by linkage  with the 
West German  labor market. At the risk of appearing  callous, let me 
venture  to argue  that  perhaps  the threat  of unemployment  should  be one 
of the instruments  used to keep excessive wage claims under control. 
Such a threat, accompanied by the certainty of the availability of 
appropriate  unemployment benefits, might provide a more efficient 
solution  to the labor  market  imbalance. 
These considerations  lead directly  into the paper's  proposal  for a self- 
eliminating  flexible  employment  bonus (SEFEB), which, as I said at the 
outset, has obvious merits. Its net financial  cost will be limited  because 
of the consequent savings on unemployment  compensation  as well as 
the taxes and contributions  made by and on account of the otherwise 
unemployed.  Society will gain  when idle labor  can be used productively. 
And, although  all employed  labor  would  benefit  from  the bonus, this will 
not impair  firms  in the Treuhandanstalt  portfolio  because their  value will 
correspondingly  rise. Indeed, if wages do not increase  on account  of the 
bonus, the government  may in fact make  a net gain out of the scheme. 
But let us examine  the case closely. If the bonus is to be paid  to firms 
across all sectors and not just to those in industry (so as to avoid 
distortions  in labor  allocation),  the budgetary  cost of the scheme would 
be higher  than the paper suggests. Furthermore,  the cost of the bonus 
will in any event increase  because unemployment  benefits  decline after 
the first year while SEFEBs continue until the establishment  of wage 
parity. Moreover, there is no reason to presume that those employed 
because  of the subsidy  would  have remained  unemployed  in its absence. 
Finally, as the paper acknowledges, there is a real possibility that the 
introduction  of the bonus  will lead  unions  to press  for  even higher  wages, 
thereby  endangering  the  financial  viability  of the scheme.  The  importance 
of the cautionary  notes made explicit in the paper with regard  to the 
SEFEB scheme and its calculations  must  be stressed. 
A most appealing  feature of the SEFEB plan is its self-liquidating 
nature,  but subsidies will only fully disappear  after (or if) wages reach 
parity.  Yet the paper  does not make  clear  how the scheme will affect the 
incentives to narrow  the productivity  gap between East and West, let 
alone how long it would  take  for the gap  to be closed. It would  have been 
desirable for the paper to discuss further certain critical aspects of 
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only serve to prolong  the demise  of decaying  industries?  How fast would 
unemployed  labor  be gainfully  occupied without  SEFEBs? 
In a real sense, the wage subsidy  scheme resembles  attempts  made  to 
reform  central  planning  partially,  that  is, without  fundamentally  changing 
the regime. Instead of focusing on the need to revamp the industrial 
sector, a need increasingly perceived as essential to the process of 
reform,  the SEFEB plan  may  only serve to perpetuate  it. Is it reasonable 
to expect the development of entrepreneurial  spirit, so critical for the 
transition  to the market,  to occur in such an environment? 
Then, there are a number  of practical  considerations  worth noting. 
The temporariness  of subsidy schemes is typically easier to assert than 
to ensure. Moreover,  the complexity  of such schemes is often underes- 
timated:  a clear illustration  is provided  in the paper's acknowledgment 
that the effects of SEFEBs on border areas between East and West 
Germany  may call for the reinstatement  of the special border  subsidies 
prevailing  before unification  (thus paradoxically  converting  old "costs 
of division" into new "costs of unification").  All these considerations 
aside, is it logical  to start  ajourney to the market  system by introducing 
subsidies  that  are  likely to endure  for long? Have employment  subsidies 
ever worked?  Last, will West German  voters countenance  subsidizing 
East German  wages for a protracted  period? 
In sum, attractive  though  the SEFEB plan  appears,  it is doubtful  that 
it will function as the paper describes. Not only will its cost rise over 
time, but it will most likely create  distortions  that  impede  the process of 
'creative destruction"  required  for reform  to succeed. 
General Discussion 
Christopher  Sims reasoned  that  in order  to determine  the appropriate 
policies, it is necessary first to decide if unification  will lead to a brief 
transition in which the East adjusts its employment and production 
according to comparative  advantage  or whether it will lead to a long 
transition  during  which a large  number  of workers  will move west while 
infrastructure,  capital, and environmental  investment gradually  trans- 
form  East Germany.  If the new equilibrium  is one in which  a lot of people 
have to move and reservation  wages are high, it may take high unem- 
ployment to achieve the needed reallocation.  Thus it could be that the 
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where the wage is now. In this case, the correct policy may be to 
subsidize  mobility  rather  than  to subsidize  wages. 
Although  he agreed that the unions go too far when they press for 
equality  between  Eastern  and  Western  wages, Edmund  Phelps  observed 
that wages in East Germany would have risen even without union 
intervention,  although  perhaps  not as much. Personnel  managers  in the 
East would raise wages to keep from losing workers to the West. He 
compared  the situation  to that  in  the south  of Italy,  where, he maintained, 
the unemployment  rate has been kept high because of wage pressure 
from the North. Andrew Rose responded  that Eastern firms  have had 
very few problems with workers quitting, and there was no survey 
evidence supporting  the idea that East Germans  felt it was unfair  for 
them  to be paid  less than  workers  in the West. Gary  Burtless  questioned 
the authors'  discussion of the effects of the subsidy  on union  bargaining. 
While  the subsidy  makes  the demand  for Eastern  labor  more  elastic, the 
unions have a Western  worker  as a median  voter. Thus, depending  on 
how the unions take into account the welfare  of an Eastern  worker, the 
increased  elasticity may not have much  effect on their  bargaining. 
Sims was also concerned that the border  problem, whereby a large 
wage subsidy  induces  firms  near  the border  to jump to the East, may be 
bigger than the authors acknowledge. William  Nordhaus discussed a 
number  of other  potential  difficulties  with  the  policy  proposals.  A subsidy 
scheme could slow the introduction  of market attitudes in the East. 
Furthermore,  subsidies  may  not  be fully  capitalized,  making  the  program 
more  expensive than  estimated.  The policy is not robust  to mistakes  by 
policymakers. For example, if the government found the proposed 
phaseout of subsidies too complicated and instead chose a fixed per- 
centage subsidy, it would undermine  the whole scheme. And, unlike a 
tax  credit,  the  policy  would  be susceptible  to bogus  employment  schemes 
because it violates a principle of public finance to "never give a net 
subsidy." Charles Schultze suggested the scheme include a super- 
majority  clause to reduce  the temptation  to keep the subsidy  rather  than 
forcing  it to phase out. 
There  was a broad  discussion of whether  a wage subsidy  would slow 
the needed transition  by preserving existing inefficient  firms. Robert 
Lawrence noted that the goods-producing  sector of the economy was 
much  too large, so that  many  people are going  to have to leave the firms 
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tion be given to the trade-off between maintaining  employment and 
getting to the creative destruction.  Referring  to the British experience 
with state enterprises,  William  Brainard  reasoned that overmanning  in 
East German  concerns was likely to have cut labor  productivity  to half 
of what efficient  manning  would produce. Combined  with the apparent 
overproduction  of the goods sector, this made it unclear  whether, even 
with the subsidy, employment  in this sector could expand at all once 
firms became efficient. Nordhaus noted that by focusing only on the 
short-run  costs of production,  the analysis of subsidies does not get at 
the questions  of encouraging  investment  and  technology  transfers  within 
Germany  and  could even impede  them  by keeping  inefficient  firms  alive. 
Rudiger  Dornbusch  found it misleading  to treat the state enterprises 
as  having any value worth saving. He  noted that in the Mexican 
experience two out of three state enterprises  were closed and argued 
that similar closures had to occur in East Germany. Dornbusch also 
cited a recent survey in which only one in eight East German  firms 
complained of unreasonably  high labor costs. He suggested that the 
wage situation  may be radically  different  across firms,  with the authors' 
sample of the Kombinate representing  the extremely inefficient  firms 
that should be destroyed. The problems  of most firms  in the East may 
be due more  to low demand  than  to high  wages. 
Some panelists reasoned that the subsidy scheme would speed the 
transition to  the market. Schultze believed that it would promote 
investment by Western firms that would otherwise be inhibited by 
excessively  high wages. He pointed out that it is better to provide 
incentives for Western  management  to come in and promote  efficiency 
than to count on high unemployment  to push down wages. Burtless 
agreed  that  the subsidy  would  not discourage  innovation  and  investment 
in the East, because it would go to new firms as well as old. George 
Akerlof reiterated that a subsidy would speed up the transition by 
making  it possible to sell existing  firms  to private  sector investors. 
Nordhaus  calculated that the paper implied  that central planning  in 
Germany  had been even more disastrous  economically  than  previously 
thought. Whereas most calculations before unification placed East 
German per capita income between 60 and 90 percent of the West 
German  level, the authors'  results  suggest  a figure  of about 12.5  percent. 
Assuming  the two Germanys  had  roughly  equal  incomes at the introduc- 
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the East compounded  over 40 years relative to West Germany.  While 
he found this number  hard  to believe, and reasoned that the short-run 
observations  may  be misleading  because of pent-up  demand  for Western 
goods, he did believe the authors'  data showed that previous estimates 
overstated  real  incomes in the East rather  drastically. 
Nordhaus  also noted that the present difficulties  of the Treuhandan- 
stalt demonstrated  the importance  of rapid  privatization  and cautioned 
against  interpreting  the German  experience  as demonstrating  that "big- 
bang" as opposed to "step-by-step" policies will not work. He felt the 
correct analogy was more akin to Britain's  return  to gold at the wrong 
exchange  rate in the 1920s.  Lawrence  Katz noted two historical  experi- 
ences that had relevance for the situation  in Germany.  Prior  to the late 
1960s, Puerto Rico enjoyed free migration  between it and the United 
States. There were huge income and wage differences, but unemploy- 
ment  was low and  Puerto  Rico was thought  to be converging  toward  the 
United States. Once the U.S. minimum  wage was extended to Puerto 
Rico and food stamps were distributed  at U.S. levels, unemployment 
rose in Puerto Rico and has remained  at extremely high levels for the 
last 20 years. This suggests that imposing  high wages and benefits  with 
no wage subsidy  can lead to very persistent,  poor  labor  market  perform- 
ance. The second experience demonstrates  that employment  bonuses 
can pay for themselves. In Illinois  and Washington,  the Reemployment 
Bonus Experiment  provided  subsidies  to firms  and bonuses to workers 
for taking  jobs if the worker  got off the unemployment  insurance  rolls. 
In at least some of these programs,  the government  did end up saving 
money. 
Robert Barro applied the results of his paper with Xavier Sala-i- 
Martin  (BPEA, this issue) to the prospects for income and migration  in 
East Germany.  Assuming  initial  per capita income in the West is twice 
that in the East and using a convergence  coefficient  of 2 percent  a year, 
he calculated that per capita income in the East should grow by 1.4 
percent  a year faster than in the West. At this rate, half the income gap 
would  be closed in 35 years, implying  that  any program  that  sought  wage 
parity  in less than  50 years was doomed  to fail. Assuming  capital  income 
is also twice as high in the West, his migration  estimates imply  that 1.4 
percent  of the East German  population,  or a quarter  of a million  people, 
would have moved west in the first year after the border  was opened, 
which is the same order  of magnitude  as the reported  migration  rate. 102  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
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